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The African Union (AU) in response to the many violent conflicts that had erupted on the 
continent endorsed the agreement with regards to the formation of a Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) in Durban in July 2002 and this became operational as the African Union 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in December 2003.  The AU has sought to develop 
capacities for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building to deal with endemic conflict on 
the continent, but all of these is limited in their reach and effect. The AU has noted the 
challenges to its peacekeeping efforts, therefore cooperation with the United Nations has been 
one way to address these challenges. The African Union and the United Nations are presently 
collaborating in peace keeping missions in Somalia (AMISOM), Darfur (UNAMID) and the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This thesis focused on AU peacekeeping capacity and 
specifically on how the cooperation between the AU and UN, has worked in practice and 
contributes to the discussion on peacekeeping operations as an effective mechanism of 
resolving conflicts in Africa. This thesis accessed new areas such as the strategic nature of the 
African state, international interest and involvement in the AU-UN peacekeeping operations 
in Darfur, Somalia and CAR, legitimacy issues, such as the local ownership of the peace 
operations, impact of Armed no state actors on peacekeeping operations in Africa, using 
Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic where the AU and UN are 
involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations to assess that. This thesis adopted a case 
study and qualitative paradigm which involved a structured gathering , presentation, analysis 
of data on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic and adopted the 
collective security theory as its theoretical framework. This thesis finds out that seven factors 
such as funding, mandates that are clear and achievable, the doctrines of the United Nations 
peacekeeping, external actors, regional dimension of the conflict, issues of legitimacy, 
acceptance, local ownership, the roles of Africa’s regional economic communities and 
coordination between them and the African Union, the activities of armed non-state actors 
impacted significantly on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African 
Union and the United Nations in Africa. This thesis recommends increased collaboration and 
coordination amongst the African Union, the United Nations and Africa’s regional economic 
institutions. 
Keywords: African Union, United Nations, African Union Peace and Security Architecture, 
Peace and Security Council. Somalia, Darfur. Central African Republic, Peacekeeping. 
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In 2001, the Organisationsation of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African 
Union  and in July 2002, in Durban, the African Union established the African Union Peace 
and Security Council to respond to the several violent conflicts that had erupted on the 
continent. This resulted to the formation of the African Union Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) in December 2003 comprising of the following conponents, the African 
Union peace and Security council, African Standy force, the Continental Early Warning 
system, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund, all key components of this architecture 
(Vines, 2013:22).  
Inspite of the formation of these security instruments the continent remains vulnerable to 
conflict, with terrorism, war and political violence the core of Africa’s security challenge 
(Bugnacki, 2015). In 2019 the Global Peace Index (GPI) came out with the list of 162 nations, 
ranked according to lack of conflicts or violence. This list created by the Institute of 
Economic Peace (IEP), analysed by the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), listed Somalia as 
number 158, Libya 156, South Sudan 161 and the Central African Republic 157 (Ventura, 
2020). This analysis indicate increasing conflict on the continent of Africa, resulting to the 
African Union trying to develop capacities for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
as a solution to increasing conflict on the continent although with limitations towards 
achieving this security goals (Makinde, Okumu and Mickler, 2015: 131).  
Among the limitations and challenges of the African Union in peacekeeping are lack of 
institutional capacity with regards to troops deployment, development of policy plans, 
management of peacekeeping operations and lack of adequate funds needed to make its 
security architecture functional (AU 2012; Vorrath 2012). Therefore, the African Union had 
to establish peacekeeping cooperation with the United Nations to address some of its 
peacekeeping challenges. In 2013, the African Union developed a framework for cooperation 
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with the United Nations and its stakeholders (AU, 2013), comprising of the following 
components:  
• An annual joint consultations of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
and the Security Council of the United Nations which commenced in 2006. 
• The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the United Nations facilitating the Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union in advisory in areas such as sanctions 
committee, institutional memory building coupled with assistance in maintainance of 
peace to the Gender Directorate of the African Union.  
• The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the United Nations facilitating the 
African Union secretariat of its Peace and Security Council since 2008 in Joint Task 
Force of the AU/UN, Bi-annual Joint Task Force based on discussions on peace and 
security, political regional developments, responses on the prevention and 
management of conflicts with all based on mutual sharing.  
• The building of capacity and assisstance in mediation in areas such as strategic policy 
development, institutional knowledge management, strategic policy development, 
institutional knowledge management, lessons learned and tools, development of an 
African Union mediation strategy, electoral assistance, advise on democractic 
principle, trying to make functional the panel of the wise coupled with the 
establishment of the United Nations office of the African Union (UNOAU) which was 
formed in 2010 with the following goals;  
• Enhancement of the collaboration on peace and security between the African Union 
and the United Nations. 
• Provision of coordination, advise based on long term capacity building with 
operational support on a short term basis to the African Union by the United Nations 
(UN, 2014). 
On the 7th December 2011, the AU/UN Multidisciplinary mission to the Sahel was 
established (UN, 2012), followed by the African-led international support mission in Mali 
(AFISMA). In June 2012, the African-led Regional cooperation initiative against the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) was established (Boutellis and Williams, 2013:8), all the above are 
joint peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations. Since the 
outbreak of the conflict in Somalia (1991), Darfur (2003), therre have been literatures on the 
collaboration in peacekeeping missions in Africa between the African Union and the United 
Nations.  (Deconing, Gelot and Karlsrud 2015; O’Hanlan and Singer 2004; Vorrath 2012; 
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Williams 2010), argued that factors such as financial and logistical constraints, African Union 
weak bureaucratic capabilities, affect the African Union’s decision making abilities on the 
strategic, operational and tactical aspects of its peacekeeping cooperation with the United 
Nations. Using the Central African Republic as an example, the African-led international 
support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) had an earlier take over by the 
United Nations because of inadequate funding.  
Therefore, several scholars came out with their various views, (Boutellis and Williams, 2013) 
is of the view that one of the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in Africa is the nature of regional arrangements and its ambiquity 
that failed to distinguish between regional and sub-regional arrangements. Structural balances 
as an impediment were postulated by (Derblom, 2008), (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg 
2004; Murithi 2009; Sanderholm, Moller, Simion and Hallonsten 2012), viewed the different 
peacekeeping doctrines and approaches as an impediment to effective peacekeeping 
collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations. Using the crisis in Libya (2011) 
and Mali (2012) as a case study, (Alfredo, 2013) argued that this case study presented a clear 
instance of intra-AU dynamics. The views of the African Union was different to those of 
ECOWAS and SADC and were inconsistent and contradictory with regards to the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973 over Libya.  
Therefore, most of the literature on African Union collaboration with the United Nations on 
peacekeeping missions in Africa focused mainly on the financial, military and bureaucratic 
aspect of this cooperation but have failed to deal with the origin of the crisis in Somalia, 
Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic such as poverty, underdevelopment, weak 
and failed states and crisis of development and the political aspect of this cooperation on 
peacekeeping of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. Although more studies 
have been conducted on the collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations 
on peacekeeping operations in Africa. This thesis focus on areas this studies failed to cover 
such as issues of mandate, local ownership and most importantly the activities of armed non-
state actors and their impact on the effectiveness of this peacekeeping collaboration. Issues of 
poverty and underdevelopment although not the focus of this thesis are the root causes of 
conflicts in Africa. A peacekeeping operation, a key area of the AU’s engagement in peace 
and security is therefore in need of an in-depth review. This thesis will focus on AU’s 
peacekeeping capacity and specifically on how the cooperation between the AU and UN, 
outlined above, has worked in practice. Also, while some of the factors outlined above could 
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be some of the reasons limiting the effectiveness of the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in 
Africa, this thesis will assess new areas such as the strategic nature of the African state with 
regards to ethnicity and religion, international interest and involvement in the AU-UN 
peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and CAR, legitimacy issues, such as the local 
ownership of the peace operations, role of the civil societies and the impact of the root causes 
of the conflict, using Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic where the AU 
and UN are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations to assess that. 
 
1.1. Statement Of The Research Problem 
The AU, acting on its own and in concert with the UN has constructed ambitious institutional 
arrangements for order-keeping in Africa through both military and non-military means. 
These ambitions are hindered by a number of shortcomings including financial, logistic and 
bureaucratic weakness, ambiguities in the UN’s peacekeeping arrangements under its charter, 
differences of approach between the UN and AU, rivalries between African regions and 
states. 
Another challenge confronting the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping in Africa is Intra-AU 
rivalries, principally among the African Union and the Regional Economic Commissions 
(RECs). Where the AU and RECs adopted different policies such as happened with the AU 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during the crisis in Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2010-2011, Mali in 2012 these differences complicate the cooperation between the 
UN and AU. This was evident in the crisis in Libya between the AU, the South African 
Development Community (SADC), Sahel and the AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia 
and Mali. There are also the political and strategic calculations of the AU and the UN, several 
African states feel that the views of the AU are not always respected and as a result refuse to 
be involved in AU-UN peacekeeping operations. The UN on its part feel that AU member 
states are not united on key issues and are slow to act on urgent matters (UN, 2012). The 
African United and the United Nations are collaborating in peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, Darfur (Sudan and the Central African Republic and this peacekeeping operations 
are facing several challenges impacting on its effectiveness, therefore this thesis while 
reviewing some of these arguments, also review other areas that most studies neglected such 
as issues over mandates, ownership of this peacekeeping operations between the African 
Union andthe United Nations, legitimacy issues and entire new areas sure as activities of 
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armed non-state actors on the effectiveness of this peacekeeping collaboration. An analysis of 
the literature on peacekeeping operations in Africa acknowledges the fact that lack of 
adequate funding, over dependence on external donors, coupled with bureacratic and 
logistical constraints on the part of the African Union impact on the African Union 
peacekeeping operations and necessitiated collaborative peacekeeping operations with other 
international organisations such as the United Nations in Africa, 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The objectives of the present study are: 
1. To what extent does the collaboration between the African Union and the United 
Nations affect the success of peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the 
Central African Republic.  
2. To examine the failures, successes, differences and similarities of the Africn Union 
and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa using Somalia, Darfur 
(Sudan) and the Central African Republic as case study. 
3. To identify lessons for future cooperative interventions. 
 
1.3. Significance Of The Study 
The significance of this thesis lies in its contribution to the field of peacekeeping 
operations in Africa and the the prospects for peace and security on the African 
continent. The desire to execute this research emanated from the realization that for the 
past decade, Africa has become the principal continent for UN peace keeping operations 
and of the thirteen (13) peace keeping operations presented under the authority of  the 
UN department of peace keeping operations, (7) are in Africa (Blanchfied, Arieff and 
Blanchard, 2019). Unfortunately only few have been successfully handled or result in 
lasting peace. The AU-UN peace keeping operations while desirable are facing several 
challenges limiting its effectiveness. 
This thesis offers ways to improve the cooperation in peacekeeping for the African Union 
and the United Nations to achieve more successful burden sharing and a unity of effort 
that is indispensable in bringing peace and development to Africa. Therefore it is hoped 
that the findings of this research will lead to further research in the area of institutional 
6 
 
cooperation on peace and security. The insights gained from an in-depth qualitative study 
should assist in developing strategies and policy for organizational collaboration in 
peacekeeping. 
Applying comparative methods will introduce comparative methodology to the study of 
institutional collaboration and supplement local work done recently in the general field of 
peacekeeping. Also the management of conflict is the most serious challenge facing the 
AU and conflict within ‘failed states’ is one of the most serious obstacles to Africa’s 
aspirations for growth and continental (or even regional) integration. This, the subject of 
this proposed research is central to Africa’s prospects for peace and security. 
 
1.4.   Research Questions 
 
1. How do the AU/UN Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the 
Central African Republic illustrate the effectiveness and failures of AU/UN 
Peacekeeping operations? 
2. What do the AU/UN Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the 
Central African Republic have in common and how do they differ? 
3. What is the prognosis for future cooperation between the two bodies and how could 
the prognosis be improved to bring about effectiveness in peacekeeping operations in 
Africa.  
 
1.5. Scope Of The Study 
The sphere of this study is on cooperation on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa of the 
African Union and the United Nations  with Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic 
as the field of study. This is mainly because the peacekeeping operations in these countries 
are models of cooperative peacekeeping operations. We shall focus mainly on the African 
Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to 2016, the United Nations-African Union 
mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from 2007 to 2016 and the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) from 2014 to 
2016 as test cases of the peacekeeping cooperation mechanism of the African Union and the 




1.6. Outline Of The Thesis 
The thesis is splited into eight (8) chapters from the introduction to the conclusion. In other to 
give the reader a quick overview of the structure of the thesis, this section will provide a brief 
review of the chapters. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
This chapter explained the background of the study, as it provides an overview on the African 
Union Peace and Security Architecture, its challenges and how conflict and terrorism, war and 
political violence remain the core of Africa’s security challenges despite various peace and 
security mechanisms of the African Union. The purpose of the research is to assess the 
alliance of the African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
The research hypotheses were presented here and these were answered at the end of the 
research, in addition to its significance, the scope and focus of the study as well as objectives. 
 
Chapter 2: Concept, History and Evolution of Peacekeeing Operations. 
This chapter gave a detailed and elaborate literature review through the relevant literature, 
such as journals, conference proceedings, articles, books and reports. This thesis was 
conducted in other to access the collaboration on peacekeeping operations of the African 
Union and the United Nations in Africa. Therefore, the concept and definitions of 
peacekeeping operations, history and evolution of peacekeeping operations were reviewed. 
This served as a background for this research development. 
 
Chapter 3: The African Union and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 
This chapter gave an overview of United Nations peacekeeping missions in other regions of 
the world. It reviewed the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa and institutional 
cooperation and concluded with a review of the collaboration in peacekeeping operations 
between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
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Chapter 4: The Development of the conflict in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central 
African Republic. 
This chapter reviewed from the historical development of the conflicts to the present conflicts 
where the African Union and the United Nations are presently involved in cooperative 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework. 
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework used in the course of this thesis. The 
theoretical framework adopted for this thesis is the realist theory, major theories relating to 
peacekeeping operations were also discussed.  
Chapter 6: The Research Methodology. 
This chapter described the research methodology of this study and detailed the chosen method 
for the data collection and analysis. It includes sections like research design, sampling and the 
research method. The relevant methods in the thesis are literature reviews, interviews and the 
case studies. For each of these methods, a detailed description was provided, in other to 
inform the reader on how these methods were applied in the study. 
Chapter 7: Data Analysis and Findings. 
The analysis were mainly based on the findings from the qualititative data collected. The 
analysis in this chapter is accoring to the objectives of the research, that were mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. The research results obtained  were then presented from the interview 
conducted and compared with the relevant past literature sources. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations. 
This chapter presented the main conclusions, based on the findings from the interviews and 
case studies. Gaps in the literature are discovered and the contributions, recommendations, 
direction for further research are suggested as well. The limitaions of the study also form part 








This chapter which is chapter one introduced the topic of this dissertation which is 
collaboration on peacekeeping missions in Africa between the African Union and the United 
Nations. This started with an introduction followed by the resons for this thesis. The 
objectives, research questions, purpose and an outline of this thesis was stated in the course of 
this chapter. The next chapter will however review the conceptualization of peacekeeping 
operations, followed by an analysis of the history and evolution of peacekeeping operations. 
 
























CONCEPT AND HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
 
2.0.  Introduction 
 
In 1989, when the cold war was terminated, international establisments like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union, began to be involved in peacekeeping 
operations as a means of promoting peace and security. This led to the formation of 
peacekeeping operations like the United Nations Mission in Lebanon (UNMIL) established in 
2006. El-Salvador, Cambodia and Nicaragua (1989-1994). This resulted to the enlargement of 
peacekeeping operations in areas such as in scale and complexity. This transformation in the 
scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations across continentsimpacted on the defination 
of peacekeeping based on its transforming demands,  This chapter will pursue the 
development  of the concepts and practises of peacekeeing operations. The chapter will begin 
with a critical discussion of the concept of peacekeeping.  
 
 
2.1. The  Conceptualisation of Peacekeeping 
In the 1960’s, peacekeeping operations were established in Cyprus, the Congo, Lebanon, the 
Dominica Republic and West New Guinea,  whiuch urshered in the phrase ‘peacekeeping’ 
(Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). From this period, definitions of peacekeeping began 
to change with earlier definitions of peacekeeping limiting peacekeeping to an action ongoing 
in an international environment, through the usage of light or zero force, with the consents of 
the countries involved (Fortna and Howard, 2008).  
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992:20), through the United Nations peace and security document titled an 
Agenda for peace written in 1992, argued that peacekeeping is the United Nations stationing 
of a a military/police/civilian personnels with the consents of all parties involved to the field. 
(Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:11) argued that this definition of peacekeeping by Boutros-Ghali, 
defines mainly responses to inter-state conflicts of the first generation peacekeeping and not 
intra-state. (Doyle, Ian, and Robert, 1997) went further by defining peacekeeping in an inter-
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state war as second generation peacekeeping, involving such tasks as separating forces, 
disarming combatants, organising elections and protecting humanitarian and United Nations 
personnel. (Eyre, 1998) using the model of peacekeeping spectrum and terminology outlined 
in Table 1 below to define the various tasks and patterns of  of different peacekeeping 
endeavours.  
 









Figure 1:    Peacekeeping Spectrum and Terminology 
Source: Eyre, K.C (2001). 
 
A broader definition of peacekeeping is gotten from the manual of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations which defines peacekeeping as “a technique 
designed to preserve the peace however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist 
in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers, working together to help lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace” (UNDPKO, 2008:18).  Making use of the traditional or 
first generation peacekeeping as a point of reference, (Pugh, 2004) defines peacekeeping as a 
multinational force, tasked with the following duties, monitoring and patrolling of ongoing 
conflict zones, using light arms, must be impartial in carrying out his duties with the assent of 
the conflicting parties. In 2008, the Capstone Doctrine, an handbook of the United Nations 
Department of peacekeeping operations was established and it used an instrument for peace 
and security by three mutually combined with the non use of force to describe peacekeeping 
(UN, 2008). While the outlined three principles of the United Nations peacekeeping above 
can determine the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation, this thesis argued that other 
conditions such as legitimacy, national and local ownership of the peacekeeping operation and 
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strategic nature of the environment are critically important conditions for an effective 
peacekeeping operation especially in Africa. 
 
Major critics of the Capstone Doctrine such as (Brahimi and Ahmed, 2008:12) are of the view 
that the following criterias can determine the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation. They 
argued that peacekeeping operations has its criterias, one of which there is a peace to keep, 
concluding that without advanced mediation efforts, and in situations where there exist only 
partial peace and an ambiguous peace agreement, peacekeeping operations are bound to fail. 
Using the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez in 1967, the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 as case studies, (Hillen, 2000) argues that this  
case studies illustrated the importance of the assent of the host parties in peacekeeping 
missions. With regards to peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality, force must not be applied 
except for the purpose of self defence, (Frohlich, 2001) argues that getting the trust of the 
major warring parties, coupled with their consent are vital conditions to peace agreements, 
while neutrality must involve not only peacekeeping actors but also devoid of national 
interest..  
Using chapter 7 of the United Nations charter as a point of reference, (Doyle and Sambanis, 
2006:11), defines peacekeeping under the category of third generation peacekeeping, 
involving elements of peace enforcement, based on the deployment and mandate of 
peacekeeping forces with Somalia and the Central African Republic as case studies. With the 
analysis of peacekeeping operations, it point to more major assumption, which is that scholars 
define peacekeeping operations according to its aims and means (Bellamy, Willaims and 
Griffins, 2004: 3). 
The charter of the United Nations in chapter six and a half,  defined by Dag Hsammarskjold, 
placed peacekeeping between embargos and military, the traditional methods of a peaceful 
resolution of conflicts (Findlay, 2002). While (Olonisakin, 2006: 274-276), agrues that the 
intention of a peacekeeping operation is keeping of arranged or about to be concluded peace 
by the deployment of troops for the purpose of containing violence, crisis defusiuon, speration 
of warring parties and creation of zones with the host government giving its approval.  
The end of the cold war resulted into peacekeeping operations such as those of the United 
Nations Mission in Namibia in 1989 becoming more complex and its troops composition was 
expanded to include components such as military police, police, civilians and extensive 
mandates  (Durch, 2006).  This period urshered in changes in peacekeeping operations with 
the inclusion of not only the military but also civillians in tasks such as peace-building, 
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democratic processes, rebuilding the economy and reformation of the judiciary institutions 
(Durch, 2006). From this period, peacekeeping operations became multidimensional, complex 
and multi-functional resulting to definitions of peacekeeping according to these changes 
(Bellamy, 2010). (Schirch, 2006:27-29), argues that civilians became more involved in roles 
such as the rebuilding of political institutions and monitoring which resulted to the United 
Nations using the phrase Multidimensional with multiple tasks such as in in peace-building, 
improving governance, human rights and economic development. (Higate and Henry,  
2009:43-45) argue that over the time, peacekeeeping operations transformed into the ‘New 
Military Humanism’ aiming while promoting human security and rights also with the right to 
use force. This resulted into mandates being extended to include tasks such as   protection of 
civilians,  monitoring and supervision of elections, rebuilding of political institutions, 
disarmament and involvement in peace negotiations. 
Inspite of several attempts, the term peacekeeping has still not been formally defined 
and this lack of clear definition provides a measure of flexibility that serves political 
and operational purposes with corresponding disadvantages because the term 
peacekeeping can be loosely used and vaguely understood (Rikhye, 1984:1). 
 (Helch and Wallensteen, 2006:11) defined peacekeeping as intervention from a third force, 
involving the stationing of military troops, obsevers, civilian and police to a conflict zone 
created for the motive of resolving conflict, observing the ceasefires, establishing neutral 
zones while trying to restore peace and security between warring groups. (David, 1999:26) 
agrues that peacekeeping involves several operations such as, peace-building, while using the 
root causes of conflicts such as underdevelopment, poverty, degradation of the environment, 
humanitarian crisis, to commence peacemaking using diplomatic mean through restoring 
peace aafter the conflict. And as a result peacekeeping operations now involves a wide range 
of tasks like preventive diplomacy, classic peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
peace-building, post-war security, sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction (Curtis and 
Dzinesa, 2012:56).  
Therefore, the definition of peacekeeping has changed overtime as reviewed above and has 
the practice of peacekeeping. The literature on peacekeeping operations is also still dominated 
by case studies and most are studies of peacekeeping operations that pose special challenges 
or introduce new elements into the concept of peacekeeping operations such as Sierra Leone 
(Adebayo, 2002), Sri Lanka (Misra, 2004), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Ginnifer, 
2002) and Somalia (Razak, 2004). Literatures from (Hillen, 1998), (Fortna, 2008) and 
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(Howard, 2008) limit the describing peacekeeping to measures to stop war occuring again 
after all hostilities has ended. (Walter and Snyder, 1999), (Creig and Diehi, 2005) and 
(Gillingan and Sergenti, 2007) defined peacekeeping as efforts to contain or terminate 
hostilities or even to prevent hostilities. This point to the fact peacekeeping is defined 
according to their functions (Durch 1996; James 1993).   
Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the 
consent of all major belligerent parties and that these operations are designed to 
monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support 
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-time political settlement. The objectives of these 
operations is to fulfil a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, 
facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach 
a long-time political settlement. And that the peacekeepers main function is to 
establish a presence which inhibits hostile actions by disputing parties and bolsters 
confidence in the peace process while supporting continuing diplomatic efforts to 
achieve normalised peaceful relations (Galadima, 2006:51). 
According to the Clingendael Strategic Monitor Project (2015), a peacekeeping operation is 
defined using the Stockholm international peace research institute (SIPRI) definition which 
defines a peacekeeping operation using the following objectives: 
• To facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. 
• To assist the procedure of peace. 
• To help in elimination of conflict and/or peace-building endeavours. 
• Operations carried out by regional organisations and alliances. 
• Operations carried out by adhoc coalitions of states that have been authorised for the 
purpose by a United Nations Security Council resolution and may include the 
following activities: 
1. Monitoring and multidimensional peacekeeping operations carried out by the United 
Nations Department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO), including joint AU/UN 
hybrid operations such as the one in Darfur. 
2. political and peace-building missions that are organised by the Department of political 
affairs (DPA). 
The international peace academy (1984) has a broader definition of peacekeeping operations 
by defining peacekeeping operations as “the prevention, containment, moderation and 
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termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of a peaceful third 
party intervention organised and directed internally using multinational forces of soldiers, 
police and civilians to restore and maintain peace” (Diehl, 1988:485). This study is of the 
view that the various definitions and concept of peacekeeping have their merits and demerits 
and argue that the best definition of peacekeeping is the one that comprises of all the 
attributes of peacekeeping operations. For the purpose of this study, (Williams, 2011) 
definition of peacekeeping operations will be adopted which he defined as requiring the 
military usage of uniformed forces (police/military) with or without the United Nations 
authorisation, with an instruction or programme to: 
• Help in forestalling hostilities by reinforcing a procedure of peace. 
• Serve as a tool to monitor or help in the enforcement of ceasefires or peace accord or 
• Ensure ceasefires, peace accords or the order from the Security Council of the United 
Nations so that stable peace can be built (Williams, 2011). 
 
2.1 Types Of Peacekeeping 
Over the time, generations of peacekeeping operations are identified based on their distinct 
activities limited to each generations which are :  
2.2.1. Traditional Peacekeeping 
During the era of the cold war, peacekeeping operations were deployed to inter-state conflicts. 
Chapter vii of the United Nations charter which encompasses the following, peaceful 
resolution of disagreements, taking action in matters related to risks to the peace, 
contravention of the peace and acts of agression contains traditional peacekeeping which is 
characterised by the following activities:  
• Watching and observing suspension of hostilities and ceasefires. While military staff 
may be asked personally to watch, observe, make enquiry and report that parties to a 
conflict abide by agreements signed like the suspension of all hostilities. They may be 
asked to observe an evolving condition and inform the establisment that gave 
authorisation. The soldiers participating in such duties are refered to as observers or 
monitors and they carryout their tasks under the command of an international 
agreement or instruction and they must play a neutral part and answerable to the 
authority that gave such authorisation. 
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• Examination of complains and breaches. Observers may be asked to investigate 
complains and supposed breach of the provisions of an agreement, which must be 
done in an unprejudiced way. 
• Negotiations and Mediation. Observers may be asked to perform operations on behalf 
of all conflicting parties and mediate among the warring parties while neutrality of the 
observers is very importance to the fulfullment of these duties. 
• Supervision of truces. Traditional peacekeeping conduct truce supervision operations, 
this is to allow negotiations take place in a diplomatic manner in an environment that 
is free of conflict. The withdrawal and disengagement of conflicting parties may need 
the supervision of truce supervisory forces. These operations as stipulated in chapter vi 
and chapter vii of the United Nations charter point to peaceful and forceful course of 
action with the following essential characteristics. 
 
• Non-enforcement. Peacekeeping troops under traditional peacekeeping are not to 
restore order but are only deployed following a ceasefire agreement and their aim was 
to mitigate between conflicting forces and safeguard the ceasefire agreement. 
• Limited military capability. According to traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping 
troops are not to be involved in enforcement of peace or process the capabilities to be 
involved in peace enforcement. 
• Neutrality/Impartiality. Peacekeeping troops are expected to remain neutral and not 
take sides with any of the conflicting parties involved in the dispute. 
• Consent. According to (Higgins, 1994:4), traditional peacekeeping operations 
recognise and regard the authority of the states and must have the approval of the state 
on whose boundary the troops will be deployed and since its first peacekeeping 
operations in 1948, the practice of the United Nations is that the consent of the major 
warring parties to a conflict is needed before a peacekeeping operation can be 
deployed and this is the cornerstone of peacekeeping.  
• Traditional peacekeeping operations also have the following functional attributes: 
• Peacekeeping operations is a response to international conflict. 
• The Security Council of the United Nations specify the mandates of a peacekeeping 
operations. 




2.2.2. Modern Peacekeeping 
According to (Mackinlay, 1993), modern peacekeeping operations is defined 
according to certain laid down parameters by the United Nations, consisting of second 
and third generation of peacekeeping. This was a departure from the first generation 
peacekeeping based on the fact that consent of the warring parties are not needed 
before deployment while also applying force when such is necessary (Ruggie, 1993).  
2.2.3.  Second generation peacekeeping  
The second generation peacekeeping is distinct from the first generation peacekeeping 
because, there is a time-frame stipulating end of operations. Also, the second generation 
peacekeeping operation are involved in the resolution of internal conflicts, making its 
domestic political environment more complex with the following characteristics.  
• Involvement of peace enforcement methods such as military force or the threat to 
make use of it although with authorisation while also compeling compliance with 
regards to universally accepted resolutions or sanctions.  
• Implementation of sanctions and exclusive zones. 
• Safeguarding humanitarian assistance. 
• Forcible separation of belligerent parties. 
• Other mandate include non-military in compostion such as verification, involvement 
in democratic processes such as elections through supervision, humanitarian responses 
with regards to refugees, reliefs and restoration of civil administration. (Galadima, 
2006). 
 
2.2.4. Third generation peacekeeping 
 The third generation peacekeeping operation comes with its own distinct features and are 
usually deployed into an ongoing conflict situation or a state of anarchy. Some of its 
operations involves peacemaking, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and peace-
building which its operations involving the following:  
• Overthrow of existing leaders. 
• Support to democratic leaders and principles. 
• Safeguarding human right. 
• Coaching the local police. 
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• Protecting the deliveries of humanitarian reliefs. 
• Helping in maintaining law and order. 
• Monitoring cease-fire agreements between conflicting parties (Galadima, 
2006). 
Five classifications of peacekeeping missions such as traditional, managing transition, wider 
peacekeeping, enforcement of peace/peace support missions were listed by (Bellamy, 
Williams and Griffin, 2004). Six generations of peacekeeping operations were identified by 
(Thakur and Schnabel, 2001), which are traditional, non-UN expanded, peace enforcement, 
peace restoration through partnership and multinational peace restoration/UN state creation. 
Twelve types of peacekeeping operations were decribed by (Diehi, 2002), such as traditional 
peacekeeping, observer missions, support for democratic processes and enforcement of 
sanctions intervention.  
The Asian conference (2002) with regards to peacekeeping operations articulated a strong 
desire  for quiet diplomacy and non-forceful responses in “extra-ordinary and exceptional” 
cases, (Caballero-Anthony and Acharya, 2005). Therefore, while traditional peacekeeping as 
defined by (Pugh, 2004) was established to deal primarily with interstate conflict, 
multidimensional peacekeeping addresses intrastate conflict. 
 
 
Figure 2: The linkages of Peace Operations 
Source: Choi, Y. (2013) 
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2.3. History and Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations 
The history and evolution of the United Nations paecekeeping operations can be traced to the 
League of Nations controlled international force in (Saar, 1934-35) which according to 
(Diehi, 2008:34-35), may be the first partical example of an international obsever force. 
(Diehi ,2008) argues that in 1948, observers team were stationed in the Middle-East, 1949, 
observers were stationed at  the border of India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1947. In 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed to supervise the 
warring groups in the Suez canal, modelled on Pearson’s ideas recommending unarmed, 
lighty armed military personnels from several countries under the command of the United 
Nations (UN, 1956). (Monnakgotha, 1996) identified the 1815 congress of Vienna, 1899 
Hague peace conference and the 1919 Versailles peace conference as the evolution of 
peacekeeping operations. This concert of Europe led to the raising of the notion ‘settlement of 
disputes’ (Cilliers and Mills, 1995:1). In 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
established a special committee on peacekeeping operations, to deal with peacekeeping matter 
hereby formalising the term peacekeeping operations (Rikhye, 1984: 1). According to 
(Osmancavusogly, 2000), United Nations peacekeeping operations went through 
transformation after 1988 due to the following reasons: An unprecedented co-operation 
among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council over Glasnost and 
Perestroika. The end of the cold-war which resulted to reduced East-West tensions and rivary 
and led to an unprecedented era of expansion and optimism in peacekeeping operations.  
The aforementioned factors resulted to the establishment of more peacekeeping operations 
from 1989 than in the historical years of the United Nations. This era from 1989 was defined 
as second generation peacekeeping, lacking the explicit consent of the classical era of 
peacekeeping operations, with new levels of involvement such as the availabity of consent of 
the warring parties, complex peace agreement with multidimensional tasks such as the 
following:  
• Electoral assistance 
• Monitoring of Human rights  
• Resettlement of refugees 
• Training of Police 
• Protection of humanitarian relief efforts 
• Disarmament and Demobilisation of armed forces (Osmancavusoglu, 2000:3). 
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(Jett, 2001:264-99), used his five period of peacekeeping operations namely, the Nascent 
period (1946-1956), the Assertive period (1956-1967), the Dormant period (1967-1973), the 
Resurgent period (1973-1978), the Maintenance period (1978-1985) and the Expansion period 
(1988-1992) to access peacekeeping operations.  
2.3.1. The Nascent period: 1946-1956 
During this period from 1946-1956, fewer observer missions such as the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Isreal (1948), the first 
peacekeeping operations established by the United Nations (UN, 1948). The United 
Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) established in 1951, in India and 
Pakistan with the mandate of observong and reporting violations of ceasefire. This 
period peacekeeping operations werev involved mainly in inter-state conflicts 
(Sumantra 2003; Wiseman 1987).  
2.3.2. The Assertive period: 1956-1967 
The assertive period was characterised by renewed conflict in the Middle-East and 
decolonisation struggles which result to innovations and new opportunities for 
peacekeeping operations, while breaking new grounds such as the following: The 
addition of civilia police, establishent of a large scale operations involving the use of 
arms, drafting of the peacekeeping principles of the United Nations which are, that 
peacekeeping missions must only be stationed, with the assent of the warring groups, 
force must not be applied except for the purpose of self-defence, neutrality and 
impartiality of the paecekeeping operation in the conflict (Jeff 2001; Urquhart 1997).  
During the assertive period eight new peacekeeping operations were established such as the 
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, the United Nations Yemen 
Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-
General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan 
Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965, the First United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF1) in Egypt in 1956, the United Nation operation in the Congo in 1960, the United 
Nations Security for West New Guinea (UNSF) in 1962 and the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. 
2.3.3. The Dormant period: 1967-1973 
This period witnessed inactivity or establishment of new peacekeeping missions by the 
United Nations due to the following factors. 
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• The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) regional 
security mechanism. 
• Super power rivalry. Deadlock between the super powers over matters of 
procedure and principle and the inflexibility of their positions in the United 
Nations Security Council prevented doing this period any progress in 
development of new concepts for peacekeeping (Rikhye and Skjelsbaek, 
1991). 
 
2.3.4. The Resurgent period: 1973-1978 
During this period, renewed conflict also in the Middle East resulted a resurgence of 
peacekeeping operations although limited to classical peacekeeping on a larger scale like;  
• The second United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF11) formed by the United 
Nations General Assembly, in accordance with the Security Council of the United 
Nations Resolution 340 (1973), to monitor the armistice between Egyptian and Israeli 
forces at the end of the Yom Kippur War (UN, 1996). 
• The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established on 31 May 
1974 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) following the 
accepted withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights (UN, 1074). 
• The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established by the United 
Nations with the acceptance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 
and 426 on 19th March 1978, to confirm Israeli disengagement from Lebanon (UN, 
1978). 
2.3.5. The Maintenance period: 1978-1988 
Increased anxiety and rivary between the United States and the Soviet Union, the  lack 
of crisis in the Middle-East, resulted into a second perid of peacekeeping operations 
dormacy. 
2.3.6. The Expansion Period 1988-1993 
This period witnessed a resurgence of peacekeeping operations as a result of the 
following factors. 
• The end of the cold war, new levels of global cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, the end of the Iraq-Iran war, invasion of Kuwait in 1991 by 
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Iraq, changed the patterns of peacekeeping operations (Hume, 1994:214), leading to 
peace enforcement.  
• From 1988, the dimension, nature and numbers of conflict changed, to ethno-religious, 
conventional armies, dimishing importance of states and frontiers and fragmented 
conflicts of several armed non-state actors (Voncreveld, 1991: 193). Civilians became 
the target of conflicts rather than soldiers, resulting into humanitarian crisis and war 
crimes (Nordstrom, 1992:261).  
• According to (Evans,1994:4), 29 of the 30 conflict recorded during this period were 
intra-state conflicts. This was as a result of increasing capitalism and reducing ability 
of military power. This transformed peacekeeping operations to a multidimensional 
force and complications with the involvement of armed non-state actors in conflict 
(Jett, 2001:28).  
• This was the period that saw the emergence of Globalisation, making peacekeeping 
operations more desirable. Global electronic village such as the CNN, transmitted live 
images and news of ongoing conflict with negative and positive impact on 
peacekeeping operation. Positive because issues of national sovereignty and non 
intervention declined for the purpose of humanitarian interventions (Jett 2001; 
Mandelbaum 1994; Pearce 1995).  
This study also argues that the global broadcasting of the horrors in Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Rwanda in 1994 might have been one of the factors that necessitated the adoption of article 4 
(h) of the African Union constitutive act which extend the right of the African Union to 
respond to conditions like war crimes, acts of genocide and crimes against humanity when 
they occur in a member state. The negative factor is that while the international community 
will quickly deal with the humanitarian effects of an intrastate conflict, rarely will it be 
willing to do what is necessary militarily or politically to bring these intrastate conflicts to a 
definitive end (Jett, 2001:29). The case studies of this study, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the 
Central African Republic are examples of such negative factor. 
There was an increase of peacekeeping troops from 9000 to over 80000, peacekeeping 
operations became more complex with broader mandate (Jett, 2001; Deconing 2007).   (Uvin, 
2002) argues that organisational framework has shown to be an intimidating assignment for 
the United Nations and in order for these interlinkage in the field of peacekeeping operations 
to be managed, the United Nations has established the integrated missions model that is 
particularly directed at increasing consistency between the United Nations Country Team, that 
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concentrate on humanitarian and development, and the United Nations peace operations, that 
is peace and security focused. A former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 
2005 defined an integrated peacekeeping mission as: 
 A mission that is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the 
priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at the 
various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the United 
Nations system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from 
conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive 
manner.  
Examples of an integrated peace operation are the United Nations missions in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo and Sudan (Deconing, 2007). Finally, the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations since 1992 known as the contraction period in the history of 
peacekeeping despite its failures such as in Rwanda (Bercovitah and Regan, 2003) have 
recorded several achievements majorly by carrying out the following tasks. 
• Helping countries transformation from civil war to stable governance. Examples are 
countries like Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Haiti and 
Liberia with the United Nations having distinctive experience in the executive 
management of states and territories in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo 
and Timor-Lesk (Fortna, 2008:113). 
• Reducing tensions across borders, from 1974, the United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force (UNDOF) has assisted in stabilising relations between Israel and 
Syria, and a multinational force still monitor the Israel-Egypt border (Jones, Gowan 
and Sherman, 2009), 
• Mitigating humanitarian crisis, peacekeeping operations as well as to adding to the 
resolution and prevention of conflict frequently providing a structure within which 
humanitarian bodies and non-governmental organisations can assist those that are 
vulnerable (Jones, Gowan and Sherman, 2009). 
(Kenkel, 2013) argues that the evolution of peacekeeping operations can be traced through 
five analytical generations centred on the following factors: 
• The state of the debate surrounding issues of sovereignty and intervention. 
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• The accompanying change in peacekeeping operations propensity to use military 
force. 
• The United Nations attitude towards the conflict varying from reactive to 
proactive. 
• The attendant type of peace. 
• The concrete mandate and tasks. 
• The actors required to carry out the mandate. 
(Fetherston, 1994), in continuation of Boutros-Ghali’s an Agenda for Peace, proposed a 
postulation of peacekeeping built on the concept of a peaceful response from a third party. 
Fetherston pursued the development of peacekeeping from its emergence to its present 
expansion period and stated that the adhoc method of peacekeeping of the United Nations did 
not meet up with the demands caused by  the post-cold war. She reviewed the United Nations 
peacekeeping and concludes that better coordination of all these three rules and a framework 
of intervention are crucial for more effective peacekeeping operations 
United Nations peacekeeping operations from mid-1990s experienced some failures as a 
result of many challenges with regards to the aim and means of such operations. This led to 
the proceedings of the panel on United Nations peace operations known as the “Brahimi 
Report” issued in August 2000. The Brahimi report offered an in-depth analysis of the 
conduct of the United Nations peacekeeping operations and made several recommendations 
for change for it to be able to meet the critical 21st century peacekeeping challenges (UN, 
2004). The Brahimi Report argues that Peacekeeping since its inception has transformed from 
its traditional primary model such as observing ceasefire during inter-state conflicts to a 
compounded blue-print involving both military and civilians involving also peace-building 
roles (UN, 2004). 
The United Nations operation in Somalia 11 (UNOSOM 11) in 2002 compromised its 
impartiality by directing action against the Mohammed Farah Aidid rebel group going against 
its mandate of impartiality and failed (Boulden, 2005).In contrast, the United Nations Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established in 1999 combined dialogue and negotiation with 
credible military deterrence against Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels 
and were successful (UN, 2003).  
The outlined success and failure of peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality and that force must 
not be applied except for self-defence purposes led to a new interpretation of the 
peacekeeping doctrine with the realisation that the issue of impartiality should not be 
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confused with neutrality,  with the following assumption,  military force even though it 
involves coercion, can be used impartially to ensure compliance with a given mandate without 
designing an enemy,  using force in this manner precisely because it is impartial and ever 
handed will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict in question (Mats Berdal, 
2000:56). 
 
The above made the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in its peacekeeping doctrine 
to conclude that “any transformation to peace enforcement from a mission only approved for 
peacekeeping need responsive political resolution, a new instruction and more robust rules of 
engagement’’ (NATO, 2011). The above defined peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in 1992 which ended in disgrace 
and massacre at Srebrenia (Mats Berdal, 2000:64).  
 
(Williams, 2013) is of the opinion that peacekeeping missions are tools, not a blue-print and 
to be effective, peacekeeping operations must be part of a constructive political blue-print,  
peacekeeping missions should not be the solution to all wars. (Jones, 2009:12) shares the 
same views by arguing that “It is not sensible to deploy a peacekeeping operation to a region 
where there is an ongoing war except the peacekeeping operation is a part of a feasible 
political procedure to resolve or manage the conflict’’. Peacekeepers should not be deployed 
unless the host government is ready to work together with them and they should avoid 
crossing the ‘’Darfur line’’, deploying a peacekeeping operation without the full approval of 
the host country’’. (Williams, 2013:5) argues that legitimacy is a very important factor in 
peacekeeping operations and that sustaining legitimacy among the important audience, like 
the conflicting groups, local populace, international non-governmental institutions (NGOs), 
and foreign government, is a vital part of achieving effectiveness.  
That peacekeeping operations regarded as legitimate by major audiences are likely to achieve 
their aims and those regarded as lacking legitimacy will struggle on both counts. As evident 
with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the United Nations Mission 
in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in 2007 and the United Nations 
Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 
1999, whose peacekeeping operations legitimacy were eroded as a result of behaviors such as 
involving in acts of war crimes (AMISOM), could not safeguard the local populace from 
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violence (MONUSCO), corruption (AMISOM) and sexual exploitation and abuse (MONUC, 
UNMIL), (Williams, 2013). 
According to (Mandoyi, Choane and Twala, 2013), peacekeeping operations have proven to 
be one of the most successful tools accessible to the structures such as the United Nations in 
order to assist host countries to steer through the most demanding part from conflict to peace 
and it has distinctive strengths such as legitimacy, burden sharing, an the capability to station 
and sustain troops and police from around the globe, and combining them with civilian 
peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandate. (Fleck, 2008:3) sharing the same views 
argues that “peacekeeping is a mechanism created to help war-torn states to establish the 
conditions for lasting peace and that peacekeepers should supervise peace processes in 
countries emerging from conflicts and help ex-combatants to implement the peace accords 
that has been agreed upon.  
Critics of peacekeeping operations such as (Adebajo 2007; Langille 2007) linked 
peacekeeping operations to a new type of neo-colonialism by arguing that the permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council only get involved actively in peacekeeping 
operations when it involves their former colonies or the regions that are of strategic 
importance to them.  
 
(Bellamy, 2004:4) argue that even though peacekeeping is an action embarked upon by 
seperate actors, its history and development is linked to the United Nations and as a result, 
peacekeeping is frequently perceived as a major function of the United Nations.  United 
Nations peacekeeping is based on the assumption that the presence of an unbiased United 
Nations can reduce tensions and make room for  resolving the conflict peacefully. The first 
step, which involves extreme diplomacy by the United Nations Secretary General, is to secure 
a cessession of hostilities and get the approval of the conflicting groups before deployment of 
peacekeepers. United Nations peacekeeping operations normally fall into two major 
classifications which are: 
• Military observer’s missions comprising of few unarmed officers, expected to 
perform duties like observation of ceasefires, establishing the disengagement of 
troops, or guarding borders or neutral zones. 
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• Peacekeeping forces comprising of national delegation of troops stationed to carry 
out duties that is close to the duties of military observers and frequently to mitigate 
between conflicting parties (Galadima, 2006). 
 
 
2.4. Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: 
Peacekeeping operations have over the years transformed into one of the primary tools 
used by the international community to manage and resolve complex crises. (Crichton, 
2009:39) argues that the following factors led to contemporary peacekeeping 
operations: 
• Peacekeeping as a practice has progressed from a traditional blue-print. 
• The direction of peacekeeping missions has expanded above inter-state 
conflict.  
• Peacekeeping has developed from a meek emergence into a compounded 
international operation. 
Therefore, the assumptions  of traditional peacekeeping have been challenged by a fast 
evolving security environment and new principles have been adopted to meet the several 
threats caused by several different conflict conditions (Johnstone, Torfolani and Gowan, 
2005:56). Meaning that peacekeeping in contemporary time has surpassed the traditional 
peacekeeping model and now involves multidimensional activities. Globalisation also brought 
about several challenges to traditional peacekeeping operations as contemporary 
peacekeeping have to deal not only with ceasefires but the transnational nature of 21st century 
intra-state conflicts such as illicit arms and weapons, conflict minerals, regional powers 
involved in the conflict and non-state actors such as terrorist groups. According to (Kofi 
Annan, 2000:9) “this is the world of globalisation, a new context for and a new connectivity 
among economic actors and activities throughout the world, in which threats to peace and 
security faced by the people of the world have become distinctly transnational”. This point to 
the fact that due to the changing nature of conflicts around the world, a broader and far more 
structured approach than that of traditional peacekeeping model is needed, (Deconing, 
2008:6) therefore proposed the Four Ps which are prevention of conflict, making of peace, 
keeping of peace and building of peace. According to the Four Ps, prevention is the first step 
in reacting to a situation of conflict,  while peace-building is the last. (Deconing, 2008:6) 
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argue that the Four Ps will not only stabilised a conflict situation but also deal with the origin 
of the crisis and preventing a relapse in the long term. 
Therefore, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are usually stationed as part of a higher 
global efforts to help countries coming out of conflict acheive viable peace (Crichton, 
2009:44). According to the (Capstone Doctrine, 2008:23), the major tasks of 
multidimensional peacekeeping are: 
• Establish an environment that is safe and stable while enhancing the capability of the 
state to provide security, with regards for the rule of law and human rights. 
• Enable the political procedures by aiding negotiation and reconciliation and bolstering 
the formation of lawful and effective governmental establishments. 
• Come up with a blue-print for making sure that all global actors go about their 
activities at the country level in orderliness and well coordinated. 
Multidimensional peacekeeping operations also apart from the major military functions  of 
monitoring and observing cease-fires provide the following; 
• Giving assistance to national law enforcement bodies. 
• Provision of security at major government facilities, ports and other important 
infrastructure. 
• Create the needed security surroundings for free movement of people, goods and 
humanitarian support. 
• Provide protection to the local populace directly. 
• Disarmaments, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of militias. 
• Clearance of mine. 
• Security Sector Reform (SSR). 
• Electoral support. 
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THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION  IN 
OTHER REGIONS 
3.0. Introduction 
Literature review is an in-depth analysis of literature and involves the summary, analysis and 
evaluation of literature on a particular research area. Literature review also afford the 
researcher the ability to establish what has already been written or reviewed about a particular 
research area, have an understanding of the current situation of that research area, relate such 
understanding to the research work in progress and identify gaps that needed to be filled in the 
course of the ongoing research work (Arshed and Danson, 2015). 
Therefore the objective of a literature review is to furnish the researcher with an organised 
summary of research done on a particular research area, gives a critical and evaluative 
perspective to the research in progress, review the arguments of other authors, unravel the 
similarities and differences within an existing research work, identify gaps to be filled by the 
research and helps to justify research qusetions and hypotheses. 
This chapter will therefore examine existing literature on the United Nations peacekeeping 
missions and collaboration between the United Nations and other international institutions in 
other regions such as in Europe and the Middle-East in peacekeeping operations. The 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union will also be reviewed and the strenghts and 
weakness of these cooperation in peacekeeping operations and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations will be critically discussed. Gaps in the literature will also be 
identified that will be filled in the course of this dissertation. 
3.1.United Nations And Peacekeeping Operations In Europe 
This part will review the peacekeeping collaboration of the United Nations and international 
institutions in Europe like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Strenghts and weakness of these peacekeeping operations in Europe will also be discussed. 
In 1998 and 1999, series of conferences in Europe such as the Franco-British Saint-Malo 
summit with the European Council of Cologne resulted to the formation of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 2000, the United Nations established peacekeeping 
collaboration with the European Union at the European Council of Nice with two major 
objectives which are, development of approaches to prevent conflict that will be enforced 
mutually and ensuring that the European Union civilian and military abilities will be of real 
quality for conflict administration of the United Nations (Novossoloff, 2012:9). In September 
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24, 2003, the EU-UN crisis management cooperation pointed out four areas of collaboration 
to be enlarged like:  
• Planning; Mutual support in assessing missions and more contact and collaboration 
between mission drafting components. 
• Training; Formation of combined training standards and Establishment of joint 
training standards and regulating training seminars, conferences and exercises. 
• Communication; Exchange of liaison officers and formation of  desk-to-desk talks 
through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels. 
• Best Practices; Regular and structured interchange lessons learned and details on best 
practices on handing over and procurement of mission (EU, 2003). 
Despite the aforementioned, in March 1964, inter-communal violence in Cyprus resulted to 
the first United Nations peacekeeping missions in Europe. The United Nations peacekeeping 
force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established, this was a traditional peacekeeping operation 
becuase it was a consent force mandeted to monitor the cease-fire and enhance conducive 
conditions for the negotiation of a peace agreement (Birgisson 1993; Siekmann 1991). 
Peacekeeping operations categorised as consent forces are those that the consent of the 
warring parties is vital not only to its deployment but also to the restoration of its mandate. 
The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was able to achieve the 
following; tame the vast majority of the incidents, reduce the probality of war, created an 
atmosphere of peace, promoted and coordinatedbi-communal activities leading to 
communities social cohension and confidence (Lindley, 1997).  Peacekeeping collaboration of 
the United Nations and the European Union has been mainly operation driven after the 
conflict in Cyprus. After Cyprus, the next case study of these peacekeeping cooperation was 
during the conflict in former Yugoslavia between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 
(Novosseloff 2012; Oliver 2002). The breakout of hostilities in former Yugoslavia in 1991, 
resulted  to the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 
with the following mandate: To establish the United Nations protected areas (UNPA), disarm 
the UNPAs, protect persons from armed attacks and human rights violations (UN, 2002). 
The intervention of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did not prevent the 
escalation of hostilities which resulted to the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) (Bolger, 1995: 375-359). But  why did the United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) failed to stop the civil war in former Yugoslavia until the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organisation (NATO) interrvened? According to (Abass, 2004), Only the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) processed the military might because of its traditional 
collective defence formations to respond to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, while a lack of 
clear frame work and command led to the challenges encountered by UNPROFOR in the 
conflict.  
In December 14th 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was formed by the United Nations 
under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation due to the Dayton peace accord 
in Bosnia (Un, 1995). In 2004, the stabilization force (SFOR) replaced IFOR while in 
December 2004, SFOR was replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR). A review of 
the cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the United Nations, 
European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the 
former republics of Yugoslavia showed the following challenges; lack of adequate 
coordination in the inplementation of the Dayton peace agreement among the various 
organisations, the lack of a single command of all the peacekeeping missions of the United 
Nations weakened the cooperation leading to lack of competencies, different mandates and 
bahaviours (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004: 223). In December 20 1995, 
UNPROFOR’s mandate was terminated due to  the following: the reluntant of the United 
Nations to act in the conflict in Bosnia led to the escalation of the conflict coupled with the 
vague mandate of UNPROFOR and no real design (Rikhye, 2000). The humanitarian mandate 
of UNPROFOR was made ineffective due to their rules of engagement such as that force must  
be applied only for the purpose of self defence and non use of military enforcement (Rikhye, 
2004: 45). Therefore a major failure of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia 
was the lack of a clear purpose and after the adoption of the joint statement on the United 
Nations and the European Union Cooperation in 2007, both organisations cooperated together 
in Kosovo (Janka-Oertel 2008; Novosseloff 2012). The United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
was to be entrusted to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) but was 
interrupted by the following factors; 
• The unsuccessful negotiations held in the Security Council in 2008 about the 
termination of the United Nations Mission. 
• The threat by Russia to veto any resolution recognising the independence of Kosovo 




• The lack of global legal grounds for the presence of UNMIK and EULEX weakened 
their legitimacy. 
• Not all European Union member states recognised the independence of Kosovo 
(Novosseloff, 2012). 
The question here is this, how successful has the United Nations been in its peacekeeping 
missions in Europe? The effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Europe cannot be determined because the United Nations has never acted alone in Europe but 
in collaboration with other international organisations such as the European Union, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Georgia in 1993.  The transnational 
nature and dimension of the threat of terrorism has forced international organisations towards 
the ideal of enhanced inter-institutional cooperation and has also obliged them to demonstrate 
their relevance and served as a useful example for cooperation between the United Nations, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (Tardy 2004; Thakur 2006). 
Although the United Nations is the appropriate organisation that can provide effective 
peacekeeping operations in Europe, it is faced with several challenges such as lack of 
adequate resources to be involved in a more effective level and on long-term peacekeeping 
operations in Europe (Oertel, 2008). The United Nations also intervened in the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict, through the United Nations Obsever Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)  
formed in August 1993 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 858 with the 
following mandate; 
 
• To observe and substantiate the execution by the parties of the ceasefire agreement 
and forces separation signed in Moscow on May 14 1994. 
• To monitor the commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping operations within 
the blue-print of execution of the agreement. 
• To observe troops of the Republic of Georgia withdrawing from the Kodor Valley to 
areas outside the frontiers of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia.  
• Patroling the Kodori valley frequently. 
• To keep close contacts with the two parties to the crisis and collaborating with the 
peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and be part of the 
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situations favorable to secured and organised return of  refugees and displaced persons 
(UN, 2006). 
In Georgia, the United Nations operated a complex peacekeeping operation resulting to the 
United Nations Observer Mission in the Georgia (UNOMIG) not been able to be effective due 
to the following; the mediation process involved an existing country and a separatist region, 
which automatically placed the United Nations in a position of bias as the United Nations had 
to support the state against the separatist rehgion leading to rejection of United Nations 
proposals in the Georgian-Abkhazian case (Steward, 2003). The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict 
was a good test of cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and a 
continental hegemony, the Russian federation. The coordination between the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Peacekeeping Forces (CISPKF) in the Georgian-Abkhazia conflict was effective and an 
indication that the United Nations cooperation with continental  powers and organisations can 
be potentially fruitful despite its challenges especially in the facilitation of peace 
accords(Ekberg 2003; Macfarlane 1999). 
Finally, Europe have had its share of peacekeeping operations with over 19 multilateral peace 
operations and till 2009, nine peace operations were active in former Yugoslavia and another 
eight in the former Soviet Union with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) a response to an older conflict (SIPRI, 2009). From the analysis of peacekeeping 
operations in Europe, most peacekeeping operations in Europe were conducted by regional 
organisations like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) supported and authorised by the United Nations Security 
Council. However, Europe present the ideal case study for cooperative peacekeeping since no 
single organisation have conducted peacekeeping operations in Europe. 
 
3.2.United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations in Asia and the Middle East 
This section will review cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and 
international institutions in Asia and the Middle East and United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in these regions.  
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In 1949, due to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947, the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan intervened to observe the situation (Karel, 1990). After North Korea 
attacked South Korea in 1950, the Korea war started resulting to the intervention of the 
United Nations. This was one of the United Nations early challenges in peace and security in 
Asia (Rottman, 2002). Two of the United Nations most ambitious operations have taken place 
in Asia, which are the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) formed 
on 28 February 1992  and  the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) formed in 
1999 (Allden and Amer, 2007).  
 The Mandate for the United Nations Mission in East Timor included three components which 
were: An electoral item that gives details about the voting exercise and course of action, a 
political item used for observing the political environment and making sure political parties 
exhibit their freedom and NGOs perform their functions while an information item gives 
details about voting exercise and course of action (Marker, 2003). 
The increasing insecurity in East Timor resulted to the formation of an International Peace 
Enforcement Force (INTERFET) which was not a United Nations force and was led by 
Australia although authorised by the United Nations Security Council to restore peace and 
security, engage in hiumanitarian assistance and supporting the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor (UNAMET).  In East Timor, the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET)  was effective in electoral, humanitarian assistance, security related issues and 
military-civil relations and one of the lessons learned is the significance of have mandates that 
are clearly defined, commenced contact and dialogue with the national leadership with 
sufficient financial and hunam resources  (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005:110).   
The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was effective serving as an ideal model 
for forms of collective security interventions as stipulated in chapter vii of the United Nations 
charter. According to (Marrack 1993; Shpiro 2003), since the establishment of the United 
Nations in 1945, the United Nations has been involved in extensive peacekeeping operations 
in the Middle-East becuase of its importance to the super powers who wanted stability in the 
region.  




• That although UNTAC was unsuccessful in establishing a real politically unbiased 
atmosphere for elections in Cambodia, the general elections in May 1993 was a 
success. 
• UNTAC failed to deal with the dilemma  of reoccurring armed attacks against the 
Vietnamese minority in Cambodia which worsened the situation of the ethnic 
Vietnamese. 
•  The large influx of foreign troops resulted to Cambodian women being abused, 
encouraging prostitution and introducing AIDS, which resulted to Cambodia 
becoming one of the countries with the highest rate of AIDS infection in Asia. 
In Cambodia, the United Nations vision with regards to the mandate of UNTAC was not 
cleared while the Party of Democratic Kampuchen (PDK), a major party to the conflict in 
Cambodia was absent from the peace agreement because of the use of non military responses 
by the UNTAC (Allden and Amer, 2007). In 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organisation (UNTSO), the first United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle-East 
was formed with the purpose of supervising the Palestine truce (UN, 2003). There was also a 
resonse from the United Nations in 1956, through the establishment of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF). UNEF is a concept of Lester Pearson, the former Prime Minister 
of Canada geared towards resolution of conflict among states. This was to be achieved 
through the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed personnel from United Nations member 
states to conflict areas to observe the peace negotiations on a neutral level (UN, 1956).  
The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established in 1958 to stop 
the unlawful penetration of personnel or proliferation of arms from the United Arab Republic 
across the Lebanese borders (UN, 2003). To end the civil war in 1963, the Yemen Observer 
Mission (UNYOM) was established in 1963 (UN, 2003). To maintain the cease-fire 
agreements between Egypt and Isreal, also cease-fire along the Isreali-Lebanon border, the 
United Nations Emergency Force II was formed in 1974 and the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDIF) in 1978 (Diehi, 2008). The United Nations was also 
involved in peacekeeping operations at the demilitarized zone along the boundary between 
Iraq and Kuwait as a result of the August 2 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United 
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was formed in 1991 to monitor the 
demilitarized zone and the Khawr’ Abd Allah water way between Iraq and Kuwait but 
UNIKOM was unable to fulfil its mandate as a result of increasing insecurity in the 
demilitarized zone (UN, 2003). 
38 
 
Finally in Asia and the Middle-East, the peacekeeping cooperation of the United Nations was 
based on cooperation with other organisations and were effective compared to its 
peacekeeping operations in Europe. 
3.3.  The United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations as of September 2019 operates 
thirteen (13) peacekeeping operations among which seven (7) are in Africa (Blanchfied, 
Arieff and Blanchard 2019). Of the seven peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in 
Africa,  six are of the United Nations  largest on-going peace operations, which are 
MONUSCO in Western Sahara (1991), UNMISS in South Sudan (2011), MINUSMA in Mali 
(2013) and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (2014) (Blanchfied, Arieff and 
Blanchard, 2019).African countries also contribute about 50% of United Nations 
peacekeepers with 75% of United Nations peacekeepers deployed in Africa with over 75% of 
United Nations peacekeeping budget spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa and the 
United Nations now deploys its keepkeeping operations to Africa only in a situation where the 
African Union is unable to do so and peacekeeping operations in Africa now involves not 
only the African Union and the United Nations but also the sub-regional institutions in Africa 
(De Coning and Peters, 2019). 
On the African continent, the dominant peacekeeping operations has been that operated by the 
United Nations and the United Nations pecekeeping budget in Africa since 2006, is over 
36million dollars with approximately 70,000 peacekeepers. Several of these United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in Africa has gone well such as those in Namibia and Mozambique 
while those in Angola and Somalia were ineffective (Bellamy and Williams, 2010).  
According to (Williams, 2011), factors such as inadequate funding, lack of adequate logistics, 
corruption, vague mandate, legitimacy issues,  influence of external actors, sexual exploitation 
and human rights violations created challenges for United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Africa such as AMISOM, MINURAT, MONUSCA, AMIS, MONUC and UNMIL. Lack of 
local ownership of its peacekeeping operation in Africa  affected the African Union leadership 
of its peacekeeping operations despite  the United Nations increasing the size of the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 and 2001, the poor quality of 
peacekeepers of UNAMSIL, coupled with mining of diamonds impacted on its effectiveness. 
The United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
deployed in 1999 is encountering several challenges such as a large local population hostile to 
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the peacekeeprs, difficult and large terrains, lack of a peace agreement and political solution 
to the crisis, impacting on its effectiveness (Farah 2000; Jett 2001).   
In the Global Policy Forum (GPF) report of 2013, desertification caused by climate change, 
external interventions over natural resources such as crude oil is leading to rising insecurity in 
Chad and the Central African Republic. The strategic nature of the African environment 
makes the United Nations peacekeeping operations more challenging compared to other 
continents across the world (Downs and Stedman, 2002). Other factors such as involvement 
of multiple conflicting groups, absent of a peace accord before deployment, state failure, lack 
of functional state institutions, involvement of thousands of soldiers, illegal mining of 
national resources and hostile neighbours equally complicates the peacekeeping operations of 
the United Nations in Africa (Downs and Stedman, 2002).  The problems of scale of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the process of its mandate delivery coupled with 
dimension of the operational theatres involved posed a challenge . The size and harsh terrains 
make logistics difficult affecting the growth in the number of United Nations peacekeepers. 
Lack of adequate infrastructure worsen scale problems while the implementation of mandates 
that are complex in such harsh environment result an excessive dispersion of forces, limiting 
responses to military challenges (Jones, Gowan and Sherman, 2009).  
The following challenges such as inadequate manpower, logistical constraints, lack of 
cooperation from the warring warlords, vague mandates, lack of adequate arms embargo 
enforcement, ignoring the root causes of the conflict, developed countries non deployment of 
troops and the United Nations slow response to the conflict were identified by (Agada, 2008) 
as some of the major challenges UNOSOM II faced in Somalia. According to (Nkiwane, 
2001: 102),  inspite of the effectiveness of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(VNAVEM I) and The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namiba, the 
small size composition of the operations coupled with its inability to ensure an end to clashes 
at the initial stage of its intervention drew several criticisms.  
The under resourcing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
deployed to Rwanda impacted on its effectiveness and rendered it ineffective leading to  the 
genocide of 1994 in Rwanda (Melvern, 2009). UNASMIL in Sierra-Leone until the British 
forces intervened in May 2000 suffered several harrasments from the RUF rebels while 
MONUC deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 operated with very few 
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troops until the assasination of President Layrent Kabila in January 2001 (Williams; 2001: 
140).  
In April 20 2015, four members of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) died from 
a suicide bomb attack on a United Nations vehicle while from the period between 1st 
September 2014 to 31st May 2015, over 32 United Nations peacekeepers were killed in Mali 
(UN, 2015). This cases showcased the arguments over the importance of the host government 
giving its assent, such as in Darfur that would have enabled peacekeepers operate in a less 
hostile environment (Senqupta and Gettleman, 2014).  
Lack of coordination among the several peacekeepers in Africa presented another challenge to 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. The United Nations despite it being the 
most important peacekeeping organisation in Africa especially after the cold war, lacked 
control of the activities of these multiple peacekeepers in Africa. Also the effectiveness of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa was impacted by these multiple 
peacekeeping actors, which resulted to varities of peacekeeping doctrines, methods, goals and 
strategies (Jones 2002; Williams 2011).  
Another challenge of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa was lack of 
enough soldiers as evident with MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized over 100,000 troops for MONUC, but 
below 6000 troops were deployed (Roessler and Prendegast, 2006:259). There is also the 
challenge of complex mandates such as monitoring of elections, safeguarding human rights, 
protecting the local populace, enhancing security and order, reinforcing the rule of law and 
supervising the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and 
reforming the security sector (SSR),  these complex mandates are seen by troop contributing 
countries as too broad and too all encompassing (UN, 2009). 
 According to the final report on the in-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations start-up 
phase released by the United Nations office of oversight services in March 1995, “there are 
provisions for peacekeeping operations with the United Nations charter and the basis for each 
peacekeeping operation is the mandate given to it”. Therefore the mandate of a peacekeeping 
operation can make it to fail if it sets  unachievable goals coupled with inadequate fundingand 
political dynamics in the United Nations Security Council (Durch 1993; Jett 2001). (Anstee , 
1996:39) while assessing the earliest peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) formed in April 1992  is of the view that, Somalia (UNOSOM) 
41 
 
operational mandate was unclear, adjusted regularly during the process while opened to 
multiple interpretations. This thesis argues in support of the mandate theory which states that 
mandates of peacekeeping operations should be reflective of a political strategy such as a 
diplomatic resolution to the crisis and peacekeeping  just a  part of that political solution not 
an alternative (Nadin, 2014). 
 An analysis of the mandate of UNAMID in Darfur, AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in 
the Central African Republic reveals a vague and limited mandate without a diplomatic 
resolution to the crisis. The above made President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya while addressing 
the African Union summit in January 2016 in Addis Ababa to call for an evaluation  of the 
African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate with regards to its rules of engagement, 
adequate and sustainable funding (Daily Nation, 2016). 
The United Nations mandated MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo to safeguard 
civilians and support the President Joseph Kabila led government. Despite this, government 
soldiers in the FARDC, were involved in several actrocities against the local population 
resulting to the withdrawal of MONUC support to the FARDC (HRW, 2009). The withdrawal 
of the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations was demanded by the Burundian 
government in 2006, while consent for the UNMEE forces were equally withdrawn by Eritrea 
because Asmara was of the opinion that the United Nations was refusing to implement the 
Ertrea-Ethiopia boundary commission rulings (Williams, 2011: 199). There is also the lack of 
likeness and the vagueness that regularly perpetrated the texts handed over by the Security 
Council of the United Nations and according to the United Nations Department of 
peacekeeping operations, “the United Nations peacekeeping mandates more complex than 
ever but there remains a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled” 
(UN, 2009:9). The above was evident with UNAMIR during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 
and according to the Canadian force commander General Dallaire: 
The Bangladeshi contingent commander has persistently voiced out that he was 
commanded by his government that evacuating Rwandese will put his men in danger. 
They will evacuate expatriates but not local people. His junior officers have clearly 
stated that if they are stopped at road block with local people in the convoy they will 
hand over these local people for inevitable killing rather than use their weapons in an 
attempt to save local people. This reticence to engage in dangerous operations and 
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their stated reluctance to use their weapons in self defense of crimes against humanity 
has led to widespread mistrust of this contingent among its peers in other units and 
amongst staff officers/United Nations military observer at the headquarters when they 
are tasked to go with this men on dangerous missions. (Melvern, 2009:187). 
This led to the Bangladeshi delegation in UNAMIR to abandon  the peacekeeping operations 
before United Nations Security Council resolution 912 officially withdrew most of the 
peacekeeping operations including their delegation  and another challenge was that of 
misconduct of United Nations peacekeepers as evident in early 1990s when Canadian 
peacekeepers were involved in the murder of Somalian locals (Williams, 2011:202). In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations peacekeepers illicitly were dealing in gold 
and other conflict trade goods including arms (UN, 2008) and there have also been several  
scandals involving United Nations peacekeepers abusing local women and chuldren sexually, 
while involving in  human trafficking which led to the United Nations ensuring the starting of  
the so-called “Zero Tolerance Approach” (UN, 2005). 
The United Nations also conducted investigation into the alleged sexual abuse of French 
military personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) before  the establishment of 
MINUSCA, the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic 
(UN, 2015). These misconducts by United Nations peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations 
in Africa put most of the entire peacekeeping operations at hazard, impacting negatively on its 
capability to bring about constructive adjustment in the host countries (Wiharta, 2009:115).  
The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa has faced a major challenge of 
legitimacy which has dealt a severe blow to its image and credibility as a vehicle of 
peacekeeping in Africa. This has led to the argument by the special committee on 
peacekeeping operations about the necessity for a code of conduct to be developed for 
peacekeepers as well as the universalisation of standards for peacekeeping whether by the 
United Nations, regional organizations or willing coalitions and has resulted into the 
effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa being reliant not on their 
capability to impose their will immense force but on the moral authority conveyed by their 
multilateral presence and to regain its legitimacy in Africa, applications of some peacekeeping 




3.4. The African Union And Peacekeeping Operations In Africa 
In July 2000, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was converted into the African Union 
(AU) for it to be able to deal more proficiently with several challenges, particularly the 
challenges caused by conflicts within borders.  In its constitutive act, the African Union gives 
priority to all its members to live peacefully  (AU Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4 (11)). 
Intervention of members is allowed in other states with the continent in conflicts where war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are being committed is stipulated in Articale 4 
of the African Union constitutive act (Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4(h)).  
Any member state can also ask for the intervention of the African Union for the purpose of 
restoring peace and security within its boundaries (Article 4(5)). This gives the African Union 
the right to respond with the approval of the Assembly in a member state where there are 
issues such as  war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as was the case of Rwanda 
and Burundi (Eze, 2003). The founders of the African Union also realized that the burden of 
conflicts in Africa is a significant barrier to the socio-economic development of the continent 
and this was addressed with the adoption of the protocol establishing the peace and security 
council of the African Union in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002 (AU, 2004). The 
objective for which the peace and security council of the African Union was formed is 
stipulated in Article 3 of the agreement dealing to the following: Advancing peace, security 
and stability in Africa so that life and property can be safeguarded and maintained, welfare of 
the people of Africa and its environment, coupled with the establishment of circumstances 
favorable to viable development, foresee and avert conflicts. In situations where conflicts 
have taken place, the Peace and Security Council is obligated to commenced peace-making 
and peace-building tasks for the settlement of these conflicts.  Safeguard and apply peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to solidify peace and stop the resurgency 
of violence, organise and integrate continenal efforts in the stopping and tackling of 
international terrorism in all its ramifications.  Produce a common policy of defence for the 
Union as stipulated by article 4 (d) of the constitutive act and safeguard and inspire 
democratic principles such as good governance, the rule of law, safeguard human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, regards for dignity of life and international law, as part of efforts for 
averting conflicts. The prinicples stated in constitutive act, the United Nations charter, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights shall assist the African Union Peace and Security 
Council. The following principles stipulated in article 4 shall of importance assist it: 
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 Resolution of disputes and conflicts peacefully, quick interventions limit crisis situations to 
avert its escalation, honour for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the 
dignity of human life and international humanitarian, interlinkages between socio-economic 
development and the safety of people and states, honour for the sovereignty and probity of the 
territories of fellow African states, states must also not interfere in the internal concerns of 
other members.  Inter-linkages, supremacy and fairness of member states, every state has the 
right to its supremacy and its boundaries inherited from independence must be honoured. The 
African Union can only be involved in the domestic concerns of member states after the 
general assembly of the African Union take such decisions in situations involving crimes 
against humanity, as stipulated by article 4 (h) of the African Union constitutive act, and its 
members have the right to ask the African Union to intervene for the purpose of reinstating 
peace and security as stipulated by article 4 (J) of the African Union constitutive act. The 
duties of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is stipulated in Article 6 of the 
agreement which are: Enhancing of peace, security and stability in Africa, diplomacy based 
on quick warning and preventative, peace support operations and responses, stated in article 4 
(h) and (j) of the African Union constitution act, building of peace and reconstruction after 
conflict, actions geared towards humanitarian purposes and management of disaster, coupled 
with any other tasks given by the African Union General Assembly together with the 
commission chairperson.    
For the African Union Peace and Security Council to be effective, the ensuring  commission 
was established to support its activities such as the panel of the wise, continental warning 
system, African standby force and the peace fund. And to help states gavely impacted by 
extreme conflicts, the African Union Peace and Security Council will perform the various 
taskes stipulated in article 4: The negotiated peace agreements must be solidified, formation 
of cirumstances of political, social and economic rehabilitation of governmental and societal 
establisments, the programmes of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation 
programmes must fulfilled, such as programmes involving kid soldiers, reestablishing and 
rehabilitating of refugees and those that were displaced internally  and help to those that are at 
risk such as children, the elderly, women and other endangered societal groups. 
The panel of the wise is provided for in Article 11 of the agreement. This is to compliment the 
work of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The composition of the panel of 
the wise is made up of distinguisged figures across the African continent that has contributed 
greatly to the purpose of peace, security and development in Africa. They also give advise to 
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the African Union Peace and Security Council together with the Chairperson of the 
commission on virtually everythiong relating to the enhancement, and preservation of peace, 
security and stability in Africa.  Article 12 provided for the continental early warning system 
to facilitate the expectation and elimination of conflicts in Africa. According to article 12 of 
the protocol, the early warning system shall be made up of  the following: A survelliance and 
tracking hub to be called “The Situation Room” that will be situated at the conflict 
administration department of the African Union, and will be in charge of collecting data and 
review based on a suitable early warning indicators module and examination and tracking 
units of the regional mechanisms connected directly through suitable methods of 
communications to the situation room, and which shall gather and process data collected and 
transfer the processed data to the situation room.  
The African Union standby force is accounted for in Article 13. The African Union standby 
force is to make sure that the peace and security council of the African Union discharge its 
tasks wit regards to the deployment of peacekeeping operations and responses as stipulated in 
article 4 (h) and (j) of the constitutive act of the African Union. The functions of the African 
standby force include the following: Observation and monitoring missions, other kind of 
peace support missions, responding to severe conditions as a result of a demand from a 
member state in a member state for the purpose of restoring peace and security as stipulated 
by article 4 (h) and (J) of the African Union constitutive act, deployment of troops for the 
purpose of stopping a dispute from an upsurge, a conflict that is ongoing from spreading 
across borders and the renewal of hostilities after conflicting parties have arrived at an 
agreement, peace building, including disarming and demobilising of combatants after the 
resolution of the conflict, humanitarian support to reducing the suffering of the local populace 
in areas affected by conflict and assistance to deal with significant natural disasters and other 
tasks instructed by the  the Peace and Security Council or the assembly. 
Regional mechanisms are a part of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture which 
is in charge of advancing the process of peace, security and stability in Africa. The   Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union and the Chairperson of the commission shall: 
integrate and organise the tasks of regional mechanisms in the area of peace, security and 
stability and to make sure these tasks are in line with the goals and assumptions of the African 
Union and work together with regional mechanisms, to guarantee successful collaboration 
between them and the Peace and Security Council in the enhancement and maintenance of 
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peace, security and stability. The procedures of such collaboration shall be comparative 
advantage and the conditions that are prevailing. 
The Peace and Security Council shall in delibration with regional mechanisms, enhance 
initiatives directed at expecting and stopping conflicts and in conditions where conflict had 
taken place in peace-making and building tasks. In carrying out these efforts, regional 
mechanisms involved will through the Chairperson of the commission, make sure that the 
Peace and Security Council are constantly informed of their tasks and make sure these tasks 
are closely integrated and organised with the duties of the Peace and Security Council. The 
Peace and Security Council shall keep the regional mechanisms regularly aware of its tasks. 
In order to make sure that integration, coordination and facilitation of frequently exchanging 
of information is close, meetings shall be conducted periodically at least once in a year 
between chairperson of the commission, chief excutive or officers incharge of peace and 
security within the regional mechanisms.  
The Chairperson of the commission shall take appropriate measures, to make sure that 
regional mechanisms are fully involved in the formation and successful functioning of the 
early warning system and the African Standby Force. Regional mechanisms shall be invited to 
be part of any question presented to the Peace and Security Council when such a question is 
been dealt with by a regional mechanism is of significant to the particular institution. The 
chairperson of the commission shall take part in the meetings and negotiations of regional 
mechanisms. In order to enhance coordination and collaboration, the commission shall form 
liaison offices to the regional mechanisms. The regional mechanisms shall be motivated to 
form liaison offices to the commission. On the premises of this services, a memorandum of 
understanding on collaboration shall be agreed upon between the commission and regional 
mechanisms.  
The Peace fund of the African Union is accounted for in article 21, which  deals with the 
needed financial requirements for carrying out peacekeeping operations coupled with other 
functioning duties related to peace and security in Africa. Article 21 made provisions for a 
peace fund, which is to come up with the necessary financial resource for peacekeeping 
operations and other operational tasks in relation to peace and security in Africa.  The 
provisions of article 21 stated that the functions of the peace fund shall be regulated by the 
basic financial rules and regulations of the African Union. The peace fund source of financing 
shall be from appropriations from the African Union normal budget, outstanding 
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contributions, funds given freely by African Union member states, such as from the private 
sector, civil society and individuals including from fund raising fuctions.  
The African Union commission chairperson can source for funds outside the African Union. 
So far such funds conform with the goals and assumptions of the African Union, a revolving 
peace fund will also be constituted from the trust fund. The relevant policy making arms of 
the African Union, will determine the amount of the revolving trust fund after 
recommendation by the African Union peace and security council. Also when it is needed and 
after the basic policy arms of the African Union has decided, members of the African Union 
will assess the cost of the peacekeeping operations defined under Article 13 (3) of the 
agreement determined by their level of contributions to the normal budget of the African 
Union.  The delegates from member states contributing towards the peacekeeping operations 
will be asked to bear the first (3) months. The union shall refund the expenses incurred by the 
concerned contributing states within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to 
finance the operations. Therefore, the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa is 
anchored on the peace and security architecture and with the formation of the African Union 
peace and security council in 2002, the African Union embarked on peacekeeping operations 
starting in Burundi in 2003, with the African Union Mission in Burundi in 2003, followed by 
the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur and the African Union Mission in Somalia in 
2004 (Okumu and Jaye, 2010: 13).  
Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) founded in 1963, the African 
Union now have a  broader peace and security architecture in place,  but many of the new 
structures provided by its constitutive act however, still need to be fully operational 
(Bakwesegha, 2003:377-81) and  the major short coming of the African Union peacekeeping 
operations is inadequate  institutional capacity, especially human resources, to adequately 
develop policy, plan and manage its peace operations (Berman and Sams, 2010). Also the 
African Union has significantly less staff, dedicated to the planning and management of peace 
operations, than its United Nations and European Union counterparts, even when taking the 
number and scope of mission managed into account and benefactors having the ideal of 
investing in African peace operations capacity need to understand that investments in training 
and equipping peacekeepers are unlikely to prove sustainable unless matched by a 
corresponding investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity and the African 
Union Peace and Security architecture is evolving in an environment with dramatic 
challenges, if Africa is to live up to its motto of solving its own problems and that the African 
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Union is severely restrained by limited resources and trained manpower (Deconing, 2010:42) 
and (Okumu and Jaye, 2010:11).  
(Olonisakin, 2006) using the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) as case studies argues that the effectiveness of Africa’s peacekeeping 
operations can only be effective as regional mechanisms allow them to be and that the 
dynamic nature of Africa’s strategic environment and by implication its regional security 
environment requires that planning processes for peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations 
reflect this reality. 
(Neethling, 2006) argued that while the African Union may have normatively and 
theoretically succeeded in developing a comprehensive peace and security framework 
revolving around the Peace and Security Council (PSC), there nevertheless remains a pivotal 
divergence between aspiration and actual implementation and that indeed, at the conceptual 
level, the African Union has undoubtedly made great progress in moving towards an African 
peace support operations capability, significant challenges and even problems remain in 
translating political statements and ideals into reality. 
(Ramsbotham, Bah and Calder, 2005:10) shared the above views by arguing that the 
significant stumbling block hampering the growth of the African Standby Force, is the 
continued absence of a memorandum of understanding between the African Union and 
regional economic communities (RECs) and the resultant lack of coordination between the 
African Union and regional standby brigades and that regional economic communities such as 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are now moving at a much 
faster pace than the African Union itself, while other regions such as North Africa appear to 
be practically disengaged from the entire process and that the African Union is currently 
lacking the organizational structures to deploy integrated missions or to substantially 
implement long-term oriented peace-building programmes such as those envisioned for the 
African Standby Force. 
 The African Union politically in some cases is captive to the internal politics or interests of 
member states, foreign powers and host governments, which prevent it from acting effectively 
with governments such as in Sudan, out of fear or reaction from key African member states or 
foreign powers which effectively undermines the African Union’s peacekeeping operation 
credibility a major weakness of its forbear  the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) this lack 
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of member states political will is a major impediment to effective deployment of the African 
Union peacekeeping operations and also the peacekeeping operations of the African Union  in 
Africa is faced with the difficulty of reconciling the apparent contradictions between state 
sovereignty and the need for intervention in intra-state conflict and that although the African 
Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) 2004-2007, represented a bold step by the African Union to 
intervene in Sudan and Darfur and the African Union mission in Sudan demonstrated that the 
African Union have not yet overcome the political weakness inherent in the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) because of its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and resulting 
indifference to the grave humanitarian and human rights situations in the country(Kobbie, 
2009).  
On funding of the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa, (De coning, 2010) is of 
the opinion that the future of effective African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa will 
depend on how they are financed, that the African Union experience in Somalia and Darfur 
has shown that the African peace fund or the budget of the African Union cannot solely 
finance its peace operations. Using Nigeria’s role with ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(1990) and South Africa’s support to AMIB in Burundi (2003) as case studies of the only 
fully funded peacekeeping operations by African Union member states in Africa, the African 
Union remains dependent on voluntary contributions to finance its peacekeeping operations 
which impact of the African Union liberty to take free decisions on strategic and even tactical 
aspects of its peacekeeping operations.  
And  while AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Sudan are landmarks for the African Union in 
terms of operationalizing peacekeeping operations in Africa, they also provided lessons for 
the African Union on how to better fulfill its roles and readiness in peacekeeping operations 
and notwithstanding its severe challenges such as lack of consent from conflicting parties, non 
a ceasefire agreement in place, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) can be credited with 
stabilizing Burundi and made a positive difference despite financial, logistical and planning 
difficulties. While the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) achieved only limited results 
because AMIS was not large enough, had a weak mandate, lacked funding, manpower and 
political will to complete the mission (Pham 2007; RGA 2006; Sharamo 2006). 
Another major challenge of the African Union peacekeeping operations has been the 
disinclination to draw on its rich experiences and that when the African Union was pressured 
to respond to the crisis in Darfur in 2004, it experienced several difficulties in planning and 
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deploying the monitors and protectors and that observers of the African Union wondered why 
the African Union did not draw on its experiences in Burundi since the African Union mission 
in Burundi in 2003 should have provided useful lessons in mission planning, deployment and 
sustainability and that the African Union were ‘re-inventing the wheel’ whenever faced with a 
new situation that needs deployment of a peacekeeping force (Okumu and Jaye, 2010). 
 On United Nations peacekeeping doctrine which is seen as a challenge to African Union 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, Africa deserve another “developmental peacekeeping 
doctrine”, because the motivating force of conflict in Africa are conflicts over natural 
resources and peacekeeping operations in Africa which is majority composed of use of 
military should be replaced by a more multidimensional developmental approach, the nature 
of conflict in Africa has changed with many societies in Africa becoming depended on war, 
where the displacement of populations, destructions of lives and properties and vast violations 
of human rights are a way of accuring resources, a vital dynamic which they claim 
peacekeeping operations in Africa has ignored and therefore developmental peacekeeping is 
offered as  a substitute to Africa, opinioned as post conlict reconstruction responses geared 
towards achieving viable levels of human security through a mix of several responses geared 
towards facilitating capacity building and socio-economic development (Madlala-Routledge 
and Liebenberg, 2004). 
Several conclusions were drawn about the African Union peacekeeping since its 
establishment in 2002 some of which are, the African Union peacekeeping operations depend 
on the participation of a small handful of main troop contributing countries which translate 
into an uneven level of support for peacekeeping in Africa. South Africa was crucial to the 
African Union peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Comoros and in Darfur. Rwanda, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Uganda and Ethiopia were crucial in AMISOM and UNAMID and African Union 
peacekeeping operations in Africa rely upon external assistance as evident with AMISOM in 
Somalia which received nearly $800 million dollars from the United Nations in addition to 
nearly $40 million dollars pledged to the United Nations AMISOM trust fund between 2009 
and 2011 (UN, 2012). This dependence on foreign assistance for its peacekeeping operations 
undermines a core rhetorical tenet of the African Union approach to conflict management, 
namely African solutions to African problems and despite the dependence on foreign 
assistance for funding of its peacekeeping operations, the African Union still lack sufficient 
funds, troops, police, materials, strategic airlift capabilities, training facilities, management 
structures, and qualified staff to sustain even relatively small scale peacekeeping operations 
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(Williams, 2011).The Prodi report on the African Union peacekeeping operations also 
supported the argument of  by emphasizing that: 
The African Union will only be able to respond to crises effectively if there is 
sufficient political and financial commitment of its own member states and, more 
generally, of the international community. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, 
such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising 
expectations of the people that cannot be fulfilled worse still, it undermines the 
capability of peacekeeping and weakens the organisation that is responsible. (UN, 
2008). 
The African Union also has difficulty agreeing on mandates for its peacekeeping operations, 
especially when the host state is a member of the  Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (PSC) or has friends on the council willing to support its position as was evident with 
AMIS (2004) in Sudan and Ethiopia in the case of AMISOM (2006-2007), in both cases, 
negotiations on mandate terms became a delicate and overtly politicized process with another  
new challenge to African Union peacekeeping operations identified as the impact and spread 
of disease such as HiV/AIDS, Malaria, yellow fever and tuberculosis (Feldman 2008; 
Williams 2011). 
Conflicts in Africa remain one of the First World War and conflicts between western nations 
in the distant pasts where the spread of disease impacted on the conflicts.  In February 2007, a 
Rwandan peacekeeper in UNAMID in Darfur, died of malaria. African Union peacekeepers 
serve in areas where they may not have immunity against some of the local microbes, 
especially gastrointestinal leaving most of them incapacitated with traveler’s diarrhea and 
unable to complete against the enemy forces, who have lived in that region their whole lives 
and are immune to some of this diseases (Feldman 2008; Munyaneza 2007; Schlim 2004). 
Therefore one major argument of the various scholars on the challenges of the African Union 
peacekeeping operations in Africa despite its peace and security mechanisms and is that in 
comparison to other international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) with a rich case of effective 
peacekeeping operations in Europe, the African Union lack the military capacity, logistic and 
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planning and administrative structure of NATO and the EU and in support of a coalition of 
the willing model that was applied in the Middle East in the case of Iraq and also cooperative 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union, the United Nations and other international 
organisations. 
3.5. Institutional Cooperation In Peacekeeping 
The end of the cold war in 1989 and the nature of post-cold war politics encouraged 
regionalism and a reconsideration of regional security organizations and new thoughts on how 
regionalism and globalism might be paired to advance international peace and security 
(Barnett, 1995:412). The United Nations, recognizing that it could work together with 
regional organizations to fulfill a shared goal of pacific dispute settlement and global justice, 
made Boutros-Ghali to write in An Agenda for Peace that, “the future security order should 
realize the promise of chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations because regional action 
could foster security and contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and 
democratization in international affairs” (UN, 1992). 
This necessitated the need for institutional cooperation in peacekeeping between the United 
Nations and regional organizations and began a series of cooperation in peacekeeping 
between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Bosnia, 
with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Burundi and Rwanda, with the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) in Haiti and El Salvador, with the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia (UN, 1994) and of recent with the African 
Union (AU) in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. 
 Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping became necessary as a result of the shift of 
international conflict from basically that of conflicts between states to conflicts within the 
borders of a state, which led to the advocation for a return to the balance of power and 
alliance politics of the cold war era with the emerging multilateral view that states with 
common interest, largely driven by increasing interdependence, which requires joint action to 
obtain their common goal (Ruggie, 1994:31). Two factors that brought about the 
establishment of institutional collaboration among the United Nations and regional 
institutions as : The United Nations was looking for burden sharing arrangements to lighten 
the load and security challenges of its peacekeeping operations and to create new mechanisms 
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to foster regional security and order and to fulfill the spirit of chapter viii of the United 
Nations charter (Barnett, 1995:418). 
Articles 52-54 of Chapter VIII of the United Nations charter reiterate the following salient 
points with regards to regional arrangements and collaboration among the United Nations and 
regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. It is stipulated in Article 52 of the United 
Nations charter, that the present charter of the United Nations do not stop arrangements 
between regions or agencies in finding solutions to matters consisting of maintenace of 
international peace and security so far such regional initiatives are within the purposes and 
objectives of the United Nations.  Article 53 state that the Security Council shall, where 
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies foe enforcement action under its 
authority. But this regional initiatives shall not be implemented without the authorisation of 
the United Nations Security Council and Article 54 of the charter of the United Nations 
stipulates that the United Nations Security Council must be properly informed of all form of 
regional arrangements with regards to internation peace and security. It is therefore glaring 
that as stipulated by the three articles under chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations 
that those that founded the United Nations vusualised a place for regional arrangements and 
collaboration in the pacific settlement of disputes wherever possible (Birender, 2003). 
According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (2012);  
Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations has become central to the 
analysis of contemporary peacekeeping operations. From the Balkans to Sudan, 
Somalia to Afghanistan, peacekeeping operations are now characterised by the 
simultaneous involvement of several international organizations. This evolution 
carries hope for a more effective management of current crisis as institutions allegedly 
intervene on the basis of their comparative advantage. 
Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations have been carried out based on realities 
that are operational, not by any special blue-prints  and over two-third of the European Union 
(EU) peace operations have been stationed together with  a United Nations peacekeeping 
operations and all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ground operations have 
involved cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and since 2007, the United Nations and 
the African Union (AU) Have run a hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan), 
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integrating their military and mediating efforts (Gowan, 2012). Also peacekeeping operations 
partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations have advanced 
considerably both in operational and institutional terms and that recent progress on 
institutional linkages in peacekeeping operations include the establishment of a new United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) liaison office in Brussels, the 
creation of United Nations-African Union joint task force on peace and security and the 
appointment of a civilian North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) liaison officer at the 
United Nations Headquarters (Koops, 2012:1). 
The Center on International Cooperation in its annual review of global peacekeeping 
operations (2008) divided institutional cooperation in peacekeeping into three broad variants 
which are; 
• Sequential operations: Where different peacekeeping operations platforms succeed 
each other. 
• Parallel operations: These are platforms that are two or more  operating in the same 
theatre under separate command but to the same broad purpose. 
• Hybrid operations: Characterised by unified or joint command, the rarest form of 
partnership. 
Therefore institutional cooperation in peacekeeping has demonstrated an impressive amount 
of flexibility with regards to the global community community in addressing diverse conflict 
situations, and has been useful in joining up global legitimacy to regional actors or vice versa, 
matching different comparative advantages among peacekeeping platforms and marrying 
legal frameworks with operational capacities (CIC, 2008). 
In 1995, the then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Ghali, in celebration of the 
50th anniversary of the United Nations, released the supplement to an Agenda for Peace. 
(Boutros Ghali, 1995) identified five ways of institutional cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional organizations such as; 
• Formal and informal consultations geared towards swapping opinions relating to 
conflicts involving the United Nations and regional organisations.  
• That diplomatic support and technical input will be provided to regional organisations 
involved in peacekeeping functions of the United Nations.  
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• The  provision of operational and technical support such as was provided by NATO to 
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.  
• The United Nations will be involved in joint-deployment with the peacekeeping troops 
from regional organisations with the regional organisations bearing the major weight 
while the United Nations will provide a little bit of technical support after proper 
verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. However, the political, 
operational and financial aspects of such an arrangement would require attention prior 
to deployment. 
 
• The United Nations and regional organisations will collaborated through a joint 
peacekeeping operations. 
And that the capacity of regional organizations varies considerably and that while a general 
style for collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and regional 
organisation was not viable, the identification of certain principles based on the following 
guidelines can be implemented such as: Formation of accepted formal/informal mechanisms 
for consultation, regard for the priority of the United Nations in maintainance of international 
peace and security, division of labour should be properly defined to prevent overlapping and 
institutional rivary in situations where both organisation are jointly involved in restoring 
peace and common areas of interest between both organisations must dealt with appropriately 
(Boutros Ghali, 1995). 
And this had resulted into the argument that despite the fact that institutional cooperation in 
peacekeeping operations are yet to mature, the general consensus is that the world is headed 
towards greater integration between the United Nations and regional establishments like  the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the African Union (AU), and that such 
institutions play an important role, especially in a world with power imbalances, distrust and 
unrest and that cooperation among states towards peacekeeping mechanisms gives birth to 
opportunities for burden sharing, balancing power, pursuing self-interest and generally 
preventing the collapse of world order as it stand and that in the contemporary security 
environment, institutional cooperation in peacekeeping are forged under three scenarios which 
are: To protect Civilians, as an antecedent to peace building and to engage in the war on 
terrorism (Bubna 2010; Gowan and Johnstone 2007). 
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 Institutions cooperate in peacekeeping operations mainly for what they will gain or to their 
own self advantage/interest, collaboration is known to bring about a reduction in costs 
implications of transcation, result to access of information, expertise, financial or other types 
of resources such as equipments  that institutions prepared to share. Global institutions like 
the United Nations and the European Union are seen as “natural partners”, unified by the 
major values stipulated in the 1945 charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights with the two organisations involving in joint peacekeeping 
operations as a result of their shared beliefs and values in international law and multilaterism, 
prefering disputes being settled peacefully to settlement of disputes through the use of force 
(Haugevik 2007; Tardy 2009). Therefore institutional cooperation or partnerships in 
peacekeeping could be a techique to become visible or become powerful within the partner 
institution or to improve ones status as a major actor in security and developing partnerships 
to improve the effectiveness of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Which can be 
accepted in theory but in practical it undergoes fundamental difficulties and affected by 
several structural factors that will be hard to deal with such as:   
• Heterogeneous institutions.  
The mandate of regional organisation is highly diverse, institutional form, resources, 
political weight and developmental levels as resolution of conflict actors and because 
of this, the collaborations becomes factional distinguished by spreading of the mutual 
benefits among partners, distance from a global burden-sharing or connceting systems 
based on the various strengths of international institutions.  
• Inter-institutional competition.  
Collaboration between international organisations in peacekeeping is distinguished by 
organisations competing among each others. These organisations are always struggling for 
resources that are limited, ability to access information and identity while developing their 
self-interest which may affect complementary collaboration.  
• The North-South Divide. 
Collaboration between international organisations in peacekeeping operations are 
considerations bordering on a division between North and South that defines the 
global community, while drawing attention to the politicization of North-South 
relations rather than weaken it.  
• Division of labour and comparative advantage. 
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Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping and burden sharing have partly developed on 
the basis of comparative advantages displayed by each organisation, and that nearly all 
institutions aspire to embrace activities, with little prospect for the emergence of an 
interlocking system based on different competencies leading to issues of duplication 
and overlap in a context of scarce resource. 
 
• External versus internal coordination. 
That although partnerships are officially promoted by all institutions, internal 
coordination and coherence are, for each of them, a more important task than building 
inter-institutional links and the compartmentalization of activities between different 
bodies of the same institution such as secretariat versus agencies on the United 
Nations side, European commission versus council secretarial complicates the 
establishment and the visibility of partnerships. That in practice, partnerships often 
develop between organs of international organizations, the European commission and 
the UNDO, DPKO and the European Union council secretariat, rather than between 
the organizations per se (Tardy, 2009). 
On challenges facing institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations, institutional 
differences constrain field-level cooperation between the various organizations and 
organizations maintain very difficult and sometimes incompatible command and control 
systems and this has made the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
unable to share intelligence with partners in many cases and lack of adequate top-level 
political contacts between organizations and  the only organisation that meets regularly with 
members of the United Nations Security Council is the African Union Peace and Security 
Council and that there is no indication that any other regional organizations such as the 
European Council or the North Atlantic Council have any interest in meeting directly with the 
United Nations Security Council (Artinano 2012; Kugel 2012). 
This had resulted into lack of coordination between institutions on decisions affecting the 
peacekeeping operations as evident between the European Union and the United Nations in 
the case of Chad and the Central African Republic,  in 2008, the European Union deployed a 
military force to assist humanitarian operations in Chad while the United Nations sent a 
parallel police operation ( Novesseloff and Gowan, 2012).  
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The internal oversight services office of the United Nations (OIOS) in its 2011 oversight 
report, is of the view that collaboration between the United Nations and regional organisations 
in peacekeeping operations is conducted on adhoc basisi and the result of demanding 
operational needs, leading to small systematic institutional learning and is expensive, due to 
the involvement of a large investmests of the time of staffs in areas such as planning and 
communications, divergent institutional structures and cultures, and these obliviousness, 
disrupted smooth collaboration (UN, 2011). The United Nations will continue to count on 
cooperation with regional organisations and its bilateral partners to meet up with 
peacekeeping demand. Such collaboration will result to a rising demands on coordination. 
Coordination on its own is affected by a lack of adequate sytem for sharing of information 
and secret by the United Nations. Therefore the United Nationsmust take note that it cannot 
alway rely on its partners to intervene everytime there is crisis. Because of the individual 
interests and constituencies of each organisations. Competitions over areas of activities will 
continue to disrupt effective cooperation between the United Nations and its regional partners 
who are anxious to show their existence and show that they have a critical role to play 
(Novesseloff and Gowan, 2012).   
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) reflected a new engaging method in the international security 
architecture where international and regional organizations are increasingly working in close 
partnership to further regional and international political and security interest (Boutellis and 
Williams, 2013). Therefore institutional collaboration in peacekeeping operations such as the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that is supported by a United Nations Support 
Mission (UNSOA), European Union deploying a training mission to Mali (EUTM-Mali) in 
January 2013 to build the capacity of the Malian army, to restore the territorial integrity of the 
country and to reduce the threat from terrorist groups, the mission was modelled on the 
European Union (EU) Training Mission to Somalia (EUTM-Somalia), which has been 
ongoing since 2010 (Freear and De coning 2013; Wiklund and Skeppstrom 2014). 
Since 2005, following request from the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) has supported the African Union in peacekeeping operations and capacity building 
with NATO providing airlift support and training for African Union personnel for the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2005. NATO has also provided planning and strategic 
air and sealift support to the African Union member states involved in the African Union 
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Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and was involved in capacity building for the African 
Standby Force (ASF) brigades (Smith-Windsor, 2013:19). 
 The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) support for 
the African Union has improved with the United Nation’s financing of peacekeeping 
operation, as it has helped provide financial and logistical assistance to the African Union and 
other regional organizations in a timely manner and that international crisis such as the one 
that occurred in Mali in 2012-13, demonstrate the continuing need for institutional 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations (Vines, 2013). 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the major objective of this thesis which is partnership  of the African 
Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. It started with a review 
of cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Europe and Asia, such as 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations between the United Nations and the European Union 
and the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe. Also in Asia 
between the United Nations and organisations across Asia like the Association of South East 
Asian Nations among others and also a review of the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in Africa, the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa followed by the collaboration  
between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The purpose was to examine 
other models of cooperative peacekeeping between the United Nations in other continents 
apart from Africa. This chapter also reviewed institutional cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations from existing literature and discussed the goals and objectives of institutional 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations as well as its challenges especially on the African 
continent.  
In Europe the United Nations was involved in peacekeeping cooperation with organisations 
like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in conflicts such as those 
in Cyprus, former Yugoslavia and Georgia. In Yugoslavia, lack of a clear framework (Abass 
2004) and the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine such as that force can only be used for 
the purpose of self defence impacted on the effectiveness of these peacekeeping cooperation. 
It is however difficult to fully determine the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping 




In Asia and the Middle East, the United Nations was involved in cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations with organisations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in places such as in South Korea, Cambodia, East-
Timor, Lebanon and in Iraq and was successful although in Iraq it was a collection of the 
willinging. From a critical review of literature of the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the major weaknesses identified were inadequate 
funding, lack of a framework for cooperation and the United Nations peacekeeping doctrines 
such as that force can only be applied for the purpose of self defence while the major strength 
is the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a traditional defense 
organisation with the military might to respond to conflict in Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East (Abass 2004). 
In Africa as of september 2019, the United Nations operates seven peacekeeping operations 
(Blanchfied, Arieff and Blanchard 2019). An analysis of literature on the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and its cooperation in peacekeeping operations with the African 
Union focused majorly on factors such as lack of adequate funding and logistical constraints 
(Agada 2008; Williams 2011). However the dimension of conflict in Africa has changed to 
fragmented conflicts with a regional spread and challenges has gone beyond just funding and 
logistical constraints of the reviewed literature to factors such as the roles of non armed actors 
that are the major actors in the conflicts in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic 
contradicting peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Most of the literature reviewed did not discuss some of this contracdictions to peacekeeping 
operations in Africa such as the strategic African environment with its porous borders and 
harsh terrains. Another gap identified in the literature is its failure to discussed in details the 
impact of a peace accord in the effectiveness of the cooperation in peacekeeping operations 
between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. For peacekeeping operation to 
be effective, its mandates must be reflective of a political strategy and peacekeeping must be 
part of a political solution and not an alternative (Nadin, 2014). 
Also the literature reviewed did not discuss the involvement of the sub-regional organisations 
in Africa and their impact on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. These gaps identified in the course of the literature review 
will be filled by these thesis.The next chapter however will focus on the theoretical 
framework of this study which is the collective security theory and its application to the 
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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR (SUDAN), 
SOMALIA AND THE  CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 
4.0.   Introduction 
This chapter will examine the root and causes of the crisis in Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic. The consequences of the conflict on peace and security in the various 
countries and region and the actors involved and their impact on the conflict.   
 
4.1.  DARFUR (SUDAN) 
Darfur is a region within the western part of Sudan,  its population consist of a multitude of 
ethnic and linguistic groupings,  since 23rd February 2003, Darfur has been engulfed in an 
ethnic conflict resulting into an humanitarian crisis. The African Union and the United 
Nations are involved in collaborative  peacekeeping operations in Darfur through the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) since 31st July 2007. This 
sub-section will review the historical evolution of the conflict in Darfur, the consequences of 
the environment and ethnicity on the conflict and the role of Janjaweed an armed non-state 
actor in the conflict in Darfur. 
4.1.1.  Historical development of the conflict in Darfur 
Sudan was colonised firstly by Egypt from 1898 and from 1914 by Britain, the biggest 
country in Africa, Sudan is one of the major country in Africa highly diversed along religious 
and ethnic lines, consisting of over 20 linguistic groups with around six hundred sub-dalects. 
Islam, African traditional and indigenous beliefs and Christianity form the basis of the 
religion in Sudan with the Islamic religion the most dominant religion in Sudan  (Bechtold 
1991; Mekankamp, Van Tongeren and Van de Veen 1999).  
From the Addis Ababa treaty in 1983,  the introduction of Islamic law with unequal regional 
development led to a series of rebellion and secessionist revolts mainly from Southern Sudan. 
This started with the Anya-Nya,  later the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM),  
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therefore for decades Sudan have been experiencing civil wars combined with armed 
struggles based on the agitation for autonomy and equal development (Tar, 2006). 
In March 1983,  the violations of the Addis Ababa agreement by General Numayri together 
with the imposition of the Islamic law led to the formation of the Southern Sudan Peoples 
Army (SPLA), which became the military or armed wing of the Southern Sudan 
Revolutionary Movement (SPLM). Darfur is situated in the Northern Sudan with 
approximately a population of over five million people, a territory the size of France, is the 
largest region in Sudan with regards to population and landmass and is one of the most 
underdeveloped regions in Sudan having a substantial history of racial and ethnic crisis (Lval 
2001; Tar 2006).  
Darfur borders with its neigbours are penetrable particulary its borders with Chad as a result 
of similar demographic characteristics like trading and other socio-economic ventures, and 
divisions between Chad and Sudan bordering on racial, ethnicity and religion.   Therefore 
conflict have been mainly over resources, such as grazing areas and farmlands between 
sedentary farmers and itinerary nomads such as the Fur, Masalit, the pastoral Arab tribes from 
the Kabkabiya region in North Darfur and Beni Halba in South Sudan (UNCHR, 2004). 
Conflict arising between the Arab tribes that are mainly pastoral and the African communities 
that are mainly living a life of inactivity were settled through revered generational methods of 
settling conflict,   influenced by Anglo-Egyptian legal heritages where community leaders and 
tribal chiefs known as Sheikh Kabilal served as legitimate instruments for the managing 
conflict.  Although these traditional means of conflict resolution were effective in matters 
relating to agricultural compensations, they also had the tendecies of generating into further 
conflict as evident in January 1999 between Arab and Masalit resulting into death and 
destruction of properties (Woodward, 2003). The crisis in Darfur over resources started ages 
ago and enhanced by a mix of socio-economic, political and security factors like reoccuring 
droughts over a long period of time, struggles over decling resources, absent of good 
governance and principles of democracy. The proliferation of small and light weapons is also 
a cause of increasing insecurity with the some of the following factors identified as the origin 
of the conflict in Darfur.  




• The commencement of the use of small arms and light weapons into the pastoral and 
farming communities transformed the the nature of the clashes over land and 
agricultural products. 
• Interventions by various Sudanese governments were partial and unproductive, 
policising the ethnic, there was also racial divide among African and Arab identities in 
Darfur in issues such as representation and local governance. Coupled with the 
appointment of Arabs into favorable positions of power, governmental support for the 
Murahellen militia and judicial favoritism of Arabs over land matters and communal 
crisis (Tar 2006; Woodward 2003; Stohl and Smith 1999).  
In February 2003, the recent crisis in Darfur started after rebel groups invaded military 
posts in the region, citing allegations of neglecting the region and unfairness against its 
inhabitants (Peterson, 2008:1). The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) with 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked Al-Fashir the capital of North Darfur 
and the Sudanese government reacted to the attacks with  its military and the Janjaweed 
and by October 2003, according to various reports, villages were raided and thousand of 
people were killed and raped and destruction of agricultural products by the Janjaweed 
against the non-Arab Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masalit ethnic groups in Darfur (Clough 
2005; Williams and Bellamy 2005). And the following factors escalated the conflict 
between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Sudanese government: 
• The lack of the Sudanese government recognition of the rebel groups and respecting 
their demands which was based on the structural imbalance in the country. 
• The absent of the advancement of the peace agreement made in 2002 amongst  the 
Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement and the Sudanese government. The 
Southern peace agreement in 2002 were followed by the Navasha peace accord in 
2003 and instead of ensuring the terms of the Southern peace agreement, the Sudanese 
government laid emphasis on its military might. 
• The discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in Sudan in 1999,led to production 
and exportation of petroleum resulting impacted positively on the Sudanese economy 
but the proceeds were not used to develop the regions and  the people of Sudan.  
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• The massive geopolitical terrain and the porous nature of the borders between Chad 
and Sudan provided a conducive advantage for the rebellion by the JEM and the 
SPLA/M.  They recuited part of their members from the Zaghawa ethnic groups in 
Chad (Tar, 2006).  
The current conflict in Darfur that started in 2003 with roots as far back as 1983 is now 
fragmented along ethnic lines with increasing violence despite the setting out of the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 and the Mission in Darfur of the African 
Union and the United Nations (UNAMID) in 2007. The independence of South Sudan in 
2011, the renewal of war in South Kordofan and the blue Nile resulted in the rebel groups 
in Darfur to unite with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Northern wing (SPLM-
N) to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). While the Sudan Liberation Army 
faction of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) continue its insurgency in the eastern plains between 
Mellit in North Darfur and Gereida in South Darfur leading to displacement of over 2.5 
million people (Ali, 2012). Some 2.8 million people were displaced in Darfur by 
December 2015 mainly from the Non-Arab/African tribal groups, tens of thousands of 
girls and women raped with over 2million people suffering from acute malnutrition, 
thousand of villages destroyed with over 600,000 people dying from the outbreak of the 
current conflict in 2003 till December 2015 (Reeves, 2016). 
4.1.2. The impact of the environment and ethnicity on the conflict in Darfur. 
Agricuture is the major sustainance and mercantile in Sudan and eighty percent of the people 
of Sudan are involved in agriculture in a territory where fertile land is insufficient as a result 
of the ecological charcateristics of the country such as inadequate access to water and 
unsuitable soil condition for agriculture due to desert encroachment which inhabits up to 45.3 
percent country’s locality amounting to 1,123,000km2 and therefore land in Darfur is a major 
determinance of the survival of the people of Darfur, a region grossly affected by droughts 
and desertification (Ahmed and Shazalli, 1999:15). 
In Darfur, several famines that have occured formed part of historical account that played a 
vital part in the collaspe of governments, the movement of people from one region to another, 
leading to religious insurgencies. The droughts in Darfur in 1984 and 1985 led to hunger and 
destitution in Darfur while the resulting famine resulted into an increase in competition for 
resources caused by droughts and desertification have a direct link to the conflict in Darfur 
(Dewaal 2005; De Almeida 2008). Apart from conditions like political, religious, ethnic, 
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tribal,  clan divisions, economic considerations, land tenure insufficiency and historical 
disputes, the sufferings caused to the pastoralist societies in Darfur by drought is part of the 
root causes of the present conflict in Darfur. 
 Between 1968 and 1976, there were three main conflict in Darfur related to struggles for 
resources and from 1976 to 1980 there were five related environmental contentions in Darfur 
and from 1980 to 1998, over 21 crisis were connected to contentions over resources and 
livestocks (De Almeida 2008; UNEP 2007). The Arab groups in Darfur invaded the Fur and 
Masalit communities in order to gain access to pasture and water and excluding the crisis with 
regards to the Jesel Amir gold mine in North Darfur, several of the recent crisis is as a result 
of prolonged feud over land and most community conflict in Darfur are between traditional 
land rights owners against those regarded as immigrants, hosts and branches of the 
landowners (Crisis Group 2015; Mohammed 2004). The people of Sudan practice several 
religious traditions under three major religion which are Islam, traditional or indigenous 
African beliefs and Christianity.    Muslim consist of 70 percent and the rest 30 percent shared 
between Christianity and indigenous African believers which ethnic groups are 39 percent 
Arabs and 61 percent African. and that the diversity of Sudan is one of the world’s most 
heterogenous society and its diversity poses an extraordinary challenge to any government.  
The Arab Muslims due to being in majority with regards to religion constitute the dominant 
group in the political scene in Sudan from its independence in 1956 and therefore  the conflict 
in Darfur reveals the complex dimension of denomination and anti-denomination encounters 
in Sudan. It is therefore clear that Sudan is extremely heterogeneous and maybe the most 
explosive with regards to socio-cultural diversities in Africa.  Therefore, this diverseness is 
the major factor behind the crisis involving people of seperate language, religion, racial and 
cultural sources over power and resources. The conflict in Darfur is due to disputed abrasions 
emerging from socio-economic and political divides among separate ethnic and racial groups 
combined with relegation with uneven access to power and its priveledges (Bechtold 1991; 
Tar 1991).   
 
4.1.3.  The role of the Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur 
According to the international commission of inquiry on Darfur constituted in 2005, 
Janjaweed interpreted as a man (a devil) on a horse, is the name accorded to the militia group 
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deployed as a form of counter-insurgency by the Sudanese government in the Darfur crisis 
and the Sudanese government is reported to have recuited 20,000 Janjaweed militia members 
(HRW, 2004).  The Janjaweed was used as a tool of counter-insurgency by the Sudanese 
government in Darfur as far back as 1991 during the failed rebellion in Southern Darfur by 
David Bolad in conjuction with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and from 2000, 
the Janjaweed began to get more assistance in form of vehicles, communication devices and 
weapons from the government of President Al-Bashir and in 2002, the Janjaweed executed its 
first significant attack against the civilians of the Fur tribe in Darfur. The International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in its 2005 report stated that the Janjaweed is divided into 
three divisions which are: 
• Members that have no direct affliation with the government of Sudan and act 
independently for personal profits from looting of properties. 
• The second division is directly coordinated by military officials of the Sudan military 
in conjunction with tribal leaders. 
• These comprises of members from the Popular Defence Force defined under the 
Sudanese law as paramilitary (Flint and De Waal 2005; ICID 2005).  
• Most members of the Janjaweed are Arabs from the camel-herding tribes of North 
Darfur and Chad,  from the tribes and clans of the Irayqat and Ouled Zeb, sub clans of 
the camel-herding Northern Rizeigat, the Mahariya and the Beni Hussein (HRW, 
2004). Members of the Popular Defence Force recieve payments from the government 
of Sudan with the tribal leaders in form of grants and gifts,  compensation,  in form of 
development such as schools, health centers and water pumps in their villages. The 
involvement of the Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur has resulted into increasing 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur as a result of the attacks on civilians (Flint and De Waal 
2005; Tar 2006).  
The Sudanese government together with members of the Janjaweed are involved in thew 
deaths of thousands of Fur, Masalit and Zaqhawa, mostly in cold blooded, raping of women 
and destruction of villages and means of livelihood of the local population. Their actions has 
resulted to the displacement of over a milliom people, especially farmers into various 
settlement camps in Darfur with little or no means of survival coupled with several abuses 
from the Janjaweed. Over 110,000 civilians have been forced to migrate to Chad with several 
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others unable to fleed the conflict in Darfur.  And Janjaweed raids are preceded by aerial 
bombardments by the Sudanese airforce and their commanders live in government garrison 
towns and using racism as a rally point (HRW 2004; Koerner 2005).  
4.2. SOMALIA 
Somalia lies within the eastern part of Africa, on the horn of Africa. Its population consist 
majorly of clan-based muslims with their major means of sustenance being nomadic 
pastoralism and has one of the most complex environment in Africa. Since 1991, Somalia has 
been engulfed in a civil war that has completely distabilised the country and the region. Since 
2007, the African Union has been taking part in joint peacekeeping missions in Somalia with 
the United Nations through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This sub-
section will review the historical development of the crisis in Somalia, the disintegration of 
the Somalia nation, the involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the conflict in Somalia and the 
emergence of political Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab and their impact on the conflict in 
Somalia. 
4.2.1.  Historical development of the conflict in Somalia. 
Somalia before colonialism was a large ethnic group comprising of several clans and sub-
clans and its pre-colonial history was that of a peaceful one because Somalis shared a 
common language, ancestory, nomadic pastoral culture and a common religion which was the 
Islamic religion (Elmi, 2000). Prior to independence in 1960, Egypt wanted the unification of 
Somalis under a single flag while Ethiopia was busy reclaiming its large territories in Somalia 
and by 1960, colonies under Italy and Britain were almagamated into independent Somalia 
and  the almagamation of the colonies under Italy and Britain was regarded as decolonization 
without regards to the opinion and views of the Somalians who were against the 
almagamation of the colonies (Agada, 2008). 
Many leaders from Somalia particularly those from the Northern part were not happy about 
the almagamation because after independence in 1960, political power was concentrated 
mainly in the Southern region, key government institutions were concentrated in the South 
and headed by Southern Somalis and policies were made that were only of advantage to the 
South and this resulted into the underdevelopment and socio-economic inequalities in the 
North and from independence in 1960, governance in Somali were characterised by 
corruption, incompetence and oppression (Ani, 2016). 
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In October 1969, the Somalian Army under the command of General Mohammed Siad Barre 
took over power in a military coup and under the government of Mohammed Siad Barre, clan 
solidarity became the norms of the Somali elites. Many clans became divided in Somali as a 
result of being disparaged and disheartened. Mohammed Said Barre introduced a socialist 
platform for self-enrichment and oppression of opposition groups. The defeat of Somalia in 
the Ogaden war between 1977-1978 led to disintegration and disunity and resulted into 
proliferation of arms in Somalia (Ani, 2016). 
Mohammed Siad Barre gave himself and his Darod clan more authority and entitlements to 
the deteriment of other clans,  as a result, other clans who felt marginalised began an 
opposition movement against the government of Mohammed Siad Barre which led to its 
collapse in 1999 (Rotberg, 2002:95). The overthrown of General Mohammed Siad Barre led 
to a vacuum in goverrnance in Somalia which led to armed conflict over whom is in the 
position of authority in Mogadishu,  the Somalian capital, between forces loyal to the interim 
President Mahdi Mohammed and the United Somalia Council (USC) and the armed group led 
by General Mohammed Faiah Aidid and the armed conflict later spread to other parts of 
Somalia with various armed groups in control of different parts of the country (Agada, 2008). 
 
4.2.2.  The collapse of the Somalia State. 
In 1991, the eruption of civil war in Somalia resulted to the disintegration of all the 
institutions of governance, coupled with the outbreak of famine and drought which led to 
significant humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Over half a million Somalis died from hunger, 
malnurition and related disease by the end of 1991, the overthrown of the government of 
Mohammed Siad Barre created a political vacuum leading to the breakout of armed conflict 
between clans, warlords, devious religion leaders, migrants and herdsmen  (Agada 2008; 
Pham 2010).  
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali in 1992 obtained a cease-fire 
agreement between the caretaker President of Somalia,  President Ali Mahdi and General 
Farah Aidid and on April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
751 (1992) which established the United Nations Operation in Somali (UNSOM1) with the 
mandate of implementing the ceasefire agreement. The United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM1) could not achieve its mandate of implementing the ceasefire agreement due to 
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the armed group led by General Aidid who were suspicious of the United States led 
peacekeeping forces (Agada, 2008). 
In December 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM11) took over from 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1) with an additional mandate of 
restoration of peace and stability in Somalia and in 1993, the involvement of UNOSOM11 in 
the armed conflict in Somali resulted to the death of 18 contigents of the United States. This  
led to President Bill Clinton of the United States asking the United States troops to leave 
Somalia in October 1993 which resulted to the undermining of the achievement of 
UNOSOM11 and led to the United Nations ordering the withdrawal of UNOSOM11 from 
Somali on 31st March 1995 (Agada 2008; Ani 2016).  
The withdrawal of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM11) led to increasing 
proliferation of weapons and insecurity in Somalia. It also led to the emergence of warlords 
competing for the control of Somali cities and through proliferation of weapons, piracy along 
the coast of Somalia and organised criminal activities increased and equally transformed the 
conflict from that of clan to warlords and the conflict also led to the decentralisation of power 
in Somalia with the formation of many self-governing states like Somaliland in 1991, 
Puntland in 1998, Galmudug state in 2006 and Himanlyo Heeb in 2008 (Muigel 2013; Pham 
2010).  
4.2.3.  The involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the conflict in Somalia 
The conflict in Somalia have been the intervention of several actors both regional and 
international actors. Apart from the interventions from the United Nations with the following 
peacekeeping operations; the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM1) in August 
1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) a peacekeeping partnership between UNOSOM 1 
and the United States in December 1992 and the United Nations mission in Somalia 
(UNOSOM 11) in 1993 (Miyandazi, 2012:2).  
4.2.4. The involvement of Kenya in the conflict in Somalia. 
The 2002-2004 Somalia peace talks were hosted by Kenya and equally provided a base for the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed till 2005 when it moved 
to Mogadishu, the capital Somalia. The 2004-2004 Somalia peace talks in Kenya were held 
under the authority of member states of IGAD with the Global community establishing  the 
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TGF and on the 16th October 2011, Kenyan military step into Somalia and have been in 
action against the Al-Shabaab armed group since 2011 till 2020 due to the following reasons;  
• Frequent kidnapping and killings by Al-Shabaab of tourists in its coastal and North-
Eastern provinces was having a negative impact on Kenya economy. 
• Exploration of oil in Somalia waters. 
• The military intervention of Kenya in Somalia was a demonstration of its military 
capability and strenght as a regional power and to address a major regional threat. 
• The Intervention by Kenya was an act of counter-terrorism due to the influx of Al-
Shabaab militias into Kenya and the carrying out of terrorist attacks inside Kenya 
territories such as in Westgate in 2013. 
• The effect of piracy in Somalia which paralysed the activities of Mombasa seaport in 
Kenya (Miyandazi 2012; Warner 2012; Williams 2018).  
Ethnicity and geographical conditions led to historical linkages between Kenya and 
Somalia and the North-Eastern province of Kenya is occupied by a Somali ethnic tribe 
and  since the outbreak of war in Somalia in 1991, Kenya have hosted over 500,000 
Somalis and apart from the influx of refugees into Kenya from Somalia, Kenya have been 
participating in negotiations and peace processes in Somalia to reconcile the warring 
groups in Somalia. Kenya intervened in Somalia in other to protect its national security 
and that Kenya continue to work towards stability and peace in Somalia through the 
creation of a security neutral zone in Jubaland to safeguard Kenyan domestic interest and 
national security and the intervention in Somalia by Kenya have transformed the conflict 
in Somalia to a regional conflict and the role of Kenya in the conflict in Somalia cannot 
restore peace because kenya’s motive is based on national interest (Eriksson, 2013) and 
(Mohammed, 2014). 
4.2.5. Ethiopia involvement in the conflict in Somalia 
Ethiopia and Somalia share a history characterised by hostility over the Ogaden region of 
Eastern Ethiopia inhabited by Somalia and  with the breakout of civil war in Somalia in 1991, 
Islamic groups such as Al-Itihad declared war against Ethiopia and carried out several 
terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia and apart from armed attacks from Al-Itihad, the civil war in 
Somalia spread to Ethiopia creating instability in the region spearheaded by groups with 
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affliation in Somali such as the Ogadan National Liberation Front (ONLF) waging war 
against Ethiopia (Abink, 2006:8).  
The activites of these Islamic groups in Ethiopia influnced by conflict in Somalia led to the 
military intervention by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in 2006. The 
intervention of Ethiopia in the conflict in Somalia transformed the conflict into a transnational 
conflict  and because it resulted into the insurgency against Ethiopia by several Islamist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda and by proxy the Eritrea government and Ethiopia equally providing 
military support to warlords in Somalia against the Islamists groups and Ethiopia intervention 
in Somalia created an humanitarian crisis as thousands of civilians were displaced in the 
Armed conflict between between the Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the 
Islamists groups in Somalia worsened the humanitarian situation in the region (Mohammed, 
2014). 
 
4.2.6. The Emergence of Political Islamist Groups and its Impact on the Conflict in 
Somalia. 
The emergence of political Islamist groups in the conflict in Somalia can be traced to the 
activities of the Al-Itihad group which began in 1995 with the establishment of a base in the 
Gedo region and the setting up of an administrative pseudo state and Islamic courts were 
therefore established in constituencies by AI-Itihaad for the basis of governance and 
maintainance of law and order. Other Islamic groups such as Ai-Itisan Wal Sunnah attempted 
to establish Islamic courts in the somalia courts in the Somalia capital, Mogadishu but such 
efforts did not work due to divisions between Northern and Southern Mogadishu and the first 
fully operational Islamic court was established in 1997 by the Abgal followed by the 
establishment of four main Islamic courts which were Hararyagale (Murosade), Shirkole 
(Saleebaan), Ifka Halane (Ayr) and Warshahada Aazaha (Duduble) (Bendtsen 2012; Hansen 
2013).  
In 2000, after the Somalia National Peace conference in Djibouti, the Islamic courts united to 
form the United Islamic court (UIC) and the establishment of Islamic law and in 2006, the 
United Islamic court (UIC) created an armed wing called Mu’ashar Mahkamad and remained 
Jamaa’a AlShabaab (Al Shabaab)  After the defeat of the United Islamic Court by the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ethiopia Armed Forces in 2006, Al Shabaad 
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left the United Islamic court and became an Independent Insurgent group fighting with the 
Transitional Federal Government, Ethiopia and Kenya and other islamic groups in Somalia 
(Hansen 2013; Reid 2016).   
Since 2006, Al Shabaad have changed the dimension of the war in Somalia into a global war 
directed against the United States and Europe with terrorist attacks carried out in Kenya, 
Uganda and Djibouti with a jihadist agenda such as the 2010 Kampala bombing and the 2013 
Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi and Al-Shabaab have been able to capture and 
control territory, sea ports and lines of communication like Southern and Central Somalia, the 
port city of Kisumayo and Baido which has assisted their operations and are a source of 
generating resources and with the imposition of sharia law as their mode of governance, they 
have been able to maintain and consolidate their grip on occupied communities (Uluma 2014; 
Horadam 2011).  The conflict in Somalia have been complicated by the activities of Al-
Shabaab who continue to commit crimes against humanity and engage in terrorist atatcks and 
armed conflict with the government in Somalia, the regional countries involved in the conflict 
such as Ethiopia and Kenya and also the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
 
4.3.  THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC. 
The Central African Republic is a noncoastal country in the Central African region. Its 
population is made up of christianity, Islam and indigenous beliefs. Since gaining its 
sovereignity from France in 1960,  the Central African Republic has been unstable. Despite its 
abundant mineral resources such as diamond, gold, oil and uranium, the Central African 
Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Since 2013, the Central African 
Republic has been involved in a political, ethnic and religious conflict that has created an 
humanitarian crisis and has spread across the region. Since 2014, the African Union has been 
involved with the United Nations in joint peacekeeping operations in the Central African 
Republic through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stablization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA). 
4.3.1.  The conflict in the Central African Republic. 
The conflict in the Central African Republic will be analysed briefly starting with the 
historical development of the conflict, the current conflict of which is the focus of this thesis, 
the religious dimension of the conflict and the involvment of local actors such as the Seleka 
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and anti-Balaka groups, regional actors like  Chad, Sudan, Camerron, Angola and the 
Republic of Congo, Foreign actors like France and South Africa, International institutions like 
the Economic Community of Central African States and the European Union and Non state 
actors like the Lord’s Resistance Army. 
4.3.2. The development of the conflict in the Central African Republic. 
The Central African Republic is a non-coastal country with a history of political uncertainty 
after gaining independence from France in 1960 and its political history has been 
characterised by military coups, mutinies, political instability and violence with civil conflicts 
in 1996-1997, 2001-2003, 2006-2007 before the current conflict started in 2013. The 
Presidency of David Dacko after independence in 1960 was characterised by daconian laws 
and ethnicity and was desposed in a military revolt by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1965 
and he suspended the constitution and renamed the state “Central African Empire” with the 
declaration of himself as Emperor for life (Call 2012; ICG 2007).   
Jean-Bedel Bokassa 14 years reign was characterised by gross human rights violations. 
Bokassa was overthrown in 1979 and David Dacko was restored as President and removed in 
1981 by Andre Kolingba. Andre Kolingba was overthrown in March 2003 by General 
Francois Bozize a Presidency characterised by corruption that affected the economic 
development of the Central African Republic  Since independence in 1960, few developments 
have been achieved in infrastructure, health and education with difficulties in accessing public 
goods and basic services and regional, ethnic and religious identities among the population of 
the Central African Republic were influced by Geographic conditions, historical patterns of 
human settlement and interactions between Muslims and the Christian groups (Amadou and 
Copley, 2015). 
Aaprt from the capital Bangui, where  infrastructure, basic services and states institutions are 
concentrated, the rural areas have been grossly neglected by successive governments resulting 
in abject poverty and isolated villages especially the Northern part of the country and the 
actions of several Presidents have resulted into a weak national security forces which resulted 
in large areas of the Central African Republic been controlled by local criminal groups, 
transnational armed actors like the Lord’s Resistance Army (Amadou and Copley 2015; 
Diallo 2015).   
4.3.3. The current conflict in the Central African Republic 
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The recent crisis in the Central African Republic began in 2012 but escalated in 2013 after 
President Francois Bozize was overthrown in March 2013 by the Seleka rebellion. The Seleka 
Militias a predominantly rebel group of a coalition of Muslims from the Northern part of the 
country engaged the anti-Balaka, a group of christian militias in an armed conflict  and the 
intervention of the African Union together with France resulted to the defeat of the Seleka and 
the drafting of a new constitution in December 2015 and elections in Febuary 2016 (Knoope 
and Buchanan-Clark 2017; Klienfeld 2017).  
In 2014, the Seleka group splitted into several factions fighting among themselves over 
domination of resources and migration and targeting civilian communities leading to 
destruction of lives and properties and the Central and North Central regions of the Central 
African Republic is undergoing a resurgence of violence and in the North-Western part of the 
country, rivalry amongst rebel militias and bandits over the dominance of periodic migration 
pathways and the livestocks market continue to undermine the implementation of the various 
paece process (Knoope and Buchanan-Clark 2017; Kleinfied 2017). 
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have taken over the Eastern towns of Nzako and Sam 
Quandja  and The Central African Republic continue to witness armed conflicts between 
pastoralists and farming communities, between christians and Muslim communities which 
have resulted into an humanitarian crisis with an estimated 478,848 internal displaced persons 
(UNOCHA, 2017). 
4.3.4. The Religious dimension of the conflict in the Central African Republic 
The November 2015 report by conciliation resources on the review of conflict and 
peacebuilding in the Central African Republic stated that religion and ethnicity are not the 
primary causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic but the elites exploited the 
religious identities and the religious based discrimination especially within the Muslim 
communities to fuel the crisis.  The various government in the Central African Republic from 
independence in 1960refused to recognise Muslim organisations due to the historical ideal 
that the Central African Republic was a frontline state of christian facing the Muslim North 
and that this conspiracy theory had long determined the political culture of the local populace. 
Therefore since the current conflict started in 2012, Muslim Seleka rebels that overthrown the 
government of Francois Bozize continue to engage the anti-Balaka militia groups made up of 
Christians and animists in large scale reprisal attacks (Cadman 2015; HRW 2016).  
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The fall of the Seleka Muslim rebel group in 2014 led to widespread anti-Muslim violence 
and displacement of a significant population of the Muslim communities leading to the crisis 
in the Central African Republic been portrayed as a religious conflict between Muslims and 
christians and the discrimination against Muslims in the Central African Republic was a major 
factor that led to the rebellion by the Seleka who tied of being regarded as second class 
citizens in their own country and those attacked by the Seleka rebels were attacked based on 
their religios beliefs (Cadman 2015; Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels 2014).  
Also in 2014, the anti-Balaka militias consisting of Christians and animists attacked not just 
members of the Seleka rebel group but people of a different religious identity and the anti-
Balaka militias attacked religious buildings such as the Bangui Foul neighbourhood mosque  
among others, Muslim women were raped and various war crimes and gross human rights 
violation committed against the Muslim population in the Central African Republic (AI 2014; 
Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittals 2014).   
Although the various acts of violence perpetuated by the Seleka and the anti-Balaka groups in 
the Central African Republic led to the conflict been described as a religious conflict by 
several scholars and the media and  violence between the Seleka and the anti-Balaka rebel 
groups had social and economic roots such as the profits from artisanal mining of diamond 
and gold, control over border crossings and checkp points and pastoralism, religious ideology 
or differences did not lead to the violence but deepened the faultline between the local actors 
involved in the conflict (Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels, 2014) 
4.3.5. The Regional and International actors in the conflict in the Central African 
Republic 
Regional organisations like  the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
regional actors like Chad, Sudan, Camerron, Angola and the Republic of Congo and 
international organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union, the European 
Union and the International Contact Group on Central Africa Republic and international 
actors such as France and South Africa and non-state actors like the Lord’s Resistance Army 
have impacted and played various roles in the Central African Republic crisis. 
77 
 
4.3.6.  Regional actors involved in the conflict in the Central African Republic. 
4.3.6.1. Chad 
Chad and the Central African Republic have communities within their border areas that share 
common languages and traditions and as a result both countries share similar political, 
historical and anthropological orientations and Chad has been a key actor in the present crisis 
in the Central African Republic as a result of the involvement of Chad’s President Deby in the 
overthrown of President Bozize of the Central African Republic and equally remain a major 
actor in the resolution of the conflict, making Chad’s role in the conflict not only ambiquous 
but also highly problematic. Also since 2002-2003 till date, Chad kept on playing a central 
role in Central African Republic politics and security. And the following reasons can be used 
to explain Chad’s involvement in the Central African Republic. 
• The Northern Central African Republic served as a base for opposition groups 
challenging the government of Chadian President Deby. 
• The inundation of refugees from the crisis in the Central African Republic led to a 
scarcity of resources in Southern Chad. 
• Pastoralism is Chad’s major source of revenue after oil and increasing desertification 
have resulted in migration of Chadian pastoralists into the Central African Republic 
and the conflict in the Central African Republic have resulted into rivarly over  access 
to water and land between Chadian pastoralists and Central African Republic Farmers. 
• The need by Chad to protect its oil wells and reservoirs in the border regions between 
the country and the Central African Republic. 
And although Chad’s President Deby has been a major actor in the current Central African 
Republic crisis and processes of resolving the crisis, Chad participation  in the conflict has 
been of a more negative impact  to the Central African Republic (Carayamnis and Lombard 
2014; Welz 2014).  
4.3.6.2. SUDAN 
The Sudanese government provided military and financial assistance to the Muslim Seleka 
rebel groups between 2012 and 2013 and relationship between Khartoum and Seleka’s leaders 
such as Michel Djotodia existed since the 1990s when Micheal Djotodia was based in the 
town of Nyala in Southern Darfur. Apart from military, financial and logistical support given 
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to the Seleka rebels by the Sudanese government, the following factors were given as reasons 
for Sudan involvement in the conflict in the Central African Republic; 
• Increasing regional insecurity with the support given to the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) by President Bozize of the Central African Republic. 
• Sudan support of the Seleka rebels was to gain more allies and to become more 
influencial in the region and to exploit Central African Republic natural resources 
(Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels, 2014). 
4.3.6.3. CAMEROON 
The commencement of hostilities in the Central African Republic in December 2012 led to 
increasing insecurity in Eastern Cameroon and Cameroonian authorities had to intervene in 
the Central African Republic to stop  the use of Cameroon as a new base for anti-Balaka and 
Seleka rebels. There is are accounts of smuggling of diamond and gold shared between the 
Central African Republic and Cameroon into Cameroon and since most of Cameroon’s gold 
mines are situated  in Eastern Cameroon in close proximity to the Central African Republic 
border, icreasing Diamond and Gold smuggling as a result of the conflict in the Central 
African Republic impacted negatively on Cameroon’s gold and diamond sales (Matthysen and 
Clarkson, 2013) 
4.3.6.4. ANGOLA 
Angola’s involvement in the conflict in the Central African Republic began in 2014 to support 
the transitional process in the Central African Republic and in 2015, Angola under the 
Kimberly process began dicussions on the partial resumption of the exports of diamond West 
and South-West Central African Republic ((Marchal, 2015). 
4.3.6.4. REPUBLIC OF CONGO   
In 2013, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo was made the mediator of 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The government of the 
Republic of Congo has also assisted the ECCAS Peacekeeping Operations in the Central 
African Republic with funding and provision of troops and since September 2014, the leader 
of the Front Democratique Du Peuple Centrafricain’s (FDPC) leader Abdoulaye Miskine has 
been hosted and protected by President Denis Sassou Nguesso and  the interest of the 
Republic of Congo in the conflict is based primarily on security and the goodwill of the 
international community despite allegations of an hidden agenda (Marchal, 2015) 
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4.4. International organisations involved in the conflict in the Central African 
Republic 
The involvement of the United Nations and the African Union in the conflict in the Central 
African Republic will form the basis of Analysis in the next chapter and because of this only 
the involvement of  global and regional institutions like the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) and the European Union will be discussed briefly here. 
4.4.1. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have been involved 
significantly since the outbreak of the Central African Republic crisis through provision of 
troops and financial support and also leading several mediation talks. The involvement of 
ECCAS in the conflict in the Central African Republic have been driven by political and 
economic interest from members such as Chad and as a result ECCAS has been unable to 
prevent increasing instability and insecurity in the Central African Republic resulting in the 
transformation of ECCAS led Peacekeeping operation, the Mission for the Consolidation of 
Peace in CAR (MICOPAX) into an African Union led peacekeeping mission, the 
International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 1st August 2013 
(Welz, 2014) and (Bakari, 2014). 
4.4.2. The European Union 
The European Union on 1st April 2014 deployed EUFOR CAR under the authorisation of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. EUFOR CAR provided temporary support to the 
other forces involved in the peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic for six 
months and was given order to do the following; Stabilising and protecting some districts in 
Bangui and making possible humanitarian services (EU, 2014). EUFOR CAR was withdrawn 
on 31st March 2015 and before its withdrawal, the European Union launced a numerous trust 
fund connecting relief, rehabilitation and development in July 2014 with a sum of 64 million 
Euros and an additional 72 million Euros in 2015 (EU, 2015). 
4.5. International actors involved in the conflict in the Central African Republic. 
4.5.1. FRANCE 
Since independence of the Central African Republic from France in 1960, France has 
continued to play major econmic and political roles in the Central African Republic. In 
December 2013, France launced Operation Sangaris consisting of over 1600 troops from 
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France and the African Union under the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2127 and France was also involved in the electoral procedures  and involved the 
European Union in the conflict and also contributed significantly to the  Transformation of 
MISCA into MINUSCA (Dukhan, 2016) 
4.5.2. SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa in 2007 signed a military pact with the Central African Republic renewed in 
2012 by President Bozize with other agreements in natural resources exploration and defence 
and on the 2nd of January 2013, South Africa deployed over 400 soldiers to the Central 
African Republic but withdrawn from the Central African Republic after the overthrown of 
President Bozize by Seleka Muslim group and the involvement of South Africa in the conflict 
in the Central African Republic is based on economic interest especially in the diamond and 
oil sectors (Dukhan 2016; Weyns, Hoex and Spittaels 2014).  
 
4.6.  Non State Actors Involved in the Conflict in the Central African Republic 
After the end of the cold war, several conflicts particularly in Africa has transformed from 
that of inter-state to intra-state and from the 2000s, several African nations like Nigeria, 
Uganda and the Central African Republic among others began to witness conflict involving 
states and non-state actors such as Boko Haram in West Africa and the Lake Chad basis 
region and the Lord’s Resistance Army in East and Central Africa. 
4.6.1. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
 The Lord’s Resistance Army emerged in the Central African Republic South-East region of 
Haut-Mbomu Prefecture and that the weakness of the various regimes in the Central African 
Republic and the absent of a strong and national army coupled with geographical factors like 
remoteness and the Central African Republic porous borders made the Central Asfrican 
Republic attaractive to the Lord’s Resistance Army. The Lord’s Resistance Army is a major 
hinderance  to Peace and Security in the East and South East of the Central African Republic. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army has been entangled in human rights abuses  and other acts like 
banditry, exploitation and trading of ivory and gold. And since 2013, EX-Seleka groups and 
the LRA has been operating within the same region  and the attacks by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army on rural communities in the Central African Republic has displaced hundreds of 
thousands of people (Cakaj 2015; Dukhan 2016).  
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The LRA issue show that the lack of capacity by failed/weak nations and global 
organisations to deal with armed groups like the LRA that are versatile and move 
across national borders, consitute a major challenge to various efforts to stop violence  
(Cakaj, 2015). 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the conflicts in the research area of this thesis namely Somalia, Darfur 
(Sudan) and the Central African Republic. This chapter dealt with the root causes and the 
historical development of the conflicts and the role played by religion and ethnicity especially 
in the conflict in Darfur and the Central African Republic and the roles played by regional and 
global institutions like the Economic Community of Central African States in the Central 
African Republic and the European Union in Darfur and countries like the United States, 
France and African countries like Angola, Cameroon and South Africa in the conflicts in the 
Central African Republic, Darfur and Somalia. Apart from the roles played by state actors 
also non state actors like the Lord’s resistance movement, the Balakas and Seleka in the 
Central African Republic, the Jajanweed in Darfur and political islamic groups like the Al-
Shabaab in the conflict in Somalia. The next chapter which is chapter 7 will examine the data 
gathered in the course of this thesis inconjunction with the aims and objectives of this thesis 















This chapter will discuss the theoretical framework that guides this study. This chapter will 
commence with a discussion of what theoretical and conceptual framework are. This will be 
followed by the discussion of some of the theories that have been used to study African Union 
and United National cooperations. Sectioni 4.3 will critically discuss the theory of collective 
security.   
5.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework  
Theories are formulated to explain, predict and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to 
challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical sounding assumptions. A 
theoretical framework is the structure that can hold or support the theory of a research study 
and it introduces and describes the theory that explains why the research problem under study 
exists (Abend, 2008), (Swanson, 2013). According to (Caliendo and Kyle, 1996), a theoretical 
framework differentiates the research of scholars from that of a journalist. Theoretical 
framework is made up of two words which are “theory” and “framework”. (Kerlinger, 
1986:9) defined a theory as “a set of interrelated constructs, definitions and propositions that 
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the 
purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena and a framework is a set of ideals that you 
use when you are forming your decisions and judgements”. 
(Kerlinger, 1996) argued that a theory can be successfully used to make predictions that can 
guide researchers to ask appropriate research questions, while a framework provides structure 
within which the relationships between variables of a phenomenon are explained. (lecompte 
and Preissle, 1993) defined theoretical framework as a collection of interrelated concepts that 
can be used to direct research with the purpose of predicting and explaining the result of the 
research. (Caliendo and Kyle 1996; Radhakrishna, Yoder and Ewing, 2007), defined 
theoretical framework as a method used to provide the rationale for conducting the research. 
According to (Ad-El-Khaliak and Akerson, 2007), theoretical framework is important in a 
research because a research is theory driven and should show how research fits into an 
existing theory and research and its contributions and intellectual goals. 
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This study agrees with the various definitions of a theoretical framework and for the objective 
of this thesis will define theoretical framework as the structure that can hold or support a 
theory of a research study. The importance of theoretical framework to this study is that it 
helped in making predictions, interpretation and analysis based on an existing literature; it 
also guided the choice of the research design and questions and towards appropriate data 
collection methods and providing a connection to existing literature. 
Conceptual framework however prepares the research question that examines the research 
problem and issues that necessitated the research (Regoniel, 2015). A conceptual framework 
has been defined as an analytical tool, consisting of many variables and contexts and its major 
purpose is making conceptual distinctions and organising ideals (Richard, 2014). The 
differences between a theoretical and conceptual framework are: 
Theoretical framework is built on existing assumptions such as the realist theory while the 
conceptual framework is developing a theory based on your own concepts or relevant 
variables. In a theoretical framework, not all assumptions of a theory are utilised in a research 
while a conceptual framework utilises all its assumptions in the research. Theoretical 
framework provides an analysis of the relationship between factors of a phenomenon, while 
conceptual framework deals mainly with the relationship between a research variable 
provided by the conceptual framework.  
5.2  Theories used to study African Union and United Nations Cooperation on 
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 
Four  major theories have been used to study collaboration of the African Union and the 
United Nations on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. These theories are Resource Exchange 
theory, the Globalist theory, Realist theory and the Collective Security Theory. Collective 
security theory was selected as the theoretical framework of this the thesis because it remedies 
the weaknesses of other theories . The collective security is a security arrangement 
comprising of all or majority of states within and outside a particular region and it is not 
limited like the other theories with regards to collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations. 
5.2.1.  The Resource Exchange Theory 
The Resource Exchange theory is based on the postulation that cooperation between 
international institutions like that of the African Union and the United Nations on 
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is as a result of “resource complementarity” due to 
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scarcity of resources (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014). (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014) used the 
Resource Exchange theory to study the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, where 
sub-regional, regional and international institutions like the European Union and the United 
Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Using Burundi (2003), Darfur (2007), Mali (2013) and the mission of the African Union  in 
Somalia (AMISOM) as case studies, (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014) argued that the 
peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations in the 
aforementioned countries was a result of scarcity of resource, capability gaps and 
complementary capabilities. They identified the following intervening variables as 
determinants of exchange of resources between international organisations, 
congruence/compatibility of security policies, institutional match and strife for institutional 
autonomy. 
(Lwanga, 2017), using the exchange resource theory argued that Collaboration of the African 
Union and the United Nations in Somalia resulted to  legitimacy to the African Union Mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM) with regards to the African Union and funding with regards to the 
United Nations. Therefore, resource scarcity influences organisations to cooperate in order to 
manage scare resources, utilise available resources through the resource dependency approach 
which is geared towards the combination of individual capabilities (Lwanga, 2017).  
The strength of the Resource Exchange theory is that it acknowledges the facts that due to the 
complexity of conflict in Africa, no single organisation can on its own successfully carryout a 
peacekeeping operation in Africa. And while acknowledging the lack of financial capabilities 
of the African Union and other challenges in its Peace and Security Architecture, it also 
acknowledges the African Union’s comparative advantages such as proximity, cultural 
understanding, historical affiliation and local/internal knowledge of African conflict. The 
Resource Exchange theory demonstrates that resource pooling and burden-sharing is the basis 
of cooperative peacekeeping and provide an understanding of organisational cooperation 
(Lwanga, 2017). 
The weakness of the Resource Exchange theory is its inability to acknowledge the political 
dimension of cooperative peacekeeping such as political, economic and national interest as 
seen in most of the conflicts in Africa, where countries and organisations involved in 
peacekeeping operations do so based on the above variables. It also fails to take into 
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consideration issues of non-cooperation and other factors such as delays and time gaps in 
cooperation (Lwanga, 2017).  
5.2.2. The Globalist Theory 
Another theory used to study the collaboration of  the African Union and the United Nations 
in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is the Globalist theory. The Globalist theory was used to 
study the cooperation between the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the 
Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations through the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
in 1999. 
Nye (2002) defined Globalism as a world that is characterised by networks of connections 
that span multi-continental distances, and when states undertake peacekeeping operations, it is 
because they wanted to reduce humanitarian crisis the selected states. Globalists are of the 
view that the international community must intervene to avoid bloodshed totally and that 
states hiding behind sovereignty must not be accepted when issues such as the total 
contravention of human rights or genocide occur as seen in Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi in 
1993 (Galadima, 2006). 
According to Grinin (2012), state sovereignty started declining from the late 20th century due 
to the process of globalisation such as international financial flows, multinational 
corporations, international  media empires and international interventions as seen in Libya 
(2011) and the new world order. This has resulted into states giving and reducing their 
sovereign rights willingly, because globalisation brought about technology and new pattern of 
trades that created a new pattern of network among states across national boundaries (Grinin, 
2012). 
Globalisation has brought about increase in trade resulting into open boundaries which has 
created a haven for terrorism and organised crimes to thrive with consequences on the 
security of states. Before the emergence of globalisation, conflicts across the world were 
mainly inter-state conflicts. Globalisation has seen conflict spreading from the host country to 
several countries. An example is the Boko Haram insurgency which started from Nigeria but 
later spreading across the West African region with consequences not only on the security of 
countries within the region but their sovereignty. 
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(Phahlamohlaka, 2008), argued that this fragmented conflicts involving armed non-state 
actors operating in failed states and deprived areas conduct attacks on civilians, governmental 
and private institutions resulting into humanitarian crisis, regional insecurity and instability. 
Globalisation has also resulted into a reduction in countries’s defence budget, with emphasis 
on deterrence, privatization of state security, involvement of non-state actors in state defence 
and participation of geographical establishments in the provision of peace and security with 
implications on state sovereignty (Phahlamohlaka, 2008). 
While economically advanced states, such as European states, have delegated certain 
sovereignty powers to international organisations like the European Union and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, states that share close ideology such as China, Iran, North 
Korea and Saudi Arabia have maximum state sovereignty (Grinin, 2012). 
In the global system, states are the major actors due to the fact that states possess supreme and 
independent authority without interference from others. This sovereignty held by states has 
been affected by the impact and process of globalisation, impacting on the security of states 
through open borders brought about by free trade and international organisations taking over 
the traditional roles of states in the international system. Therefore to combat increasing 
insecurity and instability, the concept of sovereignty need to be reconsidered, so that states 
can pursue a dominant role in intercontinental peace and security due to the availability of 
resources within their reach.  
(Weiss and Chopra, 1992) argued that the imperatives of Globalism have transformed the 
world into a global village, leading to a global moral independence and expanded 
humanitarian space. The Globalist theory refers to the cooperation between the Organisation 
of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the 
United Nations in Sierra Leone as humanitarian interventions, to safeguard human lives and 
prevent an humanitarian crisis (Galadima, 2006). During the Liberia civil war from 1989, 
over 250,000 people were killed (Cillers, 2004) and in Sierra Leone in 1999, over 75000 
people were killed (Gubereki, 2006). The strength of the Globalist theory is that states no 
longer pursue their security objectives individually, and there is increasing cooperation among 





5.2.3 The Realist Theory 
The realist theory is another theory was used to study partnership in peacekeeping operations 
of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The realist theory has been used to 
examine the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Obinna, 2015) and the United 
Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Lanz, 2010). The origin of realism can 
be traced to the works of Thomas Hobbes and Nicolo Machiaveli (Goordin, 2010:132). 
According to realists such as (Mearshemer 2002; Morgenthau 2002; Waltz 1990), realism is 
centred on the following premises: The state is the central actor in the global system, a system 
characterised by anarchy with the state being the only actor capable of regulating interactions 
in the international system. The primary concerns of  states is having the military capabilities 
to defend themselves and protect their territories. Interactions among states are based on self 
interest and resources attainment and the story of international relations is that of great power 
politics. 
Using realism to study the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 
(Lanz, 2010) argue that materials interest and competition between intervening states were the 
major factor in the cooperation of the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur. This is 
in support of the argument of (Waltz, 1990) and (Mearsheimer, 2002) that cooperation among 
states can only succeed due to the alignment of state interests and preferences. Also using the 
realist theory to analyse the African Mission in Somalia, (Obinna, 2015) argued that the 
involvement of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia was based on domestic and 
economic concerns. A major weakness of the realist theory is its emphasis mainly on power 
politics and national interests as the basis of institutional cooperation. This theory fails to take 
into consideration other emerging factors brought about as a result of globalisation (Korab-
Karpowicz, 2010). Another weakness of the realist theory is one of its assumptions about the 
state being the major power in the international system (Waltz, 1990). This assumption did 
not take into consideration the impact of non-state actors in conflicts across the world. This is 
more so on the African continent where non-state actors like terrorist, ethnic and religious 
movements are playing a major role in countries like Darfur, Somalia and the Central African 
Republic. 
The major strength however of the realist theory is that it provide an understanding of the 
nature of human behaviour with a clear analysis of inter-state and institutional relationship 
and the nature of such interactions. 
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5.2.4 Collective Security Theory 
This chapter earlier discussed three other theories which were the Globalist, Resource 
Exchange and Realist theory that had been used to examine partnership of the African Union 
and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa and the strengths and 
weaknesses of these theories were stated. However, collective theory remedies these 
weaknesses because it is a security arrangement which comprises all or majority of states 
within a particular region. Collective security is not limited to resource complementarity of 
the resource exchange theory, nor based on national and self interest of the realist theory and 
not influenced by the process of globalisation. Collective security is  joint interventions to 
challenges to peace and security. This section will be divided into four subsections, starting 
with definitions of collective security, weaknesses of collective security theory, strengths of 
collective security theory and conditions that make collective security successful. 
5.3. What is Collective Security? 
The development of the theory of collective security which is summarized in a phrase “an 
attack on one is an attack on all”, can be traced to the Holy League of Venice in 1454, the 
treaty of London in 1518 and the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The above treaties were early 
examples of collective security mechanisms although it was limited to the nations bound by 
these treaties but after the Napoleonic war on 1815, collective security became an 
international concept in the concert of Europe, which was an attempt by European powers to 
keep the existing state of affairs and prevent war (Reichard, 2006:9). 
Although the concert of Europe existed without written rules or permanent institutions, it was 
based on a balance of power arrangement where the expansionist activities of every European 
power would be checked by other powers and countries in Europe (Georges-Henri, 2010). On 
28 July 1914, the world erupted into a major war caused by factors such as imperialism, the 
spread of nationalism, territorial and economic conflicts and complicated alliances and 
triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinard of Austria by a Bosnian Serb 
(Ruth, 2006). The League of Nations was formed in 1920 with the concept of collective 
security to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedies of the 1st world war. According to (Struic, 
2017), the League of Nations was the first global institution established on the concept of 
collective security in modern world.  
The League of Nations collapsed with the beginning of the 2nd world war in September 1 
1939 and in 1945, the United Nations was established with its charter making strong 
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provisions for the principle of collective security. Articles 39-51 of Chapter VII of the charter 
gives the Security Council of the United Nations the principal right to maintain or restore 
international peace and security through individual or collective interventions to threats to 
international peace and security. These responses to threats  to international peace and 
security can be through the deployment of armed forces and sanctions totally complied to by 
all concerned parties.  
The United Nations charter in chapter vii defined the concept of collective security with 
regards to its application by the United Nations. On definition of collective security, 
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995:52) defined collective security as an agreement between states 
based on specific standards and regulations sustain stability and combining them  to stop any 
form of hostilities. This agreement between states are mostly limited to traditional collective 
security measures directed mainly at inter-state aggression where a state combine with other 
states to deter or fight against an aggressor which is typical of United Nations collective 
security arrangements. However these traditional methods of collective security create 
complications for addressing challenges of non-state actors. According to (Gleason and 
Shaihutdinov, 2005), applying the principles of collective security to the threats imposed by 
non-state actors comes with several challenges such as difficulties in identification of non-
state actors and groupings unlike state actors that are known. Also the fragmented modes of 
operation of non-states actors provide serious challenges to traditional methods of collective 
security.  
In order to address the issue of non-state actors, collective security theory has adopted several 
mechanisms which include decentralising institutions into various functions and designs 
(Gleason and Shaihutdinov, 2005). This is to enable collective security institutions deal 
effectively with all the issues of non-state actors and their challenges to peace and security 
with the conclusion being the elimination or neutralisation of these threats.  
Therefore in dealing with non-state actors, collective security involves international, regional 
and sub-regional cooperation and coordination and the involvement of various security 
institutions with several initiatives. A good example is the Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF) against Boko Haram. The MNJFT is under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin 
Commision (LCBC) a sub-regional organisation with contingents from Benin, Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger and Nigeria and authorised by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council 
with logistical support and funding from the United States, United Kingdom and France 
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working together through the centre for coordination and liaison (CCL) to support the MNJFT 
(EC, 2019).    
Sub regional organisations in Africa are involved in collective security arrangements in 
several conflicts across Africa, such as in South Sudan, Sahel, Central Africa and in the Lake 
Chad Basin (Ani, 2018). This shows that collective security theory assumes that the Africa’s 
sub-regional institutions and the African Union all play vital roles in collective peace and 
security. The primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa lies on the 
African Union through its collective security instruments at the national, regional and sub-
regional levels through the units of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture such as 
the African Standby force. In 2008, a multilateral agreement was signed among the African 
Union and the eight regional economic institutions in Africa with emphasis in peace and 
security collaboration. This means that the African Union and the regional organisations in 
Africa are collectively involved in the enhancement of peace and security in Africa.  
According to (Andreatta 1996; Organski 1960; Rourke and Boyer 1998), the concept of 
collective security rest on the following four principles. 
• Firstly, all states must only use force for self defence purposes only, meaning that 
collective security theory does not allow the use of armed force against any other 
country and nations must only apply force in defence of their territories and 
populations.  
• Secondly, the concept of collective security rest on the principle of indivisibility. This 
implies that a threat to the peace of a nation is a challenge to the collective peace of 
all nations and therefore challenges  to peace should be seen as collective threats 
which have the capabilities of undermining other nations. 
• Thirdly, as a result of the threats to the peace of a nation, all nations must collectively 
tackle such threats to peace by uniting together to take a collective decision about the 
aggressor and undertake collective actions to restore peace.  
• Fourthly, having collectively agreed about the aggressor and the aggressor seen as a 
common enemy, nations must then put together resources within their disposal such 
as finances, personnel, logistics and military capabilities and form a collective 
security force with authorisation from an international organisation such as the 
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Security Council of the United Nations to contain the aggressor or aggressors and 
reestablishing international peace and security.  
It is of significance that the host government must give its consent  before a collective 
security force is deployed. This assumption is vital especially in dealing with independent 
actors. The consent of the host government of the state where the aggressor or aggressors are 
being contained or eliminated is vital because the state has to relinquish some of its 
sovereignty to the collective security force or the international organisation under whose 
authority the collective security force is operating and this is to allow certain restrictions on 
autonomous military actions and for a successful peacekeeping operations (Jordaan, 2017). 
It is also important for major states within the international system to accept the legitimacy of 
collective security and act together to deal with states that constitute threats to peace and 
security (Jordaan, 2017). Therefore, states coming together to take a collective action against 
an aggressor or aggressors must act within the norms and rules of the international system. 
Also, such collective actions must be authorised by the Security Council of the United 
Nations and operative under the auspices of a supra-national or global organisation such as 
the African Union and other regional institutions. This will provide such collective security 
actions legality. 
  With regards to Africa, the African Union, as part of its collective security measures, came 
up with the ideal of local solutions to the problems of Africa which resulted in the formation 
of the African Peace and Security Architecture (Nathan, 2013). According to (Jordaan, 2017), 
the following sections of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture are committed to 
the promotion of collective security. Article 2 of the agreement dealing with the formation of 
the African Union Peace and Security Council state that: The Peace and Security Council of 
the union is hereby established, as stated by Articles 5 (2) of the constitutive Act, as a 
permanent decision making arm of the African Union responsible for the prevention, 
management and resolution of the conflicts and the peace and security council shall be a 
collective security and early warning arrangements to make sure that responses to conflicts 
and crisis conditions across Africa is fast and successful (AU, Protocol 2002, Article 2). 
Article 3 of the Agreement dealing with the formation of the African Union Peace and 
Security Council stated the objectives of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
as: Enhancing the process of peace and security and promote stability in Africa, expect and 
stop hostilities, enhance and establish process of building peace and reconstruction after the 
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end of hostilities, organise and balance endeavours in stopping and tackling terrorism, build a 
common defence strategy and enhance and inspire democratic practices. The constitutive Act 
of the African Union in Article 4 (h) gives the African Union the priveledge to respond in a 
member state with regards to issues on grave conditions such as war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: Article 4: h). Article 4: (j) gives also 
rights to member states to ask for the African Union to intervene so that peace and security 
can be restored (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: Article 4: J). The above represent a departure 
from the non-intervention policies of the Organisation of African Unity to that of non-
indifference based on the assumptions of collective security (Jordaan, 2017). 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which is the major postulation of collective security was 
also preserved in the constitutive act of the African Union which adopted the Ezulwini 
consensus in 2005 which recommended the Responsibility to Protect as a mechanism for the 
prevention of mass atrocities. The Ezulwini consensus is a common African Position adopting 
collective security measures to prevent conflicts and atrocities through collaboration with 
international and regional organisations on inter-state and internal conflict, conventional 
weapons, trans-national organised crime, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping capacity and 
terrorism all geared towards the Responsibility to protect (Lobakeng, 2017). 
The first test of the postulation of collective security by the African Union was with the 
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 with the collective efforts of member states of 
the African Union like South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tunisia and the United Nations. 
The African Union was a successful test case for collective security. Agoagye(2004) cited in 
Svennson (2008) argued in support that by the time the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
ended its mission on 31st May 2004 to be co-hatted into the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi (ONUB), 95% of Burundi was relatively stable. This point to the argument of this 
study that the collective security theory is the most suitable theoretical framework for 
explaining the collaboration of the United Nations and the African Union on peacekeeping 
operations in Africa. 
The African Union as part of its peace and security mechanisms is collaborating with the 
United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. The African Union Peace and Security 
Council is also collaborating with the United Nations Security Council in Peace-building in 
areas such as demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, reformation of the African 
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Union security sectors, post-conflict reconstruction and development and also collaboration in 
combating increasing terrorism in Africa (AU, 2013). 
 The African Union is therefore involved in collective security measures through cooperation 
with the United Nations in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia and the Central African Republic.  The 
chief goal of collective security is to maintain peace through dialogue, diplomacy, 
multilateralism and international organisations, to limit the outbreak of war among countries 
and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine of collective security has led to increasing 
intervention for humanitarian purposes in Africa and increasing cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations of  the African Union, the United Nations and other global organisations such as 
the European Union. 
With the type and dimension of  African conflicts which is fragmented and occur on a smaller 
scale within the peripheries of states, collective security seems to be the ideal theoretical 
framework for this study because these fragmented conflicts can only be resolved effectively 
through the involvement of various actors like the African Union, the regional organisations 
across the continent, global institutions like the United Nations and international actors like 
the United States, United Kingdom and France through logistical assistance and funding. 
(Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013). 
 
5.3.1. Weaknesses of Collective Security Theory 
The concept of collective security theory has been marginalised by the world powers 
particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Krisch, 2004). 
And as evident in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), the enforcement action of United Nations 
collective security is now conducted on the basis of alliances or coalition. The collective 
security mechanisms of the United Nations is the perogative of the permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council such as Russia and the United States and its application is 
determined by these hegemonies. (Krisch, 2004) argued that during the cold war, the 
application of collective security was determined by the United States in favour of its allies 
and United Nations collective security became an instrument for the propagation of United 
States foreign policy and self-defence. 
Another weakness of collective security theory is the operationalisation of the practice of 
collective security through several methods such as forceful interventions by a few states 
promoting their national interest as seen in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011), as against a 
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collective security system based on strict-rules therefore undermining the practice of 
collective security (Joensson, 2010). Some of this means of enforcement of collective security 
theory has created more destabilization rather than stabilization in its areas of operations due 
to a lack of a formal mode of operation thereby defeating the traditional principles of 
collective security. (Joensson, 2010) argued that the collective security system is upheld by its 
traditional principles such as state sovereignty with its principles of non-intervention while its 
practice is to protect civilian population, creating an unending compromise between the 
collective security system and practices of which consequences is humanitarian crisis and 
increasing insecurity. 
Another weakness is the lack of a central military force in the absence of states refusing to be 
part of a coalition against an aggressor. This occurred at the era of the league of nations with 
the non ratification of the treaty of Versailles such the punishment of Germany and as a result 
could not stop the commencement of the 2nd world war (Aleksovski, Bakreski and 
Avramovska, 2014). 
Another weakness of the collective security theory is some of its conditions which cannot be 
fulfilled because of its demanding nature such as: All states must agree to the status quo and 
must  use force only for the purpose of self defence and the definition of aggression must be 
agreed upon by states to avoid paralysis where its cases arise. States must provide adequate 
funding, deployment of their armed forces not as a result of their national interest on 
aggressive states and sanctions imposed must be observed by all states.  
This has failed because of economic and political interest of states as evident in Kosovo 
(1999) where China and Russia opposed sanctions by the United Nations Security Council as 
a result of the activities of Russia in Chechnya (1999-2009) and China in Tibet (1950) to 
prevent similar sanctions (Aleksovski, Bakreski and Avramovska, 2014).  
5.3.2. Strength of Collective Security 
The strength of collective security theory will be examined in this sub-section which is as 
follow: 
Collective security is an effective deterrent against an aggressor because collective security 
member states will be involved in a coalition against an aggressor to protect their national 
interest and security (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). 
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Collective security has led to increasing cooperation among states which promote trust among 
states and reduces the resources spent by states geared towards internal defence since states 
can put resources together to fight an aggressor (Mearsheimer, 2002). 
Collective security enhances stability and reduces hostility among states because an aggressor 
will understand that its actions will be contain by a collection of states which its combine will 
overwhelm its single capabilities. A good example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) that has been able to bring stability to Europe (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). 
Collective security enables the identification of aggressors and this is because the actions of 
an aggressor is determined by a committee of states thereby reducing the risks of 
misunderstanding and misconceptions when an action is taken against an aggressor and at the 
same time limiting the risks of cooperation among states. 
It also provides a framework for actions against certain situations. It create rules, norms and 
agreement on actions to be taken when there is a violation of peace and security by 
international institutions like the United Nations and the African Union and limit the risks of 
such actions on individual states , creating states expectation of reciprocity (Andreatta, 1996). 
5.3.3.  Conditions that make Collective Security Successful 
The following are some of the conditions that make collective security successful: 
Nation states must be satisfied in maintaining the status quo such as boundaries of states and 
must apply military force only for self defence and there must be a consensus among states on 
what implies an aggression. 
States especially regional powers must involve their resources such as finance and military to 
stop any form of aggression and must abide by sanctions imposed on an aggressor and must 
not assist such a nation and must allow the common defence of all member states to override 
their national interest. ( Joensson 2010; Rendall 2007). 
 
  Table 2: Alignment of Research Questions with the Collective Security Theory 
RQ1: To analyse the effectiveness of the 
AU/UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa 
Using one of the principles of collective 
security stating that nations must put together 
resources at their disposal such as finances, 
personel, logistics, military capabilities to 
form a collective strength to reestablish 
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international peace and security. 
RQ2: How are the failures and successes of 
AU/UN cooperation demostrated in these 
peacekeeping operations. 
Using collective security mechanisms such as 
decentralisation of institutions into various 
functions and designs to deal with non 
traditional challenges of peacekeeping 
operations such as the activities of armed non 
state actors and traditional ones such as 
funding. 
RQ3: What is the prognosis for future 
cooperation between the two bodies. 
Through collective security arrangements at 
the international, regional and sub-regional 
organisational level and coordination with the 
involvement of various security institutions 
with several initiatives. 
RQ4: How could the prognosis be improved 
to bring about effectiveness in future 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
By the state relinguishing some of its 
sovereignity to the organisations involved in 
the peacekeeping operations. This will result 
to certain restrictions on autonomous military 
actions and more effective peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
From the table 2 above some of the prionciples of collective security theory, application of 
collective security mechanisms such as the decentralisation of institutions of collective 
security into vrious functions and designs has made it possible to collective security 
arrangements to deal with traditional challenges of peacekeeping operations such as funding 
and logistical constraints. And non traditional challenges such as activities of armed non satte 
actors especially in fragmented conflicts in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic 
where the African Union and the United Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping 
operations.Apart from this, the prognosis for future collaboration in peacekeeping operations  
betweeen the African Union and the United Nations is through international, regional and 
sub-regional collective security mechanisms coupled with the coordination and involvement 





This chapter provided the theoretical framework that examined the collaboration of the 
African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. Using collective 
security as our theoretical framework, this thesis argued that the collective security framework 
is the most suitable theory for explaining the collaboration on peacekeeping operations of the 
United Nations and African Union in Africa due to the fragmented nature of conflicts in 
Africa, that spread to other countries across boundaries creating humanitarian and economic 
crisis and increasing regional insecurity and instability.  Section 5.1 engages with the 
definitions of theory, theoretical and conceptual framework and its differences. Section 5.2 
critically discussed other theories that have been used to study African Union and United 
Nations cooperation; these theories are the resource exchange theory, globalists and realist. 
This chapter culminates with a review of the collective security theory in section 5.3, its 
strengths, weaknesses, conditions that make it successful and its application to this thesis. The 
next chapter give a substantive illustration of the thesis research methodology and detailed 



















6.0.     INTRODUCTION 
According to Best and Kahn (1998), a good research uses valid and reliable procedures of 
data-gathering, instruments and techniques. This chapter will explain the reason for chosing 
the methods and procedures for this research work. Means of data collection, collation and 
analysis will be highlighted and this chapter will examine the research design, research 
paradigm, sampling method and recruitment, means and how data was collected, methods of 
data analysis and methods used to ensure trustworthiness of the research instruments, 
limitations and problems encountered in the course of this research work and the ethical 
principle involved. 
6.1. Research Design 
This chapter describes the appropriate research design involved in how data was collected, 
collated and investigation of data for this research work. It explains the research paradigm, 
sampling methods and recruitment, methods of collection of data, methods to guarantee 
validity and reliability, methods of data analysis, reflexivity, ethical principles and limitations. 
6.2. Research Paradigm 
Research paradigm is a broad method of connected procedure and thoughts that explains the 
dimension of enquiry based on the three major research process which are ontology, 
epistemology and methodology and it is a system of scientific and acedemic ideals, values and 
assumptions with regards to the nature and conduct of research (Thomas, 2003). 
A research paradigm defines the perspective of the researcher and guides the researcher on the 
types of research methods to be used in the course of the research and in the analysis of data 
collected (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017).This research work adopted a case study and qualitative 
paradigm which involved a structured gathering, presentation and analysis of data on the 
effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in peacekeeping 
operations in Somalia from 2007-2018, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
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(UNAMID) in peacekeeping operations in Darfur from 2007-2018 and the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) in peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic from 2014-2018.  
The methods  involved the collection of data texts, literatures, documents and the use of 
interviews to collect relevant data and analysing them based on qualitative techniques and a 
case study research approach. The qualitative approach gives broad insights to a research 
work and it is a set of how data is collected and investigated through the usage of purposive 
sampling, semi-structured and open-ended interviews and its an effective model that can be 
used to analyse the actual situation of things in a natural way. It also takes into consideration 
the different observations and interpretations of participants to have a complete understanding 
of the situations on ground (Mohajan, 2018). 
While a case study approach to research is a qualitative research method that gives an indepth 
explanation of a complex stituation. It allows the researcher to choose a particular 
geographical spread and a limited numbers of respondents as the research participants to be 
able to gather data within a particular context (Zainal, 2007). 
(Yin, 1989:14) argued that the necessity for the use of  a case study research is because of the 
aspiration to have an understanding of social situation that is compounded. A case study 
approach enabled this research to use multiple methods with both primary and secondary data 
sources. The qualitative research approach on the other hand allowed this reseach to be able to 
investigate and narrate the nature and quality of the behaviour of people, experience and 
understand in relation to the subject matter of this research (Hamza, 2014). 
(Flick, 1998:19) argued that the concentration of the subject’s points of view and on the 
meaning they attribute to the experiences and events as well as towards the meaning of 
objects, activities, and viewpoints, informs a large part of qualitative research which is the 
selected method for this research work. Qualitative method used allowed this research to 
examine the extent to which the United  Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) peacekeeping operations led to viable peace in Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic. The method examined some factors such as the mandates, funding, the role 
of concent and legitimacy, roles of African Economic Regional communities, the impact of 
armed non state actors and the complex nature of the African envinroment and their impact 
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with regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. The method also 
unraveled UNAMID, AMISOM AND MINUSCA mandate, specifically with regards to 
achieving sustainable peace in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic, examined 
the conditions that brought about conflict in Darfur, Somalia and CAR and appraised the 
effectiveness of the various peacekeeping operations. This design was used based on the chief 
objective of this research which is to examine the African Union and United Nations 
cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African 
Republic. 
6.3.  Sampling Technique 
Due to the impossibility of studying the whole population, this research adopted a sampling 
method of data collection. According to Ogunbameru and Ogunbameru (2010:43), sampling 
is refered  to as a smaller representation of large population and  the importance of sampling 
is to avoid the various difficulties faced by researchers in their attempt to study the whole 
population. Since researchers cannot make direct observations of the entire population,  data 
is collected from a set of individuals and used to make inferences about the entire population 
(Ogunbameru and Ogunbameru, 2010, 43). For selection of respondents for this research 
work the following sample method were adopted. 
Purposive sampling was used to select key informats and this presented this research with 
important data relevant to the research questions. The purposive sampling which allows for 
the selection of respondents whose experience is valuable for a proper understanding of the 
focus of attention of this research was selected because the objectives of this research required 
the knowledge of experts in peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic.This research also used network sampling and participants were asked to 
suggest other participants who qualify. Participants with expertise in the field of peacekeeping 
operations were selected from the African Union, educational institutions, ACCORD, Institute 
for Peace and Security Studies, the South African Institute of International Affairs and the 
political affairs offices of the embassies/consulates of the case studies which are Somalia, 
Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic. 
Therefore, a total of 30 key informants respondents (KIRs) were purposively selected for this 
research. The choice of these respondents was based primarily on their specialization, 
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expertise, experience and participation in peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the 
Central African Republic. 
Tabel 3: Tabular presentation of the sample size. 
Numbers of Respondents Positions/Expertise Institutions/Affliations 
8 These are senior lecturers and their 
areas of specialization is in the 
areas  of political science and 
international relations with 
specialiazation in African conflict 
and peace and security in Africa. 
They are from African institutions 
of learning which are the university 
of Zulu-land, Johannesburg, 
Witswatersrand, Jos and Addis-
Ababa university. 
10 These are experts on the crisis in 
Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic. 
The African Union specialised 
agencies which are the department 
of political affairs and peace and 
security. 
6 These are field and desk officers of 
the peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United 
Nations in Darfur, Somalia and the 
Central African Republic. They are 
members of the peacekeeping 
troops from Nigeria and South 
Africa and are involved in the 
actual operations of these 
peacekeeping operations. 
Peacekeeping operations which are 
UNAMID (Darfur), AMISOM 
(Somalia) and minusca (CAR). 
6 These are researchers with 
expertise in the field of 
peacekeeping operations in Africa 
with publications in the field of 
peacekeeping and peace and 
security in Africa. 
Research institutions in South 
Africa which are ACCORD in 
Durban and the Institute of peace 
and security in Pretoria. 
Total Number of Respondents (30). 
6.4. Sources of Data. 
The primary and secondary sources of data are the two types of data. The secondary data were 
gathered through the existing information from national and international sources like the 
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University of Kwazulu-Natal (UKZN) database, journal and conference papers, articles, 
books, reports and thesis.  Primary data sources used are interviews and official documents of 
the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations. 
 6.5. Interviews 
The use of interviews was one of the primary source of collecting data. The importance of the 
interview is that accurate and reliable information can be obtained, and on time too. Instead of 
writing the reponse, the subject or interviewee gave the needed information orally and face-
to-face. It also presented the opportunity to evaluate the sincerity and insight of the 
interviewee. The semi-structured interview was used in this research work. 
According to (Hitchcook and Hughes, 1989:83) interviews that are semi-structured make it 
possible for comprehensiveness to be achieved by presenting the chance on the interviewer’s 
part to investigate and enlarge the responses of the interviewee’s. This also can result to 
development of some sort of balance between the interviewer and the interviewee, leading to 
space for negotiating, discussing and expanding of the responses of the interviewee’s. 
(Bernard, 1988) argued that the benefit of the semi-structure interview is allowing the 
interviewer to be in control of the procedures of getting information from the interviewee, 
while equally following new leads as they emerge.  
This was the most challenging starting with drafting of interview questions according to the 
focus of this research. The second major challenge was getting the right respondents with 
specialiazation in the field of this research work. Most letters that I sent to prospective 
interviewees were not replied, the few that respondented declined. However, when my first 
respondent agreed to participate, he linked me with other experts in my area of research. The 
third challenge was funding because majority of respondents were based outside South Africa 
and I wanted a face to face interview methods.  
I had to make use of social media platforms such as skype in interviewing respondents from 
the African Union and members of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. Interviews with 
respondents within South Africa were done face to face but most were busy and some 
appointments were fixed very early in the mornings or late at night.  
The interviews were explosive and some of the information/data gathered were first hand 
experiences of respondents in the specialiasation of peacekeeping missions in Africa. As the 
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interview process progressed, I learnt several lessons about interviews. I learnt the importance 
of allowing the respondents the freedom to speak. I also learnt the importance of asking short 
and precise questions. It is also important to reassure the particicpants about the 
confidentiality of the interviews.  
The interview guide were questions directed at several classifications of respondents with 
regards to their experience in the field of peacekeeping operations and arranged 
correspondently across respondents to enhance uniformity in the gathering of data and 
allowing researcher to compare the data collected from the different respondents. As shown in 
Table 6.1, interviews were conducted with lecturers from the following African institutions; 
University of Zulu-Land, University of Witswaterands, University of Jos, Addis Ababa 
University and the University of Johannesburg.  A letter of introduction and a copy of the 
interview questions where sent to the respondants. The average interview lasted for one hour. 
Sixteen interviews were conducted through Skype and IMO and fourteen were conducted face 
to face. The researcher used the interview guide to focus the interview and to ensure some 
degree of compatibility, while allowing for flexibility in pursuing greater insight into unique 
practices and programmes. The interview questions comprised 30 questions which were 
divided into 2 sections which are: Demographic data and questions bordering on the United 
Nations and the African Union peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic. 
6.6. Validation of the instrument. 
According to (Bamisaye, 2001:74-76) validity is “the process by which a researcher actually 
measures what he claims  to measure, it is the extent to which differences among individuals, 
in scores reflect true differences among individuals and the characteristics being measured”. 
To ensure validity and reliability in this research work, the results were based on qualitative 
data. The instruments used such as the semi-structured interview under went scrutiny so that 
any form of bias or prejudice  will be removed . Data collected were cross checked with self –
reliant sources for the purpose of fair assessment and authenticity, attempts were made to 
separate facts from personal views using comprehensive analysis with regards to oral 
interviews.   
6.7.   Methods of Data Analysis. 
The research work adopted in-depth content analysis and descriptive analysis method. 
According to (Prabad, 2008:173) “content analysis is the scientific study of the content with 
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reference to the meanings, contents and intentions contained in messages”. (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1976) argued that content analysis may be seen as a procedure where message 
contents forms the premises for illustration of reasoning and concluding about the contents. 
According to ( Krippendorff 1980; Sandelowski 1995),  content analysis is a means of 
research making use of systematic and fair ways of describing and quantifying phenomena 
and it allows researchers to examine issues relating to theories to improve an understanding of 
the data. Scholars such as (Morgan, 1993) have criticised content analysis as a method of 
research analysis due to it being too simplistic as a technique and argued that content analysis 
does not lend itself to detailed statistical analysis and its a method of analysis is not 
sufficiently qualitative in nature. However the advantage of content analysis are: The method 
is content sensitive, the research design is flexible which can be used to enhance a grasp of 
communication meaning and finally,it is concerned with meanings, intentions, consequences 
and context. 
Therefore the indepth content analysis procedure was adopted due to its structured, objective 
and quantitative way of calculating communication variables in the study. This method 
involved extensive reading, prognosis, review and representation of conclusions from the 
review of every important data collected from the two sources of data, the primary and 
secondary sources. To deal with the danger of bias of sources of data, critical analysis of data 
from both primary and secondary source was carried out and the expertise of this research 
supervisor also helped to resolve this. 
This research looked at case studies and therefore made a comparative analysis using 
descriptive method of analysis. This involved a descriptive analytical narrative method 
involving inquiry, analysis descriptive interpretation of data collected from interviews and 
discussions with resource persons and groups. This method helped to describe, analyze and 
examine the role of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions in 
Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. 
6.8.       Research Reflexivity. 
According to (Shacklock and Smyth, 1998) reflexivity refers to the responsive disclosure of 
the part of beliefs and values which researcher hold in the choice of research methodology, 
for generating knowledge and its making as a research account. (Patnaik, 2013:100) argued 
that reflexivity is the awareness, assessment and reassessment by the researcher of the 
researchers own contributions and the consequent research findings. According to (Gouldner, 
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1971) it is frequently barely considered as logical attention to the place of the researcher in 
qualitative research. According to (Koch and Harrington, 1998) using the term in wide spread 
research delibrations is of the believe that the researcher should be involved in critique and 
appraisal of self and explaining the impact of the experience of the researcher on the research 
process stages. Reflexivity has a significant role in qualitative methodogies and of great 
importance in this research work. With regards to this research, the interviews i conducted led 
to a process of reflection about my initial assumptions and preconceptions about this research 
topic. I also becaome more objective unlike in previous research where i controlled by 
emotions and background and as a result all the analysis done in the course of this research 
are done impatially and effectively. 
To deal with the issue of reflexivity in this research, the bracketing tool was used.  Before the 
commencement of this research my past knowledge with my personal experiences, previous 
findings of the research topic was set aside and written down. This was followed by taking 
notes/memos during the interviews while alighting my biases and preconceived notions in my 
mind, taking notes of them while also keeping them in check. Finally during the analysis of 
the data collected my biases and preconceived notions about the research topic were made 
known in the interpretation of the data. According to (Koch and Harrington, 1998) bracketing 
is the deferment of all biases and beliefs with regards to the circumstances being researched 
before the commencement of the collection of data.  The three phases of bracketing defined 
by (Wall, 2004) which are bracketing pre action, bracketing in action and bracketing on action 
were applied.  The researcher engaged in self-critique with self-appraisal periodically in the 
process of this research to ensure that a distance is maintained between preconceived ideals, 
biases, beliefs, feelings and intentions about the subject matter and study area.  The research 
findings  according to (Van Manen, 1984)  help  rid the research of value judgments and to 
achieve this indifference, the researcher undertook a pre-field record of all personal beliefs, 
ideas and biases as regards the subject matter with the study area. Reflexivity was also 
considered at every stage of this research work through the examination and making clear the 
decisions made and making a review of the political and context conditions surrounding the 
research.  
6.9.  Ethical Principles. 
Respondents in social science research do not owe researchers any information and their 
participation in any research is based solely on their own volition. According to (Asante-
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Kissi, 2012) the only way participants protection can be guaranteed is if nothing in the 
research is traced to specific individuals or groups. Respondents were given a consent form 
indicating voluntary participation, guaranteeing their autonomy while protecting their 
confidentiality. In the analysis of data collected, statements or quotations made were not 
associated with the respondents name. To ensure that ethical principles were upheld in this 
research, the researcher made adequate efforts to present the research in such a way that it did 
not supress, falsify or invent evidence. 
 
6.10.    Summary 
Data collection is very crucial in research, as it determines the overall objectives of the 
research study. This chapter provided an in-depth information on the study and it established 
the facts, views and opinions, thereby ensuring the validity of the objectives.  
The response from lecturers, researchers in the field of peacekeeping, staffs of the African 
Union and members of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA through the interview provided 
their general opinions and views on the research objectives. Their responses provided an 
overview of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, 
Darfur and the Central African Republic. 
The data collected provided detailed information on all the objectives, showing the challenges 
confronting AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA. Several factors were examined such as the 
role of consent and legitimacy of peacekeeping operations, the role of African Economic 
communities and the impact of non armed state actors, the role of external actors, funding of 
the African Union peacekeeping operations, local owners and the complex nature of African 
environment. These gave the researcher and indepth analysis of the situations on ground a 
major advantage of the qualitative method of approach. The data collected from the interview 
are analysed and discussed in chapter 7.  
 
 





DATA PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
7.0    The African Union and the United Nations Cooperation on Peacekeeping 
Operations in Africa 
The Organisation of African Union (OAU) established in 1963 was transformed in July 2002, 
to the African Union (AU). This was done with the ideal that one of the major obstacle to the 
socio-economic development of Africa is the raising conflicts on the continent. Therefore 
there is the need to encourage peace, security and stability as a precondition for  the 
application of developmental and integration agenda, with the following principles, the 
settlement of conflicts in a peaceful manner and the right to live in peace and security (AU, 
2012).  
In December 2003, the agreement forming the African Union Peace and Security Council was 
approved and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was formed as the African 
Union’s highest ranking arm for conflict prevention and settlement of conflicts (AU, 2012). 
The agreement confirms the position of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(AUPSC) against the backdrop of the United Nations as the maintenance of international 
peace and security and the United Nations own recognition of regional arrangements as 
recommended by chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations (AU, 2010). 
Also, the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union,  an initiative of the African 
Union in its resolve to find African solutions to African problems through the following 
components, Peace and Security Council (PSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWs), 
African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise (POW) and the African Union Peace Fund 
and several norms such as, Supreme fairness of member states, denounce unconstitutional 
changes in government and the African Union just responses in member states in issues 
relating to mass atrocities and unconstitutional changes of government, that prevent and 
enhance a culture of peace and security and promote coordination with the United Nations on 
peace and security in Africa (Alfredo, 2013). 
Also, the African Union and the United Nations acknowledges  that the United Nations 
Security Council has the prime  but not exclusive responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security including the African continent  and also, both institutions also 
acknowledge that no single organisation alone can cope with the multitude of peace and 
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security challenges in Africa and that while the African Union is an important source of 
political authority for addressing threats to peace and security in Africa, it lacks the necessary 
material and financial capabilities to take decisive action alone to resolve these threats 
(Boutellis and Williams 2013; UN 2012). 
Therefore in order for the African Union to be able to meet its mandate of undertaking 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, it did not only established  its peace and security 
architecture but also forged close working relationships with the United Nations in 
peacekeeping operations in Africa and as a result,  there is a deepening relationship between 
the African Union and the United Nations in their efforts to respond collectively to Africa’s 
security challenges through collaborative multidimensional peacekeeping operations in 
particular. The African Union and the United Nations collaboration in peacekeeping 
operations has greatly intensified in recent years through the following collaborative 
endeavours in preventing conflict, mediating  and peacekeeping: Annual joint consultative 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(AUSPC) meetings since 2006, AU-UN Joint Task Force and desk-to-desk exchanges, where 
political regional developments and responses on the elimination and administration of 
conflicts are assessed and discussed since 2008, capacity building for mediation and the 
United Nations assisting the African Union in developing mediation plan of action and 
making operational the African Union panel of the wise and the establishment of the United 
Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), to enhance the partnership between the 
African Union and the United Nations in the area of peace and security (Aning 2010; Okumu 
and Jaye 2010; UN 2014). 
On peacekeeping operations in Africa, the African Union since 2006 has been partnering with 
the United Nations based on chapter viii of the United Nations charter which gives 
subsidiarity to regional arrangements and this is the basis for the African Union and the 
United Nations collaborating on peacekeeping operations in Africa Frameworks for 
cooperation were developed and some of these vision frameworks are: Collaborative efforts in 
conflicts and crisis situations with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and Counter-Terrorism (AU, 2012). 
In 2006, the document declaring the enhancement of the the African Union collaborating in 
peacekeeping operation was signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations which 
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resulted to the advancement of the establisment of the African Union Peacekeeping Support 
team in 2007 under the auspicies of the United Nations department of peacekeeping 
operations which led to proficiency in the provision of much needed skills, logistical 
assistance and transfering of technical knowledge to the division of peace support operations 
of the African Union. Some of the main contexts of this document are: Organisational 
development, development of human resources, financial administration, human rights, 
political, legal and electoral matters, social, economic, cultural and human development and 
food security and environmental protection (Clement and Smith, 2009:9). 
The African Union and the United Nations have cooperated in peacekeeping operations in, for 
example, Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The 
African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been engaged in peacekeeping operations 
in Somalia since March 2007 with the United Nations providing logistical support and 
funding (UN, 2012). The African Union and the United Nations established a hybrid 
peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan), the United Nations African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) in July 2007, with the United Nations providing funding, command and 
control structures (UN, 2007). A United Nations Security Council Resolution 2127 also 
established an African Union support mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 5th 
December 2013, to stabilize the country and was re-hatted into the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in 
September 2014 (UN, 2014). 
Therefore in the last few years, cooperation in peacekeeping operations amongst  the African 
Union and the United Nations has developed into a meaningful, practical and pragmatic 
partnership and the African Union has proven overtime that it has the capacity to undertake 
high-risk stabilization type peacekeeping operations geared towards an humanitarian 
intervention as evident in Burundi with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 and 
in Sudan with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 (UN, 2009). These 
according to the Brahimi Report (2000) are the no-peace-to-keep type of peacekeeping 
operations at which the United Nations are particularly bad and has been advised by the 
Brahimi report (2000) not to undertake (Deconing, 2010). 
However with regards to the peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United 
Nations, several challenges is limiting the effectiveness of this cooperation in peacekeeping 
operations as a result of the political and strategic calculations of both institutions and the 
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African Union lack the funding mechanisms, support capacity, logistics and personnel to 
sustain these peacekeeping operations. One of these challenges is structural imbalances which 
constitute an impediment to peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations and  the two organizations are unequal entities in the sense that the United Nations 
has more knowledge of peacekeeping and more advanced structures for coordination of 
peacekeeping operations while the African Union’s lack of expertise and resources in 
peacekeeping operations is a major motive for its collaboration with the United Nations on 
Peacekeeping operations in Africa but also raising various technical, budgeting and 
administrative challenges especially on the part of the African Union (Aoi, Deconing and 
Thakur  2007; De coning 2010). 
 The African Union and the United Nations collaboration on peacekeeping operations is 
asymmetrical given that advice and resources are flowing from the United Nations to the 
African Union and not the other way round and there is a larger gap between the demand for 
peacekeepers and the available supply of resources required to meet peacekeeping targets and 
therefore the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations  funded and 
supported by the international community  undermine the ability of the African Union to take 
independent decisions on the mandate, size and durations of these peacekeeping operations in 
Africa (Murithi 2008; O’Hanlan and Singer 2004). 
 African Union’s reliance on external resources rebuff it the independent priveledge to make 
decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peacekeeping 
operations, the numbers of peacekeepers, the nature of their equipment and support, the 
duration of the mission and the level and intensity of their operations and whenever a mission 
of the African Union is deployed, external sources of funding must be sought undermining its 
credibility on the continent and the primary maintenance of peace and security and limits its 
ability to exercise local ownership of certain initiatives (Benwick, 2015).  
In Somalia, AMISOM member states provided troops while the United Nations provided 
funding, training, logistics and planning support, resulting in a think tank  led by Former 
Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo has proposed various ways in which the African 
Union can raise its own funding through a levy of USD 10 on plane tickets to Africa and USD 




 The creation of an African Standby Force one of the units of the African Union Peace and 
Security Architecture will give more credence to the partnership with the United Nations on 
peacekeeping in Africa but such plans remains crippled by lack of funding and equipment and 
by continental rivalries between African powers and political differences between African 
Union member states and non-African members especially at the United Nations Security 
Council pose a major challenge to the partnership of the African Union and the United 
Nations on peacekeeping in Africa. At the January 2012 United Nations Security Council 
debate on collaboration between the United Nations and regional institutions in the 
maintainance of  international peace and security (Fletcher  2015; Williams and Boutellis, 
2014).  Moses Wetangula the then Kenya’s foreign minister argued that; 
The practice in the past two years seems to indicate an undesirable trend that appears 
to be selective on the part of the United Nations Security Council and that seems to 
disregard full consideration of the position and/or recommendations of the African 
Union or its organs. (UN, 2012) 
 In 2011, members of the Security Council of the United Nations and those of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union totally disagreed with regards to their various 
responses to the crisis in Libya (2011, Cote d’ Ivoire (2010-11) and Mali (2012) with regards 
to the funding of the African Union Mission in Somalia and with the passing of the United 
Nations Security Council resolution 2100 (2012) allowing a United Nations force for Mali 
(MINUSMA), the African Union considered this resolution “not in consonance with the spirit 
of partnership that the African Union and the United Nations have been striving to promote 
for many years on the basis of the provisions of chapter viii of the United Nations charter” 
(AU, 2013). 
Therefore the lack of a strong unified African Union voice in the United Nations due to 
limited African Union representation, lack of a strong mandate, human and financial 
capacities is a major challenge to peacekeeping collaboration between the African Union and 
the United Nations and as a result there is a lack of an effective bridging role between the 
African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and the African Union member states at the United Nations. That when a clear 
African Union position is presented , African members of the United Nations Security 
Council do not automatically represent the Africa Union’s official position at the United 
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Nations and vote in accordance with it as evident with the vote over the United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) ordering  a no-fly zone over Libya, when all three 
elected African members of the United Nations Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria and South 
Africa) voted in favor despite an earlier African Union statement saying no to any military 
responses in Libya (AU 2011; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). 
There is also the challenge caused by doctrinal gap between the United Nations and the 
African Union regarding peacekeeping deployments. While the United Nations aims at 
deploying in situations in which there is peace to keep, the African Union endorses a different 
approach arguing that “in certain situations, peace has to be created before it can be kept” 
(AU, 2007) creating tensions, fueling rather than solving some of the conflicts as seen in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1998-date), Somalia (2007) and the Central African Republic 
(2012).  
(Bar 2009, 2), identified the following six challenges confronting the partnership between the 
African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa: Allowing 
coordination and unity and the several actors, lack of the United Nations, the African Union 
and its partners to rebuild the post-conflict countries economies, the development of new 
challenges to security such as trafficking of drugs and activities of transnational criminals, 
coming to terms with transnational justice especially with the emergence of the International 
Court of Justice (ICC), governance matters on a larger scale such as security sector reform, 
public administration, public finance management and bolstering commitment to the 
international community despite the recent global financial and economic crisis. 
Institutionalization of peacekeeping is also occuring within an international climate that is 
complex and there are several actors with agendas that varies which restrict concentration on 
root causes and important issues and the United Nations together with the African Union are 
yet to build ordinary benchmarks. That collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations should be designed from the begining to enhance and 
appreciate national efforts while being sensitive and ajustable to the happenings on ground 
and there presently a lack of guidelines for the partnership in peacekeeping operations 
between the African Union and the United Nations, while the application of  chapter 8 of the 
United Nations charter is vague and that the doctrines and points of view of both 
organisations often diverge (Avezov 2013; Motjope 2011). 
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Intra-African Union rivalry and the controversies of the United Nations Security Council’s 
relationship with Africa’s Regional Economic Communities represent another challenge to 
collaboration on peacekeeping operations of  the African Union and the United Nations, 
chapter viii of the United Nations laid emphasis on regional arrangements while not 
differentiating what is regional and sub-regional  arrangements and this has led to several 
potential challenges as evident in Madagascar in 2009, between the African Union and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), Ellis (2009), the African Union and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Cote d’ Ivoire (2010-11),  Mali 
(2012) and this intra-African Union rivalry especially in cases mentioned above where 
Africa’s Regional Economic Communities and the African Union adopted different policies 
complicates the parntership on peacekeeping operations in Africa between the African Union 
and the United Nations (Nossiter 2011; Williams and Boutellis  2014). 
Peacekeeping partnership of the African Union and the United Nations were motivated by 
certain political and security situations that inspired the institutions to build practical solutions 
and did not arise from combined evaluation of the circumstances or a joint perception of 
addressing them and where the governmental adenda of both the African Union and the 
United Nations co-exist, practical division of labour evolved in a situation where African 
states contributed troops and the United Nations support with an extensive logistical and 
funding in an adhoc method and approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on 
seperate cases (De coning and Gelot 2012; Williams 2011). 
 Examples are the re-hatting of the African Union Mission in Darfur to the AU-UN Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with access to the United Nations assessed peacekeeping 
budget and other forms of assistance, the counter Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Regional 
Cooperation Initiative authorized by the African Union in November 2011 and endorsed by 
the United Nations Security Council in June 2012 is benefitting from support from the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations present in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (AU, 2012). 
On the African Union’s institutional capabilities with regards to its collaboration on 
peacekeeping operations with the United Nations, the African Union needs international 
support to organize, manage and lead its peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is not well 
designed for working with outside partners and this complicates the African Union’s ability to 
effectively accept needed offers of support from other entities and that gaps in the African 
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Union institutional capacity present the organisation with significant challenges in recruiting 
and deploying personnel, meeting logistical requirements, managing peacekeeping operations 
and sustaining forces on ground (Andrew and Holt, 2007:3). 
 The Prodi report (2008) a joint African Union and United Nations report on peacekeeping 
operations in Africa stated that;  
Much of the African Union’s institutional weakness stems from the fact that it is an 
organisation in transition, structures and procedures that were conceived in the days of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are at odds with, and inadequate to support, 
the African Union’s increasingly proactive approach. Even the structures agreed upon 
at the African Union summit held in Maputo in 2003, suffered from the lack of clear 
expectation of what the commission’s programmes should be or what they should 
deliver and from the failure to meet the approved staff complement was due to an 
inefficient recruitment process, encumbered by the application of the quota system. 
Lack of flexibility in human resources management and African Union conditions of 
service have often resulted in the failure to attract and retain appropriately qualified 
personnel, thereby creating difficulties in developing capacity and an ongoing need for 
external assistance. Developing the institutional capacity to rectify this human 
resources problem is a major challenge and need to be accorded the appropriate 
priority. (UN, 2008) 
The Prodi report (2008) concluded by stating that “if the African Union commission aims to 
properly embrace wider peacekeeping and an integrated approach to tackling conflict, a step 
change is required in terms of doctrinal understanding and approach which entail working 
cross-department and cross-discipline and building the necessary expertise required to mount 
and manage peacekeeping operations” (UN, 2008).  
The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) at its 502nd meeting in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia on 29 April 2015 arrived at the following positions on the United Nations 
review of the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa: The 
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application of the spirit of chapter viii of the United Nations charter without prejudice to the 
role of the United Nations Security Council, on one hand, and without undermining or 
otherwise curtailing the efforts of the African Union to develop its own capacity to provide 
adequate responses to the peace and security challenges in Africa, on the other, the African 
Union collaboration with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa should be 
viewed as a strategic partnership based on consultative decision making,  division of labor and  
burden sharing, the African Union has identified the following principles which should 
underpin its relations with the United Nations, not on the basis of adhoc but in a systematic, 
principled and predictable manner, collective security in the context of chapter vii of the 
United Nations charter, support for African ownership and priority setting andpartnership on 
the basis of consultative decision making, division of labour and burden sharing. 
Mutual respect and keeping to the principle of comparative advantage with the following 
elements: Political legitimacy: That the political authority of external actors is proving 
increasingly debatable as conflict transform from  inter-state to intra-state. Responses from 
outside are increasingly being seen  unwillingly by national actors for several reasons such as  
sovereignty, historical reasons and perceptions linked to impartiality. Flexibility: That 
regional organization has proven to be more adaptable in  in dealing with security challenges 
in their regions than other international organizations and these tools gives the African Union 
the authority to intervene in all types of conflict in Africa.  
Division of labor underpinned by complimentarily,   the African Union and the United 
Nations need to create  a division of labour based on consensus to enhance unity and reduce 
competition, provide for African ownership setting of priorities, workable and fresh 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage and the Security 
Council of the United Nations should be forthcoming to demands made by the African Union 
relating to particular conflict and crisis situations in Africa and called on the United Nations 
to mark in a systematic way the issues relating to the financing of the peacekeeping operations 
of the African Union carried out with the authority of the United Nations  through the use of 
the United Nations assessed contribution. (AU, 2015) 
Lopsided and hybrid security challenges, religious extremism and transnational criminal 
networks traverse  in several countries is leading to  new challenges to peacekeeping and that 
connections  between extremism, trafficking, smuggling and elite networks raise high 
demands to African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
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Example is piracy of the Horn of Africa especially in Somalia where the African Union 
mission (AMISOM) is presently collaborating with the United Nations in peacekeeping 
operations and the remaining challenging areas to the African Union and the United Nations 
collaboration on peacekeeping in Africa are: Converging ideas on the preconditions for 
deployment and transitions as the African Union is often called upon to deploy to active 
conflicts where there is no viable ceasefire and/or peace agreement, differing interpretations 
of norms such as protection of civilians or unconstitutional changes of government, differing 
conceptualization and approaches to the use of force and combat roles in peace operations and 
challenges and conflicts surrounding the principle of subsidiarity and proposals and 
expectations for financing African Union peace operations and shared purposes help actors 
stay committed, which is the aim of having a strategic partnership and for the African Union 
to be an effective partner, what is needed is a forward looking perspective, not continuing turf 
battles and competitions (Deconing, Gelot and Karlsrud, 2015). 
 Also peacekeeping is more difficult as a result of the following factors: A significant number 
of conflicting groups, lack of a peace accord signed by majority of the conflicting groups 
before deployment, uncontrolled access to natural resources, hostility from neighbouring 
states or networks, large numbers of combatants. Cases with more than 50,000 soldiers are 
considered difficult, a high likelihood of ‘spoilers’, the unwillingness of major or regional 
powers to engage in conflict management/peacekeeping, wars of secession and collapsed 
functioning state institutions and peacekeeping operations such as those deployed in Africa’s 
strategic environment such as remote areas with harsh physical terrain and a lack of access to 
infrastructure face huge logistical problems and peacekeeping operations deployed in warring 
African states had to contend with most of the aforementioned factors (Downs and Stedman, 
2002).  
Therefore there is a need for addressing the changing nature of conflicts in which 
international organizations such as the United Nations have structured their support and that 
peacekeeping in the last 20 years, when led by regional organizations like the African Union, 
has often engaged in contexts where there is no peace to keep and a particular challenge with 
the African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa has been dealing 
with the key pillars of peacekeeping which are consent, impartiality and non-use of force 
except in self defence or defence of the mandate (Havard, Lisa and Havard, 2010). 
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The dimension of conflict in the period after the cold war create the most absorbing argument 
for the involvement of members of the civil society in negotiations of peace, individual 
citizens, the family together with the community are breached, forced and destabilised as part 
of the political, economic and socio-cultural blue-print of the armed actors and that this is the 
forefront of modern warfare.  As people become directly impacted by armed conflict, they 
establish a major interest in being part of its resolution. Staying in the same environment with 
the armed actors, the civil societies have a larger need and more potentials to participate in 
peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts. And surely, the strength taken by an acceptable 
government or representatives of the United Nations can have a major effect on the chances 
for agreement. However, in conditions of protracted internal conflict, violence pierce through 
the social structure, dealing with a large number of armed actors, often with contradicting 
levels of autonomy and accountability, as well as a complex tapestry of related and 
independent conflict dynamics at the level of the community.  This was evident in 
Mozambique in 1992 when after almost three decades of civil war, collaborative effort by 
Mozambique protestant and Catholic leaders helped bring about direct negotiations between 
the Frelimo government and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) (Mckeon 2005; 
Sengulane and Goncalves  1998). 
Therefore the increasing complexity of environments in which peacekeeping operations are 
deployed has created the need for constant connection between peacekeeping and the local 
communities and that strengthening engagement with the various actors that operate within a 
particular sub-national level allows peacekeeping operations to understand better and react to 
conflict trends that might be occurring in a particular locality and that this was a major factor 
in the success of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT) in 2009, where the civil society interacted with the local communities and 
created strategies that supported the conflict management initiatives and enhanced local 
governance on a daily basis and the Civil Affairs division of the United Nations Mission in 
Sudan since 2011 has been invited in facilitating reconciliation process at the local level, 
directly supporting and advising local and traditional authorities in governance (De Carvalho, 
2012:29). 
Another challenge to the partnership in peacekeeping operations between the African Union 
and the United Nations in Africa is culture clash and different bureaucratic cultures have 
further impeded collaboration between the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with other key issues such as: 
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The absence  of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils and the 
agenda for their annual meetings and that while the United Nations Security Council has a 
formal public agenda, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union does not, seperate 
working models, and the manner the councils adopt reports/decisions and the lack of 
consistent communication between the respective Presidents of the two council (Williams and 
Boutellis, 2013:24). 
Despite the formation of several coordination tools since 2007 between the United Nations 
and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, a joint ideal on how to resolve crisis 
in Africa has not been achieved, and combine assessments and planning between the United 
Nations and the African Union have been taking place regularly with a combined Sahel 
mission, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and also in Mali and these 
analysis remain conditions specific rather than on the basis of mutual relevant ideal and the 
aforementioned while not being a problem demostrate that while improved partnership may 
be available  between the two organisations technically, this does not guarantee effective 
cooperation at the governmental level between the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. And that in each case, the United 
Nations has provided capacity substitution rather than genuine collaboration and capacity 
building and the African Union’s limited human and financial resources and its limited ability 
to maintain institutional knowledge and information management tools also make it difficult 
to consistently replicate successful processes when they do occur (Williams and Boutellis, 
2013). 
Finally while collaboration in peacekeeping operations are acceptable, they should not create 
a “license for any state or organisation with the capacity to intervene to do so” and as a result, 
there is the urgent need to create the framework of real continental and international 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations such as classification of duties between sub-regional 
bodies, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations (Aning 2007; Gowan 
and Johnstone 2007).  
 
7.1.      Introduction 
Chapter seven examines the African Union and the United Nations collaboration in 
peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. The 
objective  of this chapter is to present the data collected from 30 respondents made up of 14 of 
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the face-to-face interviews and 16 interviews through skype and IMO. This chapter will also 
analyse and discuss the finding. 
In presenting the findings, this chapter is divided into two (2) parts. Part A entails a tabular 
description of the respondents profiles. Using AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and 
MINUSCA in the Central African Republic as a case study, Part B discusses the peacekeeping 
operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
7.2. Profile of respondents 
Table  4: Profile of Respondents 
 
OCCUPATION AREA OF 
SPECIALIAZATION 
SUB-TOTAL 
Senior Lecturers/Professors Political Science/International 
Relations with specialiazation in 
Peace and Security. 
7 
Researchers African Security/Peacekeeping 6 
Staffs of the African Union Peace and Security/Peacekeeping 10 
Members of the African Union and 
United Nations PeaceKeeping 
operations in Africa 
Peacekeeping 7 
Total  30 
 
The research was carried out in South Africa with 30 respondents were interviewed. The 
respondents include senior lecturers from the following African institutions: University of 
Zulu-land, University of Johannesburg, Addis Ababa University and University of Jos. The 
researcher also interviewed researchers working on peace and security at the Institute of Peace 
and Security in Pretoria, ACCORD in Durban, staffs of the African Union,  members of the 
United Nations and the African Union Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, namely, AMISOM 
(Somalia), UNAMID (Darfur) and MINUSCA (CAR). 7 academics with specialization in 
peace and security from the above named institutions provided insight on collaboration in 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. They also 
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had reasearch works on peacekeeping operations in Africa which provided this research work 
useful secondary sources of data. 
Ten staff members of the African Union and seven members of Peacekeeping troops of 
UNAMID, MINUSCA and AMISOM were also interviewed, they provided useful 
information on the African Union and peacekeeping operations in Africa. Although they were 
skeptical of giving out information on the workings of the peacekeeping operations in Darfur, 
Somalia and the Central African Republic, the information gathered from this cluster of 
respondents proved useful for understanding several activities and  the African Union and the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations challenges in Darfur, Somalia and the Central 
African Republic. 
From the profile of the respondents, it can be revealed that they are the pertinent informants 
that the study sought for, hence the results presented are regarded to be of high validity. The 
respondents profiles were illustrated in Table 7.2. 
7.3.  Data Process And Analysis     
The data collected from the semi-structured interviews were transcribed and categorised. 
Themes emerged during the course of the interviews which were analysed with regards  to the 
research questions and as a result the following themes emerged. 
1. Funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 
Africa. 
2. Clear and achievable mandates and the impact of the United Nations Peacekeeping 
doctrine on the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in 
Africa. 
3. The Influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict on 
Peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. 
4. The impact of the consent of the conflicting parties/armed groups  and peace accord 
on the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
5. The issue of legitimacy, acceptance and  local ownership of the African Union and the 
United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
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6. Roles of Africa Regional Economic Communities  and coordination with the African 
Union. 
7. The activities and impact of Armed Non State actors on the effectiveness of the 
African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. 
Table 5 :    Emerging Themes 
Themes No of Respondents Brief 
The funding of the African Union 
and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. 
30 How the AU/UN Peacekeeping 
Operations in Somalia, Darfur and 
the Central African Republic are 
funded and how inadequate funding 
and financial contraints of the 
African Union affect the 
effectiveness of these Peacekeeping 
Operations. 
Clear and achievable mandates  30 Arguments are presented on the 
mandates of AU/UN Peacekeeping 
operations. Also the the impact of 
the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Doctrines which are, unbiased, 
impartial, non-partisan and the non 
use of force except in self defence 
on these peacekeeping operations. 
The Influence of external actors 
and the regional dimension of the 
conflict  
22 Several countries are involved in 
the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and 
CAR when the AU/UN are 
presently involved in cooperative 
peacekeeping operations, giving the 
conflicts a regional dimension and 
impacting on the effectiveness of 
the peacekeeping operations. 
The impact of the Consent of the 
host government/warring 
parties/armed groups  and peace 
accord  
28 Here the importance of a peace 
accord in the effectiveness of the 
AU/UN peacekeeping operations is 
discussed and also the consent of 
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the warring parties. 
The issue of Legitimacy, 
Acceptance and local ownership of 
the African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations in 
Africa. 
 
30 Respondents gave their views on 
acceptance and legitimacy of the 
AU/UN Peacekeeping Operations 
and the role of local ownership in 
the effectiveness of these 
peacekeeping operations.  
Roles of Africa Regional Economic 
Communities   
 
25 The conflicting roles of the RECs 
in the cooperative peacekeeping 
operations and lack of coordination 
between the the RECs and the 
African Union. 
The activities and impact of Armed  
Non State actors. in Africa. 
 
30 According to Pearlman and 
Cunningham (2012), Non state 
actors are organised political actors 
not directly connected to the state, 
but pursing aims that affect vital 
state interests. They operate beyond 
the borders of the state and are a 
major challenge of the AU/UN 
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. 
 
The results relating to the arguments presented in Table 7.2 are presented and discussed in the 
following sections. 
7.4  Discussion Of Emerging Themes   7.4.1. Funding of the African Union and the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 
Although, the African Union since its transformation from the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, has gained enough experience in peacekeeping 
operations across the continent. It still lack adequate financial capabilities to fund its 
peacekeeping operations or to make financial contributions to cooperative peacekeeping 
operations with the United Nations (Pharatihatlhe and Vanheukelom 2019; Williams 2014) 
For 99% of its peacekeeping fundings, the African Union relies on its partners. This results in 
dependency of its peacekeeping operations on external partners. Thus, the AU is involved 
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only in peacekeeping operations where its partners have a convergence of interest (Deconing, 
2018).  
The AU relies on the yearly contributions from 55 member countries and support from 
bilateral and multilateral donors to finance its operational costs, programmes and 
peace support operations. Each source of funding is problematic in different ways. 
(Pharatlhatlhe and Vanheukelom, 2019,p.3) 
Based on this argument, this research wanted to know the effect of funding on the African 
Union and the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, how funding impact on the 
African Union’s collective security arrangements and its partnership with the United Nations 
on peacekeeping operations in Africa. In their response to the question, 100 percent of the 
respondents interviewed , are of the view that the Peacekeeping operations of the African 
Union and the United Nations in Africa are under-funded and that inadequate funding is a 
significant impediment to the effectiveness  effectiveness of these peacekeeping operations. 
Respondents 1,5,9 and 13, traced the history of peacekeeping operations in Africa to the 
conflict in the Congo from 1960-1966 and argued that 75 percent of the United Nations funds 
are spent on its African peacekeeping missions,  because Africa constitute  the United Nations 
peacekeeping threatre in the world  with over 35 peacekeeping operations on the continent. 
This argument is supported by (Deconing 2019; Blanchfied, Arieff and Blanchfied 2019) who 
argued that as of september 2019, out of thirteeen (13) United Nations peacekeeping 
operations led by the department of peace operations, seven (7) are in Africa while four (4) 
are the largest United Nations peacekeeping operations. Therefore Africa 75% of the 
peacekeeping operations of the United Nations are stationed in Africa with 75% of United 
Nations peacekeeping budget spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Building on the various argument with regards to funding, 85 percent of the respondents 
argued that AMISOM in Somalia is on a shoe-string limited budget and although UNAMID 
in Darfur, is a good case study of cooperative peacekeeping operations, its effectiveness is 
limited by a lack of adequate funding. Similarly, the humanitarian directive  of MINUSCA in 
the Central African Republic is being hindered by limited funding. From January 2016, 
personnels of AMISOM in Somalia have not received their full allowances (Williams, 2019). 
This group of respondents argued that the African Union do not have the capability  to fully 
fund its peacekeeping operations. Hence, it relies on its partners like the European Union and 
the United Nations to finance peacekeeping operations in Africa. The respondents argued that 
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this created an unequal alliance between the African Union and the United Nations in 
peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the African Union lacks control over the 
peacekeeping operations. 
The respondents’ views collaborate (Bamidele, 2013:118) who argued that in the 21st 
century,  over 70 percent of the United Nations peacekeeping operations were attributed to 
Africa with the cost of over 300 million dollars, and according to (Deconing, 2018), over 75% 
of the United Nations peacekeepers are situated  in Africa with approximately 75% of the 
United Nations Peaceking budget also spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa. (Ajayi, 
2008) argued that although the African Union has a comprehensive instrument and strategies 
on peace and security, inadequate resources impact on its ability for effective utilisation.   
Also, while the African Union is doing its best to intervene in peace and security in Africa, it 
cannot sustain its peacekeeping operations because of inadequate funding, logistical and 
administrative systems to back up peacekeeping operations across Africa operating on a long-
term basis (ICG 2020; Stephen and Kristen 2018).  
Several reports on the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur 
and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic further confirms the respondents argument 
that inadequate funding especially on the part of the African Union limit the effectiveness of 
the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
According to (Williams, 2013), the agreement associated with the formation of African Union 
Peace and Security Council (2002), stipulated a method of funding, with members sending 
troops bearing the participation cost for the first three months, and then go ahead to fund the 
operation. This system has never been effective in practice as each peacekeeping operations 
of the African Union had to develop its own adhoc financial mechanism which create 
unpredictable sources of funding which invalidate planning assumptions (Williams, 2013). 
(Agada 2008; Deconing 2019; Gerlot, Gerlot and Deconing 2012; Pharatihalhe and 
Vanheukelom 2019; Williams 2018; Williams and Schulman 2012), argued that despite the 
financial contributions of the United Nations towards the peacekeeping operations of 
AMISOM in Somalia, resources constraints continue to limit the achievements of AMISOM 
due to evolving requirements,  increasing size of the force  and the increasing security threats 
of Al Shabaab. 
Respondents 1, 6,7,8.10,13,14,23 and 26 pointed out that the European Union’s decision in 
2016 to reduced its funding of AMISOM in Somalia is undermining the peacekeeping 
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operations. This point view is shared by (Williams, 2017) who argued that the decision by the 
European to cut its funding of AMISOM is causing political conflicts and disagreements t 
between the African Union and  AMISOM Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs), such as 
Burundi, Uganda and Kenya. The unpaid permitted amount to  Burundian troops in AMISOM 
led to Burundi in December 2016 threatening to withdraw its more than 5000 troops and to 
sue the African Union.  President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya in Febuary 2016 threatened to 
withdraw Kenya’s contigent from AMISOM over the European Union’s decision on 
payments of troops permitted amount, leading to the morales of AMISOM’S 22,000 troops 
are being affected by the European pay cuts (Mastro 2016). 
A further confirmation of the impact of funding with regards to the effectiveness of the 
peacekeeping operations in Africa of the African Union and the United Nations come from 
respondents views on funding of UNAMID in Darfur. All respondents interviewed argued 
that UNAMID in Darfur, the largest peacekeeping operation in the world is an appropriate 
case study of cooperative peacekeeping operations, but its effectiveness is limited by funding.  
UNAMID, according to (Williams and Boutellis, 2014), is an unequal partnership because the 
African Union lack the necessary budget to make significant financial contributions to 
UNAMID leading to the reliance of the African Union  on the United Nations budget and 
resources and lack of influence over the peacekeeping operations. With regards to its peace 
and  security architecture, the African Union launched a peace/special fund with contributions 
from its external partners to support the 7% contributions from its member states which is 
very low and inadequate to support its peacekeeping operations and all operations involving 
peace and security in (AU, 2019).  
Therefore, 93% of funds for making the collective security arrangements of the African Union 
operational is sourced from the European Union African Peace Facility (APF), voluntary 
bilateral support and the United Nations assessed contributions (Apiko and Aggad, 2018). 
Although collective security has provided the the peace and security undertakings of the 
African Union with the much needed finances,  it has resulted in dependency and restricted  
possession of its peace and security instruments. 
This research share the views of the respondents on funding of the African Union and the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The lack of adequate resources on the part 
of the African Union despite funding from its partners  undermine the peacekeeping 
operations in Darfur and Somalia and impact on its effectiveness. 
126 
 
On the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central 
African Republic (MINUSCA), all the respondents interviewed, are of the view that limited 
resources constituted a significant challenge of MINUSCA, which has a direct impact on its 
ability to fulfill its humanitarian mandate. The Stimson report on MINUSCA in August 2017, 
collaborated the views of the respondents on funding of MINUSCA by stating that the 
reduction of MINUSCA funding has reduced its efforts at extending state authority in the 
Central African Republic. 
According to the United Nations 2016 report on the Central African Republic, “MINUSCA 
lack sufficient funding for its humaitarian operations and this serve as one of its main 
challenges in pulling the country out of its current crisis” (UN, 2016).  (Cockburn, 2016) in 
support of this argued that MINUSCA soldiers have not recieved their salaries for months, 
resulting in ineffectiveness and indiscipline of a number of its forces. 
 MINUSCA has fewer resources compared to other UN missions given the immense 
size of the country, the scale of threats, and the number of tasks its been assigned. The 
mission is trying to do more with less, but it is struggling.(Cinq-Mars, 2017).  
Drawing from the views of the respondents and literature reviews, it can be argued that the 
African Union lacks the capacity to adequately fund its peacekeeping operations which has 
limited the African Union ownership and command  of its peacekeeping operations with the 
United Nations. 
 
7.4.2.  Clear and Achievable mandate 
Studies have shown that another challenges of the African Union and the United States 
Peacekeeping Operations in Africa are the mandates of its Peacekeeping operations and the 
United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines (De Carvalho, Okumu, Kasumba and Jaye 2011; 
Isabella 2019). As a result of this, this research decided to know whether mandates of 
AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA coupled with the doctrine of the peacekeeping 
operations of the United Nations plays a significant role in their effectiveness. The following 
are the mandates of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA; 
7.4.2.1. Mandate Of Amisom In Somalia 




2. Provision of security so that the political procedures can commence together with 
efforts at stabilising, reconciliating and building of peace in Somalia.  
 
3. Start a process of transfering the security responsibilities to the security forces of 
Somalia.  
4. Continuation of enforcement measures against Al Shabaab and other armed 
movements in opposition.  
5.  Maintaing a presence in all the sectors stipulated the the concept of operations of 
AMISOM so that effective and legitimate governance can be established across 
Somalia together with the security forces of Somalia.  
6. Assisting with free movent, passage and protecting everyone participating in Somalia 
peace and reconciliation process and making sure the electoral process in Somalia is 
secured.  
7.  Making sure major supply routes with those taken back from Al Shabaab, especially 
those vital to the improvement of humanitarian conditions, and those of significant to 
AMISOM logistics, while keeping in mind that it is the collective responsibily of the 
United Nations and the African Union to provide logistics for AMISOM.  
8. Conducting within its capabilities operations together with the Somalian security 
forces and involving other parties so that the national security plans of the Somalia  
can be implemented and contributing to a broader effort with regards to the training 
and mentoring of the FGS security forces.   
9. Contributing within its capabilities when asked, to the formation of security 
circumstances that are vital to the provision of humanitarian support. 
10.  Engaging with communities in recovered areas, and promoting within its capabilities, 
understanding between AMISOM and the local populace, resulting to a longer term of 
stabilisation by the Country team of the United Nations and other actors.  
11. Protecting and assisting the Somalian government in the execution of their 
governmental functions.  
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12. Protection of AMISOM’s personnel, facilities, installations, equipments and mission 
while ensuring the security and freedom of its personnel, together with personnel of 
the United Nations in the course of performing duties authorised by the Security 
Council.  
13. Recieving on a transtory basis those that defected, when suitable and in partnership 
with the United Nations (UN, 2017).  
7.4.2.2.  Mandate Of Unamid In Darfur 
1. Protecting the local populace with predisposing the Sudanese government 
responsibilities.  
2. Make easier the delivery of humanitarian assistance and making sure humanitarian 
personnel are safe.  
3. Engaging the Sudanese government and non-signatory armed groups with regards to 
the Doha document for peace in Darfur.  
4. Enhancing reconciliation of community conflict with the use of measures to address 
its primary causes (UN, 2014).  
7.4.2.3.  Mandate Of Minusca In The Central African Republic 
1. Supporting the process of transition.  
2. Aiding humanitarian support.  
3.  Encouraging and safeguarding human rights.  
4. Enhancing justice and the rule of law.  
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. 
6. Repatriation processes. (UN, 2014) 
While some of the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA were clear and 
unambigious such as protection of the civilian populace, providing humanitarian assistance 
and involvement in mediation and reconciliation process in Somalia, Darfur and the Central 
African Republic, some of the mandate of AMISOM were ambigious and outside the scope of 
traditional peacekeeping such as counter-insurgency and warfighting which created 
complications for AMISOM. Therefore according to (Williams, 2014), peacekeeping 
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operations are unlikely to succeed where there is not in place a mandate that is clear and 
achievable with resources to match  to match and realistic mandates are necessary for the 
success of peacekeeping operations (WEF, 2019). All the 30 respondents are of the view that 
mandate plays a major part in the effectiveness  of any peacekeeping operation. 65 percent of 
respondents interviewed stated that before a peacekeeping operation is given its mandate and 
deployed, the following factors have to be considered: The origin of the crisis,  the dimension 
of the conflict such as the actors involved which respondents 4 and 5 listed to be terrorism, 
inter-state and intra-state conflict eg civil war, the nature of the crisis such as ethnic, religious 
and political and the nature of the environment. 
With regards to the United Nations and the African Union Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, 
(Respondent 1) argued that their mandates should include nation building and peace building. 
Using Somalia as a case study, respondent 1 argued that since the deployment of UNISOM in 
Somalia in 1991, the situation in Somali has escalated the mandate of peacekeeping. 
Respondent 1 further argued that  AMISOM’s mandate that took over from UNISOM should 
be more of peace enforcement than peacekeeping. 
Respondent 4, 6, 7 and 14 argued that the African Union and the United Nations failed to take 
into considerations the problems encountered by past peacekeeping missions in the Central 
African Republic and Darfur that could have assisted MINUSCA and UNAMID in the 
fulfillment of their mandates.They stated that MINUSCA’s actual mandate was the protection 
of civilians which was a humanitarian mandate, but MINUSCA could not effectively achieve 
its humanitarian mandate because of the complicated political conditions in the Central 
African Republic and increasing regional insecurity. The respondents interviewed share a 
general view, that the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA has a one sided 
approach to peacekeeping and did not put into consideration, the terrain and environment, 
factors such as porous African borders and the regional dimension of the conflicts, which 
should determine the peacekeeping strategies. Respondents 11, 13 and 17 during the course of 
their interview, stated that although, AMISOM in Somalia had a broader mandate compared 
to the other two cooperative peacekeeping in Darfur and the Central African Republic, the 
tricky nature of the Somalian environment is an impediment to its mandate. 
Respondents, 3,4,7,8,19 and 22 stated that UNAMID in Darfur is operating without its full 
mandate due to the lack of a clear bench mark, that would have created an objective space for 
the peacekeeping operations to be effective. 100 percent of the respondents in the course of 
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their interviews stated that MINUSCA in the Central African Republic apart from its financial 
constraints is operating in a difficult country. The respondents argued that this mandate did 
not  into consideration a bench mark for its operations.  Respondent 5 argued that because 
African conflicts lack of boundaries and rules of engagement are challenges to its 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore,  broader mandates such as protection of civilians, 
counter terrorism and insurgency is needed to guarantee the effectiveness of peacekeeping 
operations in Africa.  
 Collaborating the views of the respondents, (Cocodia, 2015) argued that, the peacekeeping 
operations in the Central African Republic of the African Union and the United Nations, is 
finding the conflict difficult to resolve due to factors such as, poor leadership, composition of 
the peacekeeping forces and the nature of its mandate. According to (Bamidele, 2013), “not 
only were mandates of peacekeeping operations in Africa more complex than ever, but there 
was a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled”. (Bamidele, 2013) 
argued that some of the mandates of UNAMID in Dafur and AMISOM in Somalia were 
externally driven and unrealistic. According to (Bokeriya and Mansur, 2018), the nature and 
scope of a peacekeeping operation is a major determinant of its success or failure and most 
peacekeeping mandates in Africa are unclear, ambiquous and cannot deal effectively with the 
fragmented nature of African conflicts especially when dealing with armed non state actors. 
Examples of these are: To reinforce the rule of law, improve the security sector, and 
Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. 
That AMISOM”s attempt at demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former 
combatants was a recipe for disaster. This was due to the lack of a peace accord with Al-
Shabaab and the failure of AMISOM to realise that the potentials of the process of 
demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration depends on the full awareness of its limitations 
(Sharif, 2018).  In Darfur the entire process of demobisation and reintegration of combatants 
into the society led to rancor from the local populace who prefered the war criminals to be 
punished than reintegration. Related to the above is the issue of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping doctrine and its effectiveness on the African Union and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.  MINUSCA mandate of bring peace to the Central African Republic 
could not be effective because there was no peace agreement, its mandate did not include 




(Williams and Boutellis, 2014) argued that the issue of mandate and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping doctrine has led to divergent views on peacekeeping operations of the African 
Union and the United Nations.That the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine which are, 
getting the assent of the parties involved, unbiasness and force must not be applied except for 
the purpose of self defence and defence of the mandate were derived from lessons learned its 
peacekeeping operations which are, there must be a peace to keep, a truce or peace accord 
must be present  and the peacekeeping operation must have a clear and achievable mandate 
with adequate funding. These United Nations peacekeeping principles have been critised by 
African Union members as not application to peacekeeping in Africa. They are  of the opinion 
that crisis in Africa are complex because of  the involvement of several actors and as a result a 
different and more forceful peacekeeping approach is needed (Williams and Boutellis, 2014).  
Respondent 26 and 28 however stated that the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines, cannot 
change, because the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, operate 
under the United Nations framework. Using the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
intervention in Libya as an example, respondents 7 and 12 stated that peacekeeping operations 
in Africa cannot be impartial because of the humanitarian stituation of conflicts in Africa. 
These respondents further claimed that the doctrine of impartiality creates problems for 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. As a result of the involvement of several non-state actors 
such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the religious armies in the Central African Republic such as 
the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and ethnic militia groups in the conflict in Darfur, creating 
a situation of a multitude of actors. 45 percent of the respondents shared a point view, that the 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa need to have 
its own doctrines of peacekeeping to improve on the effectiveness of its peacekeeping 
operations. The fragmented dimension of African conflict and its complexity led to the 
peacekeeping operations of the United Nations  adopting offensive operations to respond to 
the activities of armed groups in the various conflict across Africa such as in Mali, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (Garcia, 2017). 
The African Union’s collective security arrangement has dealt with some of the issues of 
mandate of its peacekeeping operations in Africa through collaboration with the United 
Nations and Africas sub-regional organisations. In Darfur, the collective security 
arrangements with the United Nations has made UNAMID mandate of protecting civilians, 
providing humanitarian assistance and mediation achievable. And in Somalia, apart from 
cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union collective security mechanisms in 
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Somalia such as collaboration with the United States, European Union and operating 
alongside the security forces of Somalia is impacting on AMISOM mandate of stabiliazation, 
anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism successfully (Deconing, 2017). In the Central African 
Republic, regional collective security arrangement with the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) impacted negatively on MINUSCA mandate of supporting the peace 
process and transition due to divisions within the Sub-region from Chad and the Republic of 
Congo (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017).  
Based on the  arguments with regards to clear and achievable mandate, it is clear that the the 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, need 
different approach and principles to its peacekeeping missions in Africa as a result of the 
fragmented dimension  of these conflicts and its complexity.  
7.4.3.  The Influence of External Actors and the Regional dimension of the 
conflict  
The influence of external actors was identified by respondents as one of the factors impacting 
on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa. 73.3 percent of the respondents are of the view that the failure of the 
African Union , neighbouring states and the sub-regional organisation to respond timely to the 
crisis in Somalia and the Central African Republic complicated the conflicts. According to 
this group of respondents, when steps are taken to immediately respond to a conflict at its 
initial stage, it reduces or put an end to the risk of the crisis  spreading across borders. They 
shared a general view that the conflict in the Central African Republic and Somalia were not 
given immediate attention by the African Union. This delayed response led to the spread of 
the conflict to Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda in the Central African 
Region and that of Somalia spreading to Ethiopia and Kenya.  
Äccording to (Ekrikson 2013; Mohammed 2014);  
There are external actors in the Somali conflict since the collaspe of the country’s 
central government and Somalia’s case is a classical example of regionalised conflict. 
Since almost all states in the region have suffered spillover problems from Somalia. 
Three reasons were therefore identified by some of the respondents for the regional spread of 
the conflicts, which are, large and porous borders, weak security institutions, corruption and 
regional mistrust. President Bozize of the Central African Republic outsourced national 
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security to foreign military forces such as MICOPAX, France and South Africa due to the 
deficiencies of the Central African Republic security forces. This resulted to the Central 
African republic dependence on this foreign military forces to protect the country (Vircoulon, 
2015).  
Therefore, 73.3 percent of the respondents argued that the participation of several actors from 
outside the Central African Republic and the spreading of the conflict across borders  has 
contradicted the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in the 
Central African Republic, leading to peacekeeping roles outside their initial mandates, 
therefore, putting pressure on the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations and impacting on their effectiveness. They argued that the regional dimension 
of the conflicts resulted into hostility for the African Union and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations from neighboring states, coupled with a harsh environmental terrain 
that created enormous logistical problems for peacekeeping operations. 
Respondent 1 gave a contrary view by arguing that the involvement of external actors is an 
advantage to the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and has 
given these cooperative peacekeeping operations the much needed logistical support. 
According to respondent 1, France was invited by the Central African Republic government, 
when the African Union and the United nations did not want to be involved. This respondent 
argued that France took the leadership role and made ready the ground for the stationing,  first 
of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in 
2014, before its co-hatting into MINUSCA. 
Respondent 4 collaborated the argument of respondent 1, by arguing that in peacekeeping 
operations in Africa, we need the “champions” such as the role Britain played in Sierra-
Loene, the United States in Liberia and that of Ethiopia and Kenya, although Kenya is not as 
effective as Ethiopia, are doing the same in Somalia. Respondent 6 also argued that Ethiopia 
and Kenya intervention in Somalia, assisted AMISOM with the Al Shabaab situation and that 
France is equally playing a very important role in the Central African Republic, and that 
France, was welcomed by the people of the Central African Republic from a colonial and 
capacity point of view. 
Collaborating some of the opinions of those interviewed in relation to external actors and the 
regional dimension of the conflicts and its effect on the African Union and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations in Africa, (Bamidele, 2013) argued that the multiplication of actors 
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involved in peacekeeping operations resulted to strategic and tactical challenges. At the 
tactical level, it was not easy to enhance coordination among the various actors with regards 
to goals and methods while at the strategically, the proliferation of actors led to challenges 
related to interaction between the actors.   
(Freear and De Coning, 2013), collaborated the argument of respondents 1, 4 and 6, by 
arguing that the influx of several external actors resulted into proliferation of peacekeeping 
mechanisms and complicated peacekeeping operations particularly in Somalia. The 
compounded system of international and regional actors, the entire collective effect and what 
their joint efforts are able to produce, is a sign of the shape of future international responses, 
like an interconnecting model based on multi-stakeholders collaboration and partnership. 
According to (Albrecht, 2015), since 2010 and especially in 2014, AMISOM encountered 
several successes by recapturing areas formerly taken by Al-Shabaab.  It is however glaring 
that the organisational and strategical course are fragmented mainly as a result of the domestic 
interests of several of the countries contributing troops such as Kenya and Ethiopia that are 
more concerned with protecting their borders than in making sure Somalia is stabilised.  
(Mateja, 2015), also collaborated the views of respondents 1, 4 and 6 by arguing that while 
the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as a rule have a single-state mandate, the 
conflicts in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Darfur (Sudan) are all regional 
conflicts, and their neighboring states are part of the conflict dynamics. Because of this, the 
peacekeeping operations ofvthe United Nations is  increasingly relying on regional 
contributions because regional states are interested in conflicts that affect their security and 
political interests and therefore, are willing to contribute to high-risk situation. 
(Deltenre and Liegeois 2016; Straus 2012; Van der Liyn and Smit 2013) collaborated the 
agrument of the respondents by arguing that; porous borders across Africa facilitate the 
regional spread of conflicts, rebellions and vinsurgencies by proxy sponsored by various 
actors. They argued that insurgent groups not move across borders, from one conflict to 
another combining local grievances with international ideologies as seen across the Sahel, 
Sahara, Libya, Somalia and Northern Kenya. Therefore, the incidence and type of armed 
conflict, as well as its resolution in Africa, has obvious repercussions for the African Union 
and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.  
Analysing the role of external actors and its implication on the African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, (Mulugeta, 2014) argued, using Ethiopia 
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intervention in the conflict in Somalia, that the military responses in 2006 in Somalia by 
Ethiopia was criticised by many as a mistake and counter productive, and was seen as an 
extension of American security policy. Ethiopia military responses in Somalia resulted to a 
suitable time for AMISOM to  be deployed and led to the solidification of the process of 
peace and state building in Somalia. It encouraged collective security at the regional level 
leading to Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti joining AMISOM and the intervention by 
the Ethiopian army in Somalia in 2011, assisted in driving out Al-Shabaab from its main 
strongholds.  
The Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union in its defence pact of 2005, has 
committed its members to the enforcement of its collective security measures and for member 
states to collaborate and assist each other in combating inter-state and intra-state threats to 
peace and security (Jordaan, 2017). However with regards to the argument about the influence 
of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict, member states of the African 
Union lack cooperation on security issues which complicates the African Union collective 
security arrangement and creates challenges for its peacekeeping operations in Africa.  
In Somalia external actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are involved in counter-
insurgency against Al-Shabaab to protect their national security and national interest leading 
to multiple peacekeeping mechanisms. Also issues of mis-trust between African Regional 
Economic Communities and the African Union has weakened the African Union collective 
security arrangements to deal with the influence of external actors and the regional dimension 
of the conflict due to lack of division of labour, consultative decision-making among member 
states as evident in Libya (2011) where member states of the African Union in the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted in support of UNSC Resolution 1973 of 2011 against 
the roadmap for Libya of the African Union. Also in Mali (2012) where the Francophone led 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allowed France to play a dominant 
role over that of the African Union and also in CAR (2015) where France intervened through 
the endeavours of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).  
Therefore collective efforts by African Union member states to operate effective collective 
security mechanism in the conflict in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic has 
been hindered by external actors such as France and the attempts by countries within the 




Based on the above facts from the arguments of the respondents and colloraboration from 
various scholars, it is clear that even though the influx of external actors and the regional 
dimension of conflicts in Africa, might have its own advantages, it equally lead to 
complications in peacekeeping operations, leading to proliferation of peacekeeping operations 
and impacting on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and 
the United Nations in Africa. 
7.4.4.  The impact of the Consent of the host government/warring parties/armed 
groups  and peace accord 
One of the basis restriction ascribed on peacekeeping missions by the regulations of the global 
system is that they can lawfully carryout its operations if it has the consent of the host 
government, and that incomprehensive peace accord or agreement can affect the effectiveness 
of peacekeeping missions and for collaboration between the United Nations, host government 
and regional organisations to be effective, an inclusive peace process must be seeked (Gilder 
2019; Jones, Gowan and Sherman 2009).  Based on the above assertion, this research wanted 
to know, the impact of the host government consent, opposing parties/armed groups and peace 
accord on the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
Most of the respondents, 93.3 percent of them, are of the view that the host government and 
conflicting groups giving their approval and a peace accord are important to the effectiveness 
of the Peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.  
This group of respondents argued that the lack of a comprehensive peace accord taking into 
consideration all the warring groups and their consent before and after deployment is one of 
the major challenges of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in 
Africa. Repondent 1, argued that the opposing parties consent  and a peace agreement is very 
important, and that most of the succesful peacekeeping operations are those with a 
comprehensive peace agreement and consent. Respondent 1, supported this views by arguing 
that the lack of a peace agreement impacted on the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia,that 
without a peace agreement, the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic 
cannot be resolved. The above argument is supported by 93,3 percent of respondents 
interviewed with the following narration: 
1. That the Sudanese government is not in full support of UNMID peacekeeping 
operations in Darfur which is affecting its effectiveness, and have at several 
occassions requested UNAMID to leave. 
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2. There is no viable political argreement and binding peace agreement among the 
warring parties in Darfur which is leading to a continous limbo in Darfur. 
3. That AMISOM in Somalia has the full consent of the government but not that of the 
warring parties such as Al-Shabaab and other Islamist armed movements and this 
complicates the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM. 
4. That in the conflict in Somalia, the peace agreements do not recognise the local actors 
and as a result, AMISOM is experiencing several challenges in its peacekeeping 
operations. 
Respondents 4, 8, 9, 21,22, 23 and 30 argued that in the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and the 
Central African Republic, the consent of the major stakeholders is very vital because if they 
give their consent, the minority groups will be compel to accept.  That the African Union and 
the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African 
Republic will only be effective if they have the full consent of majority of the warring parties. 
Also according to Ndolo (2011), the United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone, the first 
peacekeeping operations of the United Nations to Sierra-Leone in 1999, (UNAMSIL),  and 
the United Nations Observer mission in Angola, MONUA, deployed in 1997, failed to 
achieve their mandates because they did not have the consent of majority of the warring 
parties. 
However, the United Nations operation in Cote D’ Ivoire, UNOCI (2002-2017) despite the 
fragile consent of the state government was able to achieve its mandate of resolving the crisis 
and achieving stability like the United Nations Mission to Chad and the Central African 
Republic, MINURCAT in 2010 because they were able to get the consent of majority of the 
warring parties (Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011).  
Respondent 5 however gave a contrary view on the importance of peace accord for the 
effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, 
by arguing that peace agreement can never be reached before deployment if we are to prevent 
another Rwanda. And because there are several rebel groups involved in any particular 
conflict in Africa with several of then unidentifiable, a comprehensive peace agreement 
consisting of all warring groups cannot be achieved. 
 Collaborating the argument, respondents 2 and 7 argued that the African Union and the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, Somalia and Darfur 
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were deployed without any political processes to guard them, but were deployed with the 
view of having a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. This they argued led to a disconnection 
between the political side and the peacekeeping sides, resulting in AMISOM in Somalia, 
UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic having no major political 
achievement or development. Collaborating the argument of the respondents on the 
importance of the host government permission and the majority of the warring parties and a 
comprehensive paece agreement to the effectiveness of the African Union and the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa in the literature, Jones, Gowan and Sherman 
(2009) and Bamidele (2013) argued that a major challenge of the peacekeeping operations of 
the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur was that the Sudanese government placed 
significant contraints on the activities of the peacekeeping operations of UNAMID as a 
prerequisite for granting continous consent, and therefore there was no real consent by the 
host country in the case of UNAMID in Darfur. (IRRI, 2016) argued that none of the peace 
accords presented a resolution to the crisis  in Darfur, because of absent of real commitment 
to peace from the Sudanese government and the various opposing parties in Darfur were not 
adequately represented.  
(Williams, 2010) argued that peacekeeping operations must not be a replacement for a 
successful political blueprint and a procedure for peace, but a part of it and it is often said 
that, peacekeepers cannot perform without a peace agreement in place  and that the history of 
peacekeeping particularly in Darfur is closely tied to the history of peace negotiations. That 
the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Darfur and the Central 
African Republic could not be effective as a result of the peacekeeping operation operating in 
an atmosphere of a conflict that is in progress, and the opposing parties continue to engage 
each others and conducting attacks on civilians. According to the Peace and Security Council 
Report for 2015: 
AMISOM struggled to make headway, because there are no conditions for peace in 
Somalia, weak government and violence involving Al-Shabaab and other militia mean 
that national dialogue towards some consitutional normalcy and transitional political 
arrangements cannot take root. Under these conditions, AMISOM has become a force 
focused on managing conflict, rather than keeping or building peace. 
According to (Caparini, 2016), the most resilient norm of the peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations in Africa has proven to be that of host state consent, 
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while resistance from some member states, opposition to the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations on their territory, impact on its effectiveness from deployment.  With UNAMID in 
Darfur experiencing the following contraints from the Sudanese government, 
1. The government of Sudan did not approve the list of countries contributing troops to 
UNAMID.  
2. Troops from countries like Nepal, Thailand and Nordic countries were not accepted by 
the Sudanese government based on the argument that they wanted only troops from 
African countries without recognising the relevance of these countries to the success 
of UNAMID.  
3. The Sudaneses tried to slot in certain arrangements into the postion of the forces 
protocol, allowing them to monitor the movements and operations of UNAMID. The 
Sudanese government did not give permission that will enable UNAMID forces to 
operate at night and restricted the operations of UNAMID in some areas.  
4. Prior to the deployment of UNAMID, the Sudanese government refused to privide 
land for bases for UNAMID.  
The Capstone Doctrine (2008) elaborating more with regards to the impact of assent of the 
host government/warring parties and a peace agreement on peacekeeping operations argued 
that when the peacekeeping operation do not have the consent of majority of the warrring 
parties especially the major parties, the United Nations peacekeeping operations will have to 
make use of enforcement action to achieve its mandates.  The Capstone doctrine was issued in 
2008 and sets the principles and guildlines for United Nations peacekeeping operations. A 
follow-up from the Brahimi Report (2000) that made the following suggestions on strategic, 
political and operational advancement towards making sure peacekeeping operations are more 
effective;  
1. The international community must make sure that peacekeeping is the appropriate 
choice with regards to the dimension of the crisis.  
2. The warring parties must be ready to agree to an end to all hostilities and a peace 
accord and achieve their goals through diplomatic and peaceful ways.  
3. All major parties involved in the conflict must accept the involvement of the United 
Nations and its part in assisting them settle the conflict.  
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4. That the peacekeeping operation must be part of an all-inclusive plan of action to 
assist in conflict resolution whilre considering its regional nature, and considering the 
political, economic, developmental, institution-building, humanitarian and human 
rights features.  
5. The Security Council of the United Nations must make sure that the mandate can be 
achieved. This must include the approving the deployment of a significant munber of 
troops to carryout the mandate’s of a mission and member states providing troops that 
are properly trained and well equipped (Murithi, 2009). 
When interviewed about the warring parties in the crisis  in Somalia and the Central African 
Republic where the African Union and the United Nations are both involved in peacekeeping 
operations, 93.3 percent of the respondents argued that armed non state actors are extremist 
groups, difficult to negotiate with since they are outside the context of international relations, 
a contradiction of the argument about the conflicting groups giving their consent, 
complicating the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the Central African Republic. 
Another collaboration of the argument of the respondents in the literature is from (Volker, 
2008), who argued that: 
The first and most important strategic hinderance for any peacekeeping operation is 
the availability of a peace accord, that is abided by and  supported by the political will 
of major stakeholders. This was the case for successful peacekeeping operations in 
Namibia and Mozambique by the United Nations at the end of the cold war. By 
comparison, the Darfur peace agreement does not have the broad support of the parties 
who signed it and, as one participant pointed out, a peacekeeping operation, will not 
serve as an alternative for the lack of a political process. The best a peacekeeping 
operation can do is supporting the political process. 
Although the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations, according to 
the respondents interviewed, were deployed to Somalia, Darfur and the Central African 
Republic without a peace agreement in place, peace process were intiated after deployment 
through the efforts of regional economic communities, The Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development working under the institutional structures of the African Union Peace and 
Security Council (AUPSC) started the peace process in Somalia in 2002 (Healy, 2009). In the 
Central African Republic, collective security dealt with the agreement of peace accord 
through mediation by the African Union, United Nations, the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
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States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African States and France (Knoope and 
Buchanan-Clarke, 2017). 
A major core assumption of United Nations peacekeeping is that before a peacekeeping 
operation can be deployed , it must have the approval of the warring groups thus a 
peacekeeping operation cannot suceed if there is the absent of a peace to keep and a peace 
agreement (Boulellis and Williams, 2013). The changing nature of conflict in Africa has 
rendered such principles very difficult to achieve before deployment. The crisis in Darfur, 
Somalia and the Central African Republic has seen the involvement of several warring parties 
coupled with the collaspe of state structures such as in Somalia, complicating the peace and 
mediation process, which the African Union collective security mechanisms has failed to deal 
with due to conflict of interest connecting  the African Union, the United Nations and regional 
economic communities.  
7.4.5.  The issue of Legitimacy, Acceptance and Local Ownership of the African 
Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 
Legitimacy, acceptance of the peacekeeping operations and local ownership have been 
identified by 100 percent of the respondents, as factors impacting on the effectiveness of the 
African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa. According to 
Wiharta (2009), “Sixty years after the deployment of the first United Nations peacekeeping 
operation, there are concerns that peacekeeping is headed in crisis and questions over the 
legitimacy of peacekeeping operations are important factors in these problems”. Also, 
legitimacy of a peacekeeping operations within the local population is a major element in 
determining the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission (Whalan, 2017). 
(Suchman, 1995) defined legitimacy which he divides into three such as normative, 
cognitive and pragmatic as the general opinion that the actions of an organisation 
conform to laid down norns, values and beliefs, 
1. Normative legitimacy: This is the ability of convictions about what gives the right to a 
seperate person or establishment to exercise control. An organisation is legal because 




2. Cognitive legitimacy: This focuses on the psychological level which is the standard an 
organisation is recieved. That an organisation is legal if as a result of us treating and 
accepting it as a given.  
3. Pragmatic legitimacy: This focuses on the “interest based” acceptance of an institution 
by groups that are mostly affected. That an organisation is considered legal when the 
groups affected consider it to be in their interest for it to be recieved (Suchman, 1995). 
The differences between this three types of legitimacy is that while pragmatic legitimacy is 
based on perceptions from the organisation’s host, nornative legitimacy is the perception of 
the people such as the local population about the activities of the organisation while cognitive 
is based on perceptions from stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). (Merslades, 2005), when 
defining legitimacy argued that if local actors percieve the peacekeeping operation as 
legitimate, it will have a remarkable impact its effectiveness and such legitimacy will not only 
give room for approval, it will also led to the local actors giving the much needed support to 
the peacekeeping operation. According to Respondent 1 and 3, the issue of legitimacy is 
important to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations  in Africa. Using UNAMID in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia as examples, 
respondent 1 and 3 argued that UNAMID is a good case study of the importance of legitimacy 
and when it became a hybrid collaborative  peacekeeping operation of the African Union and 
the United Nations. It brought in Muslim countries and troop contributing countries that were 
far from Darfur, therefore, the “Darfurians” prefered the United Nations troops contributing 
countries that those of the African Union because of religion. 
Respondent 5 argued that AMISOM in Somalia lacked acceptance among the local populace 
because AMISOM troops are mostly from neigbouring countries and because Somalis are 
Muslims, they see AMISOM as infidels. Also the actions of peacekeepers of AMISOM, that 
were involved in the raping of Somalian women undermined the legitimacy and acceptance of 
AMISOM by the local populace (Respondent 15). According to (Williams, 2013), AMISOM 
as a result of its partnership with the Ethiopian national defence force, ENDF, its authencity in 
the perception of the local citizens were undermined.  The ENDF was accused of atrocities 
against civilians, AMISOM also of killing over 100 civilians and causing harm to over 300 
civilians as of September 2008. The opinion of (Respondent 15) is collaborated by Wiharata 
(2009) argument, that; 
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Percieved shortfalls in an operation’s legitimacy can seriously undermine its 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements namely, political concensus, legality 
and moral authority, and that the conduct of its personnel largely determines the moral 
authority of a peace operation.   
Respondent 12, 18 and 22 argued that the atrocities from the peacekeepers impacted on the 
legitimacy of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Darfur, 
Somalia and the Central African Republic. The local population in the Central African 
Republic are frustrated with MINUSCA due to persistent violence, their perceived 
ineffectiveness and several sexual abuse scandal implicating several peacekeepers of 
MINUSCA (CRS, 2019).According to respondents 12, 18 and 22, AMISOM, UNAMID and 
MINUSCA are not well accepted by the local populace, the host government and the warring 
parties, making it very difficult for the peacekeeping operations to operate effectively. 
Resondents 21 and 29 collaborated the views of Respondent 12, 18 and 22 by arguing that 
AMISOM in Somalia lacked adequate acceptance from the Somalia government and the local 
actors, and has no viable local partner on ground to give AMISOM the required legitimacy. 
When interviewed about acceptance of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and 
the United Nations, a respondent has this to say: 
AMISOM has legitimacy in the eyes of the government and not in the eyes of Al 
Shabaab, and it is difficult for AMISOM to gain acceptance with Al Shabaab, because 
the group (Al Shabaab) do not have the recognition of the international community 
and UNAMID in Darfur is recognised by the rebel groups, without acceptance by the 
Sudanese government. That a major challenge of the African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa, is that they do not have legitimacy and 
acceptance from the local actors. 
In attesting to the argument about the impact of legitimacy and acceptance with regards to the 
effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations,  
52 percent argued that it is a common challenge facing AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in 
Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and the arrived at the following 
argument: 
1. That the government in Somalia lacks legitimacy, and AMISOM support of the 
government affect its legitimacy and acceptance by the local populace. 
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2. That the Central African Republic has a new government in place, that manages to 
have a degree of control only in the capital (Banjui) and not in the rest of the country. 
MINUSCA acceptance is limited to the capital, and its legitimacy has become 
fractioned due to the involvement of its peacekeepers in various sex scandals. 
3. The inability of UNAMID in Darfur to do more in terms of protecting of civillians, 
creates frustration among the people and impact on its acceptance by the local 
communities. 
Collaborating the argument of the respondents that the activities of peacekeepers impact on its 
legitimacy and acceptance by the local populace, Global Security (2016) argued, that by 
December 2016, the United Nations had recieved fifty sexual abuse accusations by 
peacekeepers of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and sixteen of such sexual abuse 
occured in 2016, thirty-one in 2015, one in 2014 with two incident of sexual abuse not 
recorded with dates. The allegations, they argued involved peacekeepers from Burundi, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, Morroco, Pakistan and 
Zambia. 
Collaborating the respondents views on the impact of legitimacy and acceptance with regards 
to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa, (Bamidele, 2013) and (Wiharta,2009) argued, that the misconduct by 
peacekeepers such as in Somalia, gave the local populace the perception that peacekeepers 
were unanswerable, immume from the law, dishonest, taking advantage and maltreating the 
local populace, also sexually, and such wrong doing could put the whole peacekeeping 
operation at peril, seriously hindering its capability to bring about a productive change in host 
countries. 
Analysing AMISOM in Somalia, (Beadle 2012; Freear and De Coning 2013) argued that the 
support of the civilian population became the central prize for AMISOM, and by vigorously 
going after  the local populace support, AMISOM was able to achieve some successes, 
despite serious deficiences in its early years. This argument point to the fact that, the 
acceptance of a peacekeeping operation by the local populace can impact on its effectiveness. 
According to (Williams, 2013): 
In peace operations, maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant audiences, 
including the conflict parties, local civilians, international NGOs, and foreign 
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governments, is a crucial part of achieving success. Importantly, peacekeepers are 
never in total control of their legitimacy because it depends on the perceptions of other 
actors. The situation is made more complex, because the relevant constituencies may 
well come to different conclusions about the legitimacy of the same actor or action. 
Operations percieved as legitimate by these key audiences will be more likely to 
achieve their objectives, not least because force generation will be easier and locals 
will support the force, including by providing peacekeepers with good intelligence. 
Operation perceived as illegitimate will struggle on both counts. 
On the argument by the respondents on the local possession of the African Union and the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. Local ownership means that the African 
Union are in charge of operations, objectives of interventions, logistics and command of the 
its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations and must take full responsibilities of its 
operations;  Respondent 1 argued that: 
You can’t own without money and ownership has to do with resources. That 
ownership issues do not hold weight, since all the peacekeepers of the African Union 
and the United Nations are paid by the United Nation. 
This was collaborated by Respondent 4 and 9 who argued, that the issue of local possession of 
the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations is not an issue since 
international peace and security is the major responsibility of the United Nations. Respondent 
3, 11, 13, 16, 27 and 30 argued that, the local ownership of the African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations is very vital in conflict situations like those on the African 
continent. They are of the view that a familar face is always better and therefore local 
ownership for maintaining peace in Africa is very important. When questioned by the 
researcher on how the African Union can take ownership of the joint peacekeeping operations 
with the African Union. 72 percent of the respondents are of the view, that it is very 
problematic, because conflicts in Africa like those of Somalia, Darfur and the Central African 
Republic usually metamorphosed into different dimensions, such as political, economic, 
religious, ethnicity and often spread across borders, to neigbouring countries, requiring 
expertise exceeding the capacity of the African Union. 
The respondents argued that the African Union can only ask for ownership of its 
peacekeeping operations with the United Nations if it can fund these peacekeeping operations 
which it is technically and financially not in the full position to do. According to Respondent 
146 
 
24, the peacekeeping operations in Africa are all types of international interventions and it is 
the responsibility of the combined peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations to have a percentage of local driven. Respondent 24, using the crisis in 
Burundi in 2015 as an example, argued that “African identity did not improve legitimacy and 
only showed that African responses will not be more accepted than foreign responses. 
However, the common view among the respondents is that, the joint peacekeeping operations 
between the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African 
Republic is yet to achieve its effectiveness because local actors are not brought on board and 
as a result, local ownership by the African Union is very important. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, funding plays a vital role in peacekeeping and an 
important challenge of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operation is 
inadequate funding. The African Union also lack adequate fund for its peacekeeping 
operations and rely on its international partners which impact on its local ownership and 
control of its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations and creating unequal 
partnership  with regards to areas of planning and policy making of its peacekeeping missions 
(Deconing, 2017). With regards to legitimacy and acceptance of the African Union 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, collective 
security gave the peacekeeping operations legal intervention status and international 
legitimacy and acceptance because they were authorised by the decisions of the Security 
Council of the United Nations. According to (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018), peacekeeping 
operations will find it difficult to achieve its effectivement with the strong assent of the host 
government and this can undermine its legitmacy and credibility among the local populace. In 
Darfur, the host government in Sudan wanted an all African peacekeeping troops from 
politically friendly nations and blocked the deployment of more experienced and well 
equipped military contigents from Europe which impacted on UNAMID effectiveness in 
Darfur (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). In the case of AMISOM, it was deployed into a violatile 
security environment in Somalia and initially faced series of armed attacks from various 
warring parties, its acceptance by the host government and communities in Somalia enabled 
AMISOM to achieve some of its mandate and also increasing successes in its joint armed 
operations against Al-shabaab made possible as a result of its collective security mechanisms 
such as joint logistical, financial and technical support from the United Nations, the European 
Union and the United States giving the peacekeeping operation both acceptance and 
legitimacy (Wiklund, 2013).  
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7.4.6.  Roles of African Regional Economic Communities  
Closely related to the issue of acceptance of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union 
and the United Nations, its legitimacy and local ownership is the issue of inadequate 
harmonisation among Africa’s regional economic communities and the African Union in its 
joint peacekeeping operations with the United Nations. Based on this, this research sought to 
know the impact of the roles of African regional economic communities in this joint 
peacekeeping operation. 
83.3 percent of respondents responded that the roles of Africa’s regional economic 
communities is very important in this peacekeeping partnership. A respondent used the 
Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS), as a case study, to showcase the 
importance of Africa’s regional economic communities in peacekeeping operations in Africa, 
and argued, that ECOMOG, the West African Multilateral Armed Force formed by the 
Economic Community of West African States did a good job in Sierra-leone and in Liberia, 
before the intervention by the United Nations. That ECOMOG was successful in Liberia and 
Sierra-leone, because they had proper communication with the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity. 
According to respondent 1, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a 
regional economic institution  actively participated in the conflict in Somalia and Darfur 
where the African Union and the United Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping 
operations. Respondent 1, argued that IGAD prepared way for AMISOM in Somalia and that 
Africa’s regional economic communities can break and prepare the foundation for 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, because they 
have more knowledge about the issues. According to Deconing and Mateja (2019), the 
African Union and Africa’s sub-regional organisations have become an important part of 
global peace and security and over the years there had been three types of African-led 
peacekeeping operations which are those deployed by the African Union, the regional 
economic communities in Africa and those deployed by an ad-hoc operations. Examples are 
ECOWAS (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, ECCAS (FOMUC) in 
Central Africa from 2002-2008 and the regional cooperative ingenuity against the Lord’s 
resistance army (RCI-LRA) established in 2012. 
The common argument among the 83.3 percent of the respondents is that Africa’s regional 
economic communities have initially been involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa, 
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such as ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra-leone, but there is now a shift in focus because the 
African Union is more accepted and the involvement of regional economic communities in 
the conflict in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, created suspicion and as one 
of the respondent stated, “the involvement of IGAD in Somalia and Darfur, and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African Republic, was seen as 
the involvement of a neighbour, leading to suspicion by the host government, warring parties 
and local communities”.Respondent 7 argued, that the African Union is more political and 
Africa’s economic communities more economical in their roles, and their roles in the African 
Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central 
African Republic, complicates not only the peace agreements, but result into multiple actors 
and duplicacy of peacekeeping roles. 
A respondent also posits that the nature of conflicts in Africa include religious, socio-political 
and traditional attributes and therefore, regional economic organisations have a role to take 
part in  the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
The respondent argued that regional economic communities understand the terrain, they speak 
the same language and although they usually are not at the forefront of peacekeeping 
operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central 
African Republic, their roles makes communication easier and they are more receptive. This 
is collaborated by respondent 2, who argued that Africa’s regional economic communities are 
actively involved in peace negotiations in conflict areas like the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), that is involved in mediation roles in Somalia and Darfur. In the 
course of the interview with respondent 2, which was conducted face to face, respondent 2 
argued that; 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is the link between the 
communities in Darfur, the affected people and the donors. Because some of the 
members of its mediating team is from the same communities, they are equally acting 
as mediators between the warring groups, and their ‘behind the scene’ role is 
impacting on the peacekeeping operations of UNAMID. 
According to respondent 12, although Africa’s regional economic organisations like IGAD, 
ECOWAS and SADC are playing greater roles in response to peackeeping operations, their 
involvement in the cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa is an “uneven type of space” and lack of adequate coordination complicate 
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this uneven space. Describing the role of regional economic communities and its impact with 
regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Africa, a respondent has this to say: 
The relationship between the regional economic communities in Africa and the 
African Union in cooperative peacekeeping operations with the United Nations in 
Africa is not properly managed, such as the competition between ECOWAS and the 
African Union in Mali, and this can have a negative influence on the effectiveness of 
the AU/UN peacekeeping operations. The African actors should defend our common 
interest, there should be unity between the various African institutions, and they must 
define their priorities and engage external actors based on these priorities. 
In attesting to the argument of the respondents on the impact of the role of regional economic 
institutions in Africa on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the United 
Nations and the African Union in Africa in the literature, (Adebayo 2002; Boulden 2003; 
Coleman 2007; Howe 2001; Khadiggala 2003; Malan 2008), is of the opinion that before the 
formation of the African Union in 2002, peacekeeping operations in Africa were mainly 
carried out by sub-regional organisations in Africa, like ECOWAS and SADC, and this was 
because the regional economic communities were attempting to fill the gap created during the 
1990s when several United Nations member states refused to participate in several African 
conflicts, for example in  Sudan, Liberia, Sierra-leone, Burundi, Lesotho and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
That the United Nations absent of commitment led to the regional economic institutions in 
Africa,  into peacekeeping operations, that were not well developed and its execution not 
ready, leading to the following challenges;  
1. Peacekeeping operations by the regional economic communities were not examples of 
peacekeeping operations, but enforcement operations to assist friends in trouble, such 
as SADC in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
2. Absent of unity and harmony within regional economic institutions member states. 
3. Issues evolving around strategy, competency, deployment, management, logistics and 
provision of suitable materials. 
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4. Misconducts of peacekeepers and involvement in the exploitation of host countries 
natural resources. 
With the formation of the African Union in 2002, and with article 4 (h) of the African Union 
constitutive act, giving the African Union the right to respond when there are cases of war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in a member state and also stipulating that 
member states have the right to reestablish peace and security (AU, 2002). This set the pace 
for the involvement of sub-regional organisations  in peacekeeping operations in the era of the 
African Union. Also, the African Union formed as its major mechanism for maintaining peace 
and security in Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). According to 
(Caparini, 2016); 
The APSA as a whole has been limited in its development and operationalization in 
particularly funding constraints, but also a certain rivalry between the African Union 
headquaters and the various regional economic communities, with which it must 
coordinate, as the RECs are essential building blocks of the African Union’s 
institutional structure. The African Union relationship with the five sub-regions has 
often been sensitive, and tensions also exist within the RECs, which have seen an 
uneven progress in harmonisation of approaches and challenges in joint planning. 
Therefore, one of the challenges of the partnership of the African Union and the United 
Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa, is the controversies with regards to  the United 
Nations Security Council association with the sub-regional organisations in Africa. According 
to (Williams and Boutellis, 2014), Chapter VIII of the charter of the United Nations did not 
seperate  regional and sub-regional arrangements which created several challenges such as; 
1. Between the African Union and SADC with regards to the crisis  in Madagascar in 
2009. 
2. The Economic Community of West African States and the African Union’s 
disagreement over the political crisis  in Cote d’ Ivoire in 2011 and Mali in 2012. 
(Williams and Boutellis, 2014) argued that,  the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding signed 
by the African Union and eight regional economic communities in Africa emphasised that the 
African Union has the major responsiblity in Africa to maintain, promote peace, security and 
stability and asked the African Union to organise the efforts of the sub-regional organisations 
in Africa, to integrate their opinions in its dealings with the United Nations and keeping to the 
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principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. This they argued, 
limited the leadership role of the African Union with regards to the sub-regional organisations 
in Africa, and situations where the African Union and Africa’s sub-regional organisations 
assumed seperate policies, have tangled the collaborations in peacekeeping operations in 
Africa between the African Union and the United Nations. (Jentzsch, 2014) analysed several 
African institutions and programs on peace and security such as: 
1. The instrument for stopping, managing and resolving conflict of the Organisation of 
African Unity (1993).  
2. The African Union Peace and Security Council (2004), the Panel of the Wise (2007), 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2005). 
3. The Economic Community of West African States, instrument for preventing, 
resolving of conflict and peacekeeping (1999), ECOWAS framework on prevention of 
conflict (2008). 
4. Southern African Development Community Council for Non-Governmental 
organisations program for Governance and Security (2009). 
5. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development conflict early warning and response 
mechanism (CEWARN) for pastoral and related conflicts (2002). 
According to (Jentzsch, 2014), while the multiplication of establisments and programs to deal 
with peace and security in Africa, is welcomed, it has led to absent of coordination, structures 
duplicating and wasting of resources,  making finacing of peacekeeping operations in Africa 
complicated and unpredictable. Based on the above factors, it is clear that lack of adequate 
coordination between the African Union and the African regional economic communities 
impact on the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Africa, and proliferation of African institutions and programs on peace and 
security further complicates this cooperative peacekeeping. 
With regards to collective security and the functions of Africa Regional Economic 
Communities, the African Union Peace and Security made provisions for the formation of the 
African Standby Force (ASF) to be functional at five subregional level with the functions as 
stated by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) (Jordaan, 2017), Apart 
from the African Standby Force to be operational at the subregions, Africa Regional 
Economic communities are increasingly involved in collective security arrangements with the 
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African Union. In the Central African Republic, the Economic Community of Central African 
States had participated in peace and security in the Central African Republic from 2008 to 
2013 with MICOPAX a peacekeeping mission with support by the African peace facility 
before the African Union and the United Nations tookover the peacekeeping operations with 
MISCA and MINUSCA (Meyer, 2015). 
According to (Meyer, 2015), member states of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS) have been mediating in the conflict in the Central African Republic with 
mediation from President Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo resulting to the Libreville 
peace accord among rebel armies  in the Central African Republic and President Bozize in 
2013. Since its deployment in 2014, MINUSCA, the African Union, ECCAS and the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are jointly involved in mediation 
initiatives in the Central African Republic (Zahar and Mechoulan, 2017).  
Also the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) working under the 
institutional structure of the African Union Peace and Security council participated in the 
peace and security  initiatives in Darfur and in Somalia since 2002 (Healy, 2009). Although 
one of the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic has been lack of adequate harmonisation 
between Africa’s sub-regional institutions and the African Union, collective security 
arrangements has been actualised especially through joint diplomacy and mediation roles. 
 
7.4.7.  The activities and impact of Armed Non-State Actors 
According to (Campbell and Banner, 2000), (Rodriquez, 2010), Carey (2012) and 
(Englehart2016), activities of armed non-state groups are very diverse and that, although, the 
general ideal of non-state armed groups are insurgents and terrorists, government occasionally 
promote the establishment of armed independent movements to attack their opponents.  The 
Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur is a good evidence (Respondent 3). (Englehart, 2016) 
argued that armed non-state groups are majorly a challenge to peace and security, with their 
activities revolving around the following methods. 
1. Violation of the rights of states to protect their citizens from external abuse and 
maintain order. 
2. Frequently targeting government officials, institutions and public monuments. 
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3. Violence against local civilians in and out of conflict zones. 
According to (Cilliers and Schunemann ,2013), one of the threats to contemporary 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, is that conflict in Africa is increasingly getting fragmented 
due to the rising numbers of armed non-state actors participating in the  the conflict. This is 
collaborated by (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012) who argued that “While non-state actors 
are politically well organised and not connected to the state directly, they go after objectives 
that impact of the important interests of the state,  and they operate beyond the borders of the 
state and are a major challenge of peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Peace operations are now becoming entangled in conflicts with regional and 
transnational dimensions, with a proliferation of armed groups (both rebel and 
criminal) to which host countries are not neutral. As a result, the relationship between 
peacekeepers and host states has been more complicated, as the latter do not always 
see an interest in complying with the mandate of those that came to assist them in 
reestablishing their state and the rule of law. In this context, the number of fatalities 
has increased since 2010, with a dramatic spike in 2017, as peacekeepers have been 
ill-prepared for these challenges. (Novosseloff, 2019, p3) 
 It is against this background that 30 respondents were interviewed on the activities and 
impact of Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.According to respondent 1, the activities 
of Al-Shabaab in the conflict in Somalia has complicated the peacekeeping mandate of 
AMISOM in Somalia. That since 2007, AMISOM has been involved in fighting against Al-
Shabaab, changing its initial mandate from that of peacekeeping to peace enforcement, 
impacting on its effectiveness. This is collaborated by (Seftel, 2017) who argued that: 
Today, AMISOM is faced with the same challenge it went through during its 
formation, how to bolster a Somalian government that was weak and at the same time 
engage an escalating terrorist adversary. This daunting task, combined with a recent 
uptick in the number of Al-Shabaab orchestrated attacks, has tarnished AMISOM’s 
accomplishents over the years. 
According to (Williams, 2015), the nature of the conflict in Somalia, with the emergence of 
Al-Shabaab in 2007, has lead to AMISOM resembling a peace-enforcement operation than a 
peacekeeping operation, and with a fatality rate of over 4000 troops between 2007 and 
January 2015. Mostly to attacks by Al-Shabaab, AMISOM has become a very dicey 
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peacekeeping  operation and is probably the most deadly peacekeeping operations conducted 
in Africa. 
All the 30 respondents interviewed had a common argument, which is that the activities of 
armed non-state actors such as the Janjaweed in Darfur, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in the Central African Republic, had resulted in increased turbulent 
in the conflicts which is destablising not only the states involved by the entire regions. This 
they argued, widens the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA, and has been a 
disaster to the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations as a 
result of the following factors; 
 
1. Killing of several peacekeepers by the armed non-state actors (Militia groups) in 
Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, has not only impacted on the 
morals of the peacekeepers, but has changed their roles of engagement. 
2. Increasing proliferation of small arms and weapons. Leading to increasing violent 
crimes in the local communities in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic, 
complicating the security situations on ground. 
3. Increasing cross border crimes since the armed conflicts operate across borders and 
are transnational, resulting in increasing attacks against border communities. 
4. Increasing humanitarian crisis especially in Darfur and the Central African Republic, 
as a result of the displacement of civilians, destruction of lives and properties caused 
by attacks by the armed non-state groups on civilian populace. 
The above respondents argued has resulted in lack of adequate manpower and logistical 
contraints since the activities of these armed non-state actors has overstretched the force limits 
of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa. 
Collaborating some of the argument of the respondents in the literature, (Charnas, 2017) 
argued, using the conflict in the Central African Republic, where the African Union and the 
United Nations currently maintains over 12,500 peacekeeping troops as an example. That in 
the Central African Republic, the government of President Faustin Archange Touadera, 
maintain control over only the capital city (Banjui), while the militias, Ex Seleka and Ex Anti 
Balaka continue to clash outside the city. According to (Charnas, 2017): 
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Various other forces including illegal miners and remnants of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army have emerged in the chaos that is currently engulfing the country. These groups 
increasingly targeted civilians and organisations, rather than engage in open conflict 
with each other. MUNUSCA maintains 12,500 troops in the country, but this number 
is woefully short of the contigent that would be needed to secure populations outside 
of the capital who are at risk.. 
(Stimson, 2017), regarding the activities of armed non-state actors in the conflict in the 
Central African Republic, argued that, the activities of armed movements driven by both 
political and economic motivations, continue to threaten civilian security across the country. 
That in areas outside the capital (Banjui), where armed groups have established parallel 
administration, they detain, sentence and extort payments from persons accused of commiting 
crimes, and displacing thousands of people. This has stretched the protection resources of 
MINUSCA and limit its peacekeeping operations in several parts of the country. 
The Institute for Security Studies report on Darfur in 2015, collaborated the argument of the 
respondents with regards to the activities of armed non-state actors. The ISS (2015) report 
stated that, the conflict in Darfur has changed, becoming ever more fractured and internecine 
and violence has continually evolved. That it is vital to take into consideration the argument 
that  the conflict has outgrown Darfur itself, which poses challenges for any effective peace 
talks, and that, this prevent UNAMID from fulfilling its mandates effectively. The report 
argued that other factors such as 60 attacks and hostile incidents against UNAMID personnel 
in the 90 day reporting period, attacks against agencies of the United Nations and other 
organisations involved in humanitarian roles add up to an extremely hostile operating 
environment. 
According to (Bamidele, 2013), UNAMID in Darfur at various levels was confronted by over 
20 armed militias and many of this armed groups were unprofessional and rarely respected the 
laws and customs of war, and the armed groups occasionally established alliances that was 
confusing and changing regularly, which made it difficult for UNAMID to know who to 
support. 
Closely related to the activities of armed non-state actors and their impact on the effectiveness 
of the peacekeeping operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African Union, is the 
nature of the African Environment. 80 percent of the respondents are of the view, that the 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, were 
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stationed in areas that was isolated and its physical terrain very harsh. They argued that the 
conflict zones lack basis infrastructure and create huge logistical problems for these 
peacekeeping operations. 
Respondents 2, 5, 8,11,16,19 and 20, argued that, the vast plains and low hills of Darfur, the 
long coastlines of Somalia and thick rain forests of the Central African Republic, coupled 
with porous and open ungoverned borders made the countries ripe for exploitation by armed 
groups, and the multiplicy of armed non-state actors with various agendas, complicates the 
peacekeeping operations of the AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in 
the Central African Republic. This was collaborated by (Van Dyk and Koopman, 2012) who 
argued that:  
Sudan is a vast, sun-baked dessert land with frequent dust storms. Temperatures are 
extremely high, making the heat unbearable especially for those who are not used to it. 
The heat makes one thirsty, but the water in Sudan is subjected to contamination 
through its distribution systems. This means that the peacekeeping soldiers should 
take extra measures when it comes to drinking water, because it can affect their 
hygiene and health. The soldiers hygiene and health are not only affected by the water, 
but also by the state of hygiene in the country. 
This argument is supported by the respondents that of the opinion that absent of facilities like 
toilet and hygiene facilities and lack of infrastructure such as electricity and access road and 
the harsh terrain and unfavorable weather conditions make the peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations difficult, leading to threats to the safety of 
peacekeepers and increasing frustration. The African Union through collective security has 
been dealing with the activities of armed non-state actors in Somalia, Darfur and the Central 
African Republic. In Somalia, the European Union had supported AMISOM to tackle the 
threats of armed non-state actors through the European Union naval force operation 
ATALANTA fighting piracy in the Indian Ocean and the European Union military training 
mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia), training the somali security forces in combating Al-
shabaab and in the Central African Republic, in combating  the Lord’s Resistance Army and 
its consequences on regional peace and security, the regional cooperation initiative for the 
elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) was established by the African Union 
Commission in 2013 comprising of the African Union and a regional task force (RTF) 
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comprising of troops from Uganda, South-Sudan, the Dempcratic Republic of Congo and the 
Central African Republic with achievements against the Lords’ Resistance Army (AU, 2015). 
 
7.5.  Conclusion 
As evidenced from the analysis of the data obtained from the respondents, this chapter finds 
out that seven factors contributed significantly on  the effectiveness of the peacekeeping 
operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African Union.The seven factors are 
closely related and are the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. The Seven 
factors include the funding of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations  in Somalia, Darfur, and the Central African Union, mandates that is clear and 
can be achieved and the impact of the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine, the influence of 
external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict, the impact of the consent of the 
host government/warring parties and peace accord, the issue of legitimacy, acceptance and 
local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Africa, the roles of Africa’s regional economic communities and coordination between the 
RECs and the African Union in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the activities and 
impact of armed non-state actors on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
This chapter finds out that funding is a major determinant of any peacekeeping operations. 
This chapter maintains that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa are not adequately funded and the African Union lack the financial 
capabilities to adequately fund its peacekeeping operations. The African Union thus rely on 
the United Nations and its partners like the European Union for funding. This the chapter 
finds out not only impact on its effectiveness, but denies the African Union control over the 
joint peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
This chapter finds out that AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA, examples of cooperative 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations, lack a mandate that is 
clear and can be achieved, as some of its mandates are not within the reach of the capabilities 
of this peacekeeping operations. Also the United Nations doctrines of impartiality, consent of 
the parties to the conflict, and the non-use of force except in self-defence of the mandate, 
cannot be applicable to peacekeeping operations in Africa, as a result of the dimension of the 
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conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, this chapter finds out that the conflict in Somalia, Darfur and 
the Central African Republic has transformed into a regional conflict with the spread of the 
conflict from the root country to neiughbouring countries, leading to the influx of external 
actors driven by economic and political interest, complicating the peacekeeping operations. 
This chapter finds out that the host government giving its consent and majority of the warring 
party before and after deployment is vital to the success of a peacekeeping operations. 
Acceptance by the local communities and populace is also a strong determinant of the success 
of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa and the 
a major argument of the respondents, is that, a peace accord will be difficult for the African 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to be effective and 
without a peace accord as evident in Somalia and Darfur, there is no peace to keep. 
This chapter finds out that legitimacy of the United Nations and the African Union 
peacekeeping operations in the eyes of the people can impact on its effectiveness and the 
activities of its peacekeepers can undermine its peacekeeping operations, as seen in the 
Central African Republic, where peacekeepers on MINUSCA are involved in sexual abuses. 
This chapter also established that while local possession of the African Union and the United 
Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa can impact on its effectiveness and give it more 
acceptance among the residents, the African Union can only claim ownership of peacekeeping 
operations with the United Nations if it can fully fund the peacekeeping operations. 
This chapter finds out that lack of coordination between the African Union ands the Africa’s 
regional economic communities involved in the conflicts lead to multiple peacekeeping roles 
and peace and create suspicion among the RECs and the African Union and impacting on the 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
This chapter finds out that the activites of armed non-state actors also complicates the 
peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The activites 
of armed non-state actors who operate across the porous and open borders have overstretched 
the capabilities of the peacekeeping operations, leading to logistical and troops constraints. 
The nature of the African environment, where peacekeeprs are deployed into harsh terrains 
with unfavorable weather conditions and lack of basic facilities has resulted to frustration of 
peacekeepers and ill health. This chapter also conclude that while collective security dealt 
with some of the themes such as the clear and achieveable mandate, the issues of legitimacy, 
acceptance and local ownership, roles of Africa Regional Economic Communities and the 
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activities and impact of armed non-state actors. It failed to deal with the issues of the 
influence of external actors and the spread of the conflict across borders and the impact of the 
consent of the opposing parties and armed groups, with the issues of funding, while collective 
security dealt with it, it created unequal partnership and impacted on the African Union local 
ownership and control of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa. 
During the course of the literature review, certain gaps were identified which were filled in 
the course of this dissertation. The gaps identified in chapter 3 has shown that the challenges 
of peacekeeping missions in Africa are not restricted to just lack of adequate funding, lack of 
capacity by the African Union and logistical constraints but to factors such as the complex 
nature of the African environment, activities of armed non-state actors, impact of external 
actors, the role of consent, legitimacy, peacekeeping doctrine and peace agreement. The 
contribution of these to the body of knowledge is the exposing of new areas for more research 
on cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations.  














FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0.      Introduction 
This chapter end the arguments by signifying the vital findings of this dissertation while 
giving recommendations on effective peacekeeping partnership of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Africa. This chapter is therefore  divided into four main segments namely, 
Findings, Contributions to knowledge, Recommendations and Conclusions 
8.1. The Findings 
Primary and secondary sources of data collected was used in the course of this dissertation to 
examine the collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa.. As set out in Chapter one (1), the three major aims of the thesis are to: 
1. Examine the peacekeeping collaboration of the United Nations and the African Union  
in Africa. 
2. Examine the challenges confronting the African Union and the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations in Africa with Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central 
African Republic as case study 
3. Identify lessons for future cooperative interventions. 
Chapter three achieved the fulfillment of the first major objectives where after an analysis of 
the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Europe and Asia, and that of the African 
Union peacekeeping operations in Africa, the United Nations and the African Union 
collaboration on peacekeeping operations in Africa was examined. The focus here was on the 
Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union and its components such as the Peace 
and Security Council, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, the Panel 
of the Wise and the African Union Peace Fund. Chapter three reviewed literature of 
authorities in the field of Peace and Security to examine this peacekeeping collaboration of 
the African Union and the United Nations. The general view is that, there is a deepening 
relationship between the African Union and the United Nations in their effortsto respond 
collectively to Africa’s security challenges through collaborative multidimensional 




The second  (2) objective which is aimed at examining the challenges facing the African 
Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations using Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the 
Central African Republic as case study was realised in chapter seven, entitled Qualitative 
Data Analysis and Findings. This chapter engages the use of interviews with experts on 
peacekeeping and Africa peace and security, including some secondary sources to discuss the 
achievements, challenges and expectations of the peacekeeping operations of the African 
Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. 
The ensuing sub-sections discussed the findings of the first and second objectives as discussed 
in chapters three and seven. 
8.1.1. Funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 
Africa 
The basic argument in chapter three is that while the African Union is an significant means of 
political authority for dealing with threats to peace and security in Africa, inadequate 
financies impact on its decisive action to single handly resolve these challenges. Notably, 
many respondents argued that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the 
United Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic are under-
funded and inadequate funding constitute a significant factor impacting on the effectiveness 
of these peacekeeping operations. 
This the respondents argued created an unequal collaboration between the African Union and 
the United Nation in peacekeeping operations in Africa and resulted to the African Union lack 
of control over the peacekeeping operations. The lack of adequate funding of the African 
Union peacekeeping operations  led to the development of two basic arguments, which are: 
a. Local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations in Africa. 
b. Issues relating to Peacekeeping doctrines and mandates. 
 
 
8.1.2.  Local Ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations in Africa 
One of the major basic arguments in this thesis is that local ownership of the African Union 
and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is very important in conflict 
situations like those on the African continent. The respondents interviewed argued that a 
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familiar face is always better and therefore local ownership for keeping peace in Africa is 
very important. 
It is argued that for local ownership of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and 
the United Nations to be possible, the African Union must fully establish its peace and 
security architecture. Chapter 3 categorised five components of the African Union which are, 
the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel 
of the Wise (POW), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Peace Fund (PF) as follow: 
This thesis argue that local ownership of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union 
and the United Nations in Africa can only be actualised if the units of the African Union 
Peace and Security Architecture can be fully effective and Africa can adequately fund its 
peacekeeping operations. 
8.1.3. Peacekeeping Doctrines and Mandates 
Chapter seven reviewed the peacekeeping doctrines of the United Nations such as, the host 
country giving its consent, impartiality and opposing parties involved in the conflict must be 
treated equally and no discrimination and force must only be used for the purpose of self 
defence and how it applies to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the 
African Union in Africa. Many of the respondents interviewed are of the opinion that the 
United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine make the African Union incapable of deploying an 
effective peacekeeping operation in a situation like Somalia. The basic argument in chapter 
seven is that the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines creates problems for peacekeeping 
operations in Africa and that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Africa need to have their own doctrines of peacekeeping to improve on the 
effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. 
As argued in chapter seven with regards to mandates of the African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa, mandate plays a vital part in the effectiveness of 
any peacekeeping operation and before a peacekeeping operation is given its mandate and 
deployed, the following factors should be considered; The origin of the conflict, the 
dimension of the conflict such as terrorism, conflict among states and within the boundaries of 
a state and the actors involved and the nature of the conflict and the environment. 
At the backgrounds, this thesis have argued that focus on peacekeeping collaboration between 
the African Union and the United Nations have mainly been financial, military and 
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bureaucratic aspect, but the root causes of the conflict in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia and the 
Central African Republic such as poverty, underdevelopment, weak and failed states and 
crisis of development were not addressed. 
For cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to be 
effective, there is the need for the origin of the conflict to be properly addressed and 
mechanisms put in place to resolve these causes. The next section will explore the 
achievements, other challenges and effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations of the 
African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 
8.2. Exploring the achievements, other challenges and effectiveness of the 
African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa 
Chapter seven engaged the Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United 
Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic to investigate the 
achievements, challenges and effectiveness of the peacekeeping collaboration between the 
African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The following are some of the achievements 
and challenges of the Peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in 
Africa.  
8.2.3. The influence of External actors 
The conflict in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic are conflicts that 
have spread across borders to become a regional conflicts and as a result led to the 
intervention and involvement of neighbouring countries in the conflict. Although the 
involvement of external actors has contradicted the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, 
Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic, stretching the mandates of the peacekeeping 
operations, it has also provided the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic with the much 
needed logistical support and funding. 
Ethiopia intervention in Somalia led to the solidification of the process of peace and state 
building,  and encouraged regional security cooperation. This has also created complications 
in peacekeeping operations as a result of proliferation of peacekeeping operations. 
8.2.4. The activities and impact of Armed Non-State Actors in the conflict 
in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic 
The Janjaweed in Darfur, Al-Shabaad in Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army and the various 
ethnic and religious armed groups in the Central African Republic like the Seleka and the 
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anti-Balaka, continue to constitute a challenge to peace and security and contradicts the 
peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the 
Central African Republic. Their activities evolved around the following methods: 
• Violation of the independent duties of state to maintain order and safeguard its citizens 
from external abuse. 
• Frequently targeting government officials, institutions and public monuments. 
• Violence against local civilians in and out of conflict zones. 
The argument in chapter seven is that conflict in Africa is increasingly getting fragmented due 
to the rising numbers of armed non-state actors involved in the conflict and poses a major 
challenge to contemporary peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
 
8.2.5. The Nature of the African Environment   
This is closely connected to the activities of armed non state actors and their impact on the 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the Unitedc Nations and the African Union  in 
Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, as a result of large and porous borders, a 
complex climate and transnational criminal networks. The African Union and the United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations deployed in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African 
Republic are operating in areas that are isolated, with a physical landscape that is harsh and 
absent of access to infrastructure, leading to significant problems logistically. 
8.3. Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has added to the spread of the knowledge in peacekeeping operations, particularly 
in the effectiveness of institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations.  These 
contributions are as follow: 
1. Peacekeeping operations must have political acceptance, acceptance by the local 
population and consent of the host government in terms of its mandate and its 
composition. 
2. While it is suitable to make sure that peacekeeping operations mandate is made clear, 
it is not absolute because the particular conditions  on ground in the conflict zones 
determines the scope of its mandate. 
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3. AMISOM, UNAMID AND MINUSCA experience in peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic highlighted the importance of 
availability of resources especially the moral of the troops and the effectiveness of the 
mission.  
8.4. Conclusion 
The collaboration on peacekeeping operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African 
Union have revealed several of the contemporary challenges  of peacekeeping operations 
especially in Africa and in an intra-state conflict situation. This study gave a representation 
about what can take place when a peacekeeping force confronts armed non state actors in its 
peacekeeping operations. 
This study reviewed also, the nature of the peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union 
and the United Nations in Africa, by examining the experience of AMISOM in Somalia, 
UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. It also examined the 
challenges encountered by AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions, 
which gave the basis for arriving at some some conclusions. AMISOM, UNAMID and 
MINUSCA stationed in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, raised some 
important questions about its legitimacy, acceptance, funding and successfulness. 
In July 2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transitioned into the African 
Union and structured to react to conflicts on the continent of Africa. And since 2002, peace 
and security has been the central components and attempted to deal with the several violents 
conflicts on the continent with solutions arrived at from the African continent to respond to 
problems of Africa, through the formation of the Peace and Security Architecture of the 
African Union (APSA) and its components which are the African Union Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), with the authority to respond in situations where human rights are grossly 
abused and government is changed unconstitutionally, a Panel of the Wise, to enhance the 
objectives of the Peace and Security Council  and to promote high level mediation efforts.  
An African Standby Force (ASF), developed around five sub-regional brigades, which are 
Southern, East, West and North Africa, planned to be stationed within thirty (30) days in 




Despite the formation of the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, the 
African Union faces several challenges in its peacekeeping efforts in areas such as absent of 
organisational capacity to develop policy, plan and manage peace operations and also 
financial constraints to devote to the goals of its Peace and Security Architecture and have 
seen collaboration in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations as one of the ways to 
address these problems. 
Recent experience in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic has underscored the 
need to pursue the African Union Peace and Security Architecture. The interventions by the 
African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic 
resulted to several opinions on the legitimacy, acceptance, and ownership of the peacekeeping 
operations, mandate, funding and the importance of a peace agreement.  
The conflicts also have a regional dimension due to the spread of the conflict from the host 
country to bordering countries because of the strategic nature of the African environment such 
as large and porous borders and the involvement of transnational armed non-state actors, 
leading to the involvement of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities like the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) and their coordination with the African Union, create the 
possibility of such regional arrangement that will serve as a condition for a novel arrangement 
in Africa of collective security, and an African Centred solutions to a peaceful atmosphere in 
Africa. This coordination between the African Union and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities reduced hostilities and actrocities in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African 
Republic. 
Finally, the peacekeeping mandates of the African Union and the United Nations  should 
allow for enough flexibility and dynamism to take into consideration the nature and 
dimension of the crisis and strategic classification of the environment. In strengthening the 
cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union, there is 
the need for the adoption of peacekeeping doctrines suitable to the nature and dimension of 





8.5. Recommendations for Effective Peacekeeping Cooperation between the 
African Union and the United Nations in Africa 
This thesis gives recommendations on policies with  implications for cooperative 
peacekeeping operations between the United Nations, African Union and other regional 
organisations. This thesis suggest these policy course of actions for a peacekeeping operation 
that will be more effective and efficient; 
1. Peacekeeping mandates should be properly stated out as possible before deployment. 
The vision, concept, doctrine and procedures should not be restricted to only 
peacekeeping but also concentrate on peace-support operations. Doctrines and 
mandates of the peacekeeping operations should consider issues such as the origins of 
the crisis, nature and dimension of the conflict with emphasis on human security. 
The concept of the operations should be clearly stated before deployment, with 
adequate knowledge and information about the operational environment. The African 
Union and the United Nations should make sure there is a peace agreement and must 
avoid deploying a peacekeeping operations where there is no peace to keep. A greater 
consensus should be sought from the host countries and warring parties and 
neighbouring countries before deployment with a broader mandate through the 
problems identified with the following recommendations. 
• Develop a more robust civil/military relations 
• Need to engage with local leaders in other to be able to operate 
• More engagement with the civil societies such as Oxfam, playing major roles in 
conflict zones such as providing reliefs and medicals. They are usually advocacy 
groups and they can help channel the discussions along the conflict. 
 
2. The United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping operations must develop a 
multifunctional force. The African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic consists mainly of 
infantry units. There should be a balance of both military and civilian component. The 
cooperative peacekeeping operations should include the following: 
• Humanitarian Affairs specialists 
• Officers for Civil Affairs 
• Personnels involved in Administration and logistics 
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• Political Affairs officers, since peacekeeping operations are also political tools. 
Political affairs officers will provide responses to policy makers and political solutions 
to the conflict 
• Financial Managers 
 
3. African Union member states should make haste to establish the African Standby 
Force and make it operational. This will provide the African Union the much needed 
troops and logistical requirements to effectively conduct a successful peacekeeping 
operation. The African Standby Force should be trained in specific areas of expertise 
of peacekeeping operations. 
 
4. Ensure that peacekeepers of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations fully abide by international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to 
the protection of civilians and civilian objects. In this regard, all soldiers and officers 
to be deployed by the African Union and the United Nations should be provided with 
appropriate training in international human rights and humanitarian law before 
deployment. A discipline unit should be set up to oversee the imposition of military 
discipline with the various African Union and United Nations peacekeeping forces and 
to address violations of international humanitarian law and other serious abuses. 
 
5. The Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations should go 
along with African traditional peace and conflict resolution mechanism. The 
involvement of local leaders is very important to play localised roles in the various 
communities. They can help in logistical issues, such as taking positions against the 
government or rebel groups and focusing on societal imbalance and injustices in the 
conflict zones. Since the nature and dimension of conflicts in Africa has religious and 
ethnical attributes, traditional institutions therefore have a major duty to play in the 
resolution of conflict. They understand the terrain, they might not be at the front of 
peacekeeping, but in the general plan, it is important to include them because it helps 
in making communication easier. They are also more receptive and there it is very 
important to incorporate traditional institutions and religious leaders in the localities of 
the peacekeeping operations. They can also act as advisory roles to the peacekeeping 





6. Increased collaboration and coordination amongst the African Union, the United 
Nations and Africa’s regional economic institutions. Africa’s Regional Economic 
institutions have more knowledge about the issues within the regions and they can 
break and prepare the foundation for peacekeeping operations of the African union 
and the United Nations in Africa. They are the region most affected by the conflict and 
stronger cooperation and effective coordination between them can prepare the way for 
deployment of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Africa.  The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) prepared the way 
for AMISOM in Somalia and the Economic Communities of West African State 
(ECOWAS) for the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA). Africa’s Regional Economic Communities are the pillars of the African 
Union Peace and Security Architecture and if the frosty partnership between the 
African Union and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities is not resolved, the 
African Standby Force cannot be fully functional. 
7. Establishment of a comprehensive public awareness unit. 
From the inception of peacekeeping operations of the African Union and United 
Nations must establish a comprehensive and integrated public awareness strategy by 
providing details with regards to the mission structures, aims and objectives, 
dimension and limitations of the mandate, political, social and the host country 
political, social and other significant circumstances. The peacekeeping mission public 
awareness should evolved around the following audiences; 
• Global Crowd 
• The warring groups 
• The host communities and population 
• The civil societies and community medias 
Successful correspondence and association with the mentioned audiences is vital for the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. 
8. Funding of Peace and Security in Africa 
As seen with UNAMID in Darfur, AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in the 
Central African Republic, the African Union Peace and Security Architecture are 
hindered due to inadequate funding. The African Union Peace Fund is under-
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resourced and limits the effectiveness of African centred solutions on serene 
atmosphere in Africa. The African Union must find alternative sources of funding and 
be less dependent on its foreign partners, the African Union must find avenues through 
which progress towards self sustainability can be made. The Olusegun Obasanjo 
report on alternative sources of funding for the African Union must be fully effective. 
The Olusegun Obasanjo report, proposed a US $2 hotel levy and US $10 airfare levy 
and it also recommended that African Union member states should increase their 
general contributions to the African Union with a new recipe for dividing the  pay 
load, based on four assumptions of fairness, predictability, flexibility and compliance. 
According to (Fabricius, 2015), the African Union has always been affected by a huge 
acceptability space between its huge ambitions and its limited capacity and its attempt 
at more financial freedom is in principle a significant step in blocking that space. 
9. Poor Governance and Political instability is one of the root causes of the various 
conflicts in the Central African Republic, Darfur and in Somalia. Therefore, the 
African Union through its developmental arm, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) with emphasis on good governance and economic 
development must be fully utilised. The Central African Republic has abundant 
deposit of mineral and biological wealth controlled by armed groups which with good 
governance could turn around the country positively. The African Union must put in 
place instruments to make sure that strategies and actions of the countries involved  
confirm to the agreed values in the following key focus areas which are democratic 
practices and administration of good leadership and socio-economic advancement.  
The goal of the African Union Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is to put Africa on 
the road to good governance which is also one of the core objectives of NEPAD. 
NEPAD strongly affirm the necessity for Africa to become masters of its own fate and 
occupy a key position in global politics and economy. Good governance will lead to 
sustainable development which is vital for Peace and Security in Africa and its 
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Appendix 2: Template of Informed Consent 
 
 
Dear Participant,  
 
My name is Fafore Olumide Adetokunbo, a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa. I write to kindly request your inputs on a doctoral project titled 
‘Cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace Keeping 
Operations in Africa’. The project is developed against the backdrop that despite the 
establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture and its components, the 
African Union is limited in its peacekeeping operations due to lack of institutional capacity to 
develop policy, plan and manage peacekeeping operations and also financial constraints to 
devote to the goals of its Peace and Security Architecture and have seen cooperation with the 
United Nations as one of the ways to address these problems. Informed by the foregoing 
concern, the project seeks to examine this peacekeeping cooperation and challenges and make 
recommendations for future effective cooperation in peacekeeping operations.  
 
I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the 
subject matter. Please note that:  
 
a. The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.  
 
b. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to 
participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking 
such an action.  
 
c. Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor 
identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.  
 
d. The interview will take about 15 minutes.  
 
e. The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-
protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line 
with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning. If you agree to 
participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be 
provided for signatures).  
 
I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard 
College Campus, Durban. Email: olumide2004@hotmail.com; Cell: 0737177790 My 
supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-
Natal. Contact details: email: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: +27824038876.  
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as 
follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: 
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587.  
 
Thank you for your contribution to this research.  
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Appendix: 3 Template of Informed Consent Declaration 
 
I,   ………………………………………………………………………………………….                                                                                                       
(Full names of participant), hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I 
understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate. 
 
I consent /(do not consent) to have this interview recorded (if applicable). 
 
 
















Appendix 4: Interview Instrument 
Section A: Demographic Data: 
1. Institution Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2. Gender.------------------------------------ 
3. Please indicate the length of your experience in the field of peacekeeping in Africa.-------------
------------------------------------------ 
4. Please indicate your highest qualification. ------------------------------------ 
5. Present position in your institution. --------------------------------------------------- 
 
Section B: Questions to be asked: 
1. Please tell us briefly who are you? 
 
2. What do you think peacekeeping is? What is it suppose to do? How? 
 
3. What are your perceptions about peacekeeping operations in Africa? 
 
4. What should be the focus of the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa? 
 
5. And who is in the best position to carryout effective peacekeeping operations in Africa? 
 
6. Briefly assess AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central 
African Republic. 
 
7. And, what are the limitations and challenges if any facing AMISOM, UNAMID and 
MINUSCA? 
 
8. How important is the legitimacy and acceptance of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA by 
the people of Somalia, Darfur and CAR to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions? 
Briefly explain. 
 
9. What are the barriers or challenges to the acceptance and legitimacy issues of AMISOM, 
UNAMID and MINUSCA? 
 
10. Should the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Africa make space for local 
ownership of the peacekeeping operations? Is this very important? And why? 
 
11. How important is the consent of the warring parties/armed groups involved in the crisis in 
Somalia, Darfur and CAR to the effectiveness of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA? 
Briefly explain. 
 
12. Should Regional Economic Commissions such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC play more 
prominent roles in peacekeeping operations in Africa? What kind of roles and how? 
 
13. In other continents of the world we see the civil societies play prominent roles in 
peacekeeping, can that be reciprocated in Africa? What roles can they play in the 




14. How important is gender equality to peacekeeping operations in Africa? 
 
15. What roles can women play in the cooperation between the AU and UN on peacekeeping 
operations in Africa? 
 
16. Considering the roles played by tribal and religious leaders in the crisis in Somalia, Darfur and 
CAR. Should African traditional institutions such as those of the Chieftains, age groups and 
religious institutions be actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa? What 
peacekeeping roles can they play and how important is such roles to peace in Africa? 
 
17. How important is negotiation and diplomacy to effective peacekeeping operations in Africa? 
And why? 
 
18. Are the UN peacekeeping doctrine of unbiased, impartial, non-partisan and the non use of 
force except for self defence applicable in the situation in Somalia, Darfur and CAR? And 
why? 
 
19. What are the right strategies, doctrine and mechanisms for effective peace keeping operations 
in Africa? 
 
20. What are your concerns about the influence of external actors such as France and the United 
Nations to the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in 
CAR? 
 
21. What is the impact of foreign imposition of solutions and western cultural norms in Somalia, 
Darfur and the Central African Republic on the peacekeeping operations in these countries 
with regards to their cultural diversity, socio-economic and political environment? 
 
22. What military, police and civilian capacity is required to make AMISOM, UNAMID and 
MINUSCA more effective? 
 
23. How important are peace agreement to peacekeeping operations in Africa? And if important, 
how? 
 
24. Is there peace to keep in Darfur, Somalia and CAR due to the fact that AMISOM and 
UNAMID have been in operation since 2007 and MINUSCA since 2012? 
 
25. In what ways can the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Africa be improved 
for future effective cooperative interventions in Africa? 
 
 
